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Abstract 
International development projects represent a fertile ground for corporate corruption. This 
form of corruption emanating from the supply-side has become pervasive and entrenched 
in the corporate world. In recent years, an increasing number of corporates have been 
sanctioned by multilateral development banks for their participation in corruption schemes. 
While international development banks seek to support governments in their development 
agenda, corporate corruption can significantly undermine such action. This is a big 
challenge for donors in their quest of increasing investment in development. 
The primary purpose of this research is to identify the main determinants that encourage 
corporate corruption in development projects financed by multilateral development banks. 
The research questions explore the challenges facing corporates; the effectiveness of 
multilateral development banks’ sanction regime; the definition of project success in 
relation to such projects and how corporate corruption is instigated and facilitated by 
corporates. This research uses a mixed method approach, comprising: survey, case study, 
interview and content analysis.  
This study identifies tension between the corporate pecuniary objectives and the compliance 
landscape of multilateral banks. Based on the empirical findings, corporate corruption is 
established to be a symptom of ‘corporate brain disorder’ - which needs to be addressed 
from the supply-side. This research contributes to knowledge on corporate corruption by 
identifying the determinants of corporate corruption namely; minimising of competition; 
maximising of profit; institutional blindness, and avoiding uncertainty. In light of the 
increasing compliance landscape, it is recommended that multinational corporations 
mitigate corruption risks based on the proposed Narrainen’s Project Governance 
Framework. It is also argued that the definition of project success needs to be extended so 
that the corporate objectives are aligned with the compliance requirements. 
  
vi 
This research offers insights to policy makers in addressing corporate corruption risk. The 
findings will contribute to guiding donor agencies in their anti-corruption strategies with 
more focus on the supply-side. There are significant research opportunities associated with 
this, including further exploration of corporate dynamics and top management perspectives. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
‘Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; 
rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those 
with the bargaining power to create new rules.’ - Douglas. C. North (1994). 
 
This chapter begins with an overview of the crucial role multilateral development banks1 
(MDBs) play in supporting international development projects. It explores the 
vulnerabilities of corruption in such projects. It then elaborates on the context of existing 
research and the complex landscape surrounding corporate corruption. This chapter then 
looks at the aims of the research and identifies the research questions.  
With corporate corruption becoming pervasive and difficult to deal with (Berg, Jiang and 
Lin, 2012), donors are very much concerned about its impact on aid effectiveness. There is 
no longer a question of shame or social condemnation (Moriconi, 2018) in the practices of 
these firms. This research provides a macro perspective analysis of corporates through the 
lens of the supply-side. The main research interest is to enhance understanding surrounding 
the determinants or situational factors in explaining the propensities of these corporates to 
instigate or facilitate corporate corruption in development projects. It concludes with 
consideration for reflective practice and a description of the thesis structure. 
                                                 
1 Multilateral Development Banks are international financial institutions that channel funds from multiple 
donors to countries with a development agenda. 
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1.1 The role of MDBs in developmental projects 
Development projects financed by MDBs are recognised to play a crucial role in the social-
economic development process of recipient countries (Gurria and Volcker, 2000; World 
Bank, 2017; UN, 2017). Aid disbursed by these MDBs is normally based on the socio-
political context of the recipient countries with the primary objective of improving the 
country’s wealth, ensuring development, and the eradication of poverty. The aid can be 
either in the form of grants or loans. While the implementation of these MDB-financed 
projects rests with recipient governments, their agencies and firms are contracted out to 
deliver these development projects.  
The last decades have seen a rise in the number of development projects financed by MDBs 
in their quest to address infrastructural gaps worldwide. In 2017, an accumulated $ 67 billion 
had been disbursed by these MDBs for financing infrastructural development projects 
worldwide (UN, 2018a). This amount is expected to significantly increase in the coming 
years. As per the Article of Agreements establishing these respective MDBs, they are 
required to ensure that funds are used for their intended purposes. Therefore, these MDBs 
have a responsibility to ensure that no funds are wasted in corruption or other malpractices 
– hence the setting-up of an investigative body within these MDBs in ensuring integrity of 
these financed projects.  
1.2 The challenges of corruption in development projects  
With MDBs investing heavily on development projects worldwide, unfortunately, such a 
huge amount of aid has the propensity to attract corruption - a phenomenon which Báger 
(2011) refers to as ‘development corruption’. Indeed, in such projects, contractors face many 
difficulties in managing corruption risks arising due to complex interfaces with the 
executing agencies (Osipova and Eriksson, 2013), along with varieties of stakeholders 
(Olander and Landin, 2005). The challenges facing these MDBs are indeed a matter of 
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concern as corruption has evolved into a more complex socio-political phenomenon (Gurria 
and Volcker, 2001). Furthermore, the international prevalence of corruption, coupled with 
continued globalisation, increases the likelihood that multinational firms will encounter 
government rent-seeking2. This has led scholars to claim that the ability to deal with corrupt 
practices is an important capability of firms (Kwok and Tadesse, 2006; Oliver and 
Holzinger, 2008; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Yet, few studies have considered the role of the 
private sector in facilitating corruption (Hellman et al., 2003; You and Khagram, 2005). 
Indeed, corruption represents a major risk in international development projects (Diallo and 
Thuillier, 2010; Mukini and Price, 2014; Leiderer, 2012), as it has the potential to seriously 
compromise desired development outcomes (Kramer, 2007; U4, 2016). Several opinion 
polls worldwide have shown that there is widespread public concern that some foreign 
development assistance from donors is wasted due to corruption (World Bank, 2003; 
KPMG, 2015; TI, 2017). While these projects greatly assist countries in meeting their 
development goals, unfortunately, studies reveal that they may also be lightning rods for 
corruption (World Bank, 2009; ADB, 2017; AfDB, 2018). Unfortunately, the risks of 
corruption and malpractices are more prevalent in these types of projects given their 
complexities and uncertainties (Khang and Moe, 2008; Guo et al., 2014). Moreover, it can 
increase the cost of doing business (Tekin-Konu, 2006). This can be a serious issue as these 
MDBs are mobilizing funds to address infrastructural gaps at country-level. 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Defined as ‘the fact or practice of manipulating public policy or economic conditions as a strategy for 
increasing profits’ or in the case of governments, government revenue.  
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1.2.1 Why is corruption a problem in development projects? 
According to the World Bank (2015), corruption can increase the cost of projects by 20% 
to 25%. Undoubtedly, the cost of corruption in international development projects is 
significant (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; World Bank, 2015). With the sanctioning of 
prominent corporations such as Siemens, Alstom, and SNC Lanvalin by MDBs in recent 
years, it is imperative to address the issue of corruption from the supply-side. Corruption, 
in any of its forms, is detrimental to the effectiveness of humanitarian aid. Isopi and 
Mattesini (2008) examine the relationship between aid and corruption. According to them, 
corruption depends upon the ‘political and institutional environment of the recipient 
country’, and more hazards arising from corrupt bureaucracies, which divert aid from its 
intended source. 
Many researchers have expressed concerns over the effectiveness of international aid as the 
success of aid projects is considered to be below the acceptable level in terms of quality and 
standards of works (Gould and Amaro-Reyes, 1983; United Nations, 1990; Mauro, 1995; 
Francis et al., 2008). Francis et al. (2008) associated corruption with its detrimental impact 
to the effectiveness of aid, citing its high propensity to divert funding from its intended 
purpose. According to estimates, it is more than 5% of global GDP ($2.6 trillion) flows to 
corruption each year with over $1 trillion paid in bribes (WEF, 2009). Studies on corruption 
confirm its destructive and negative effect on the cultural, political and economic fabric of 
society at the national level (Akindele, 2005; Kunicova, 2006; Sikka, 2008). It is in fact, 
considered as an international problem that may has a negative impact on development and 
which can be a serious threat in the development process of aid-recipient countries (World 
Bank, 1997). Researchers further argue that corruption can seriously affect development 
projects as they may fail to be completed or, if completed, may not be of the required quality 
and standards (Sikka, 2008). For instance, Gyimah-Brempong (2002), observed that in 
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African countries, which are large recipients of external aid and with high levels of 
corruption, the risk of aid siphoned into private wealth, thus retarding development. This is 
a real problem. The harmful effect of corruption is incompatible with sustainable 
development (Issa and Alleyne, 2018). 
1.2.2 The challenge of MDBs in mitigating corruption risks 
Addressing corruption for promoting development effectiveness and enhancing governance 
has been one of the major priorities of many donors and development partners (UNDP, 
2014). Corporate corruption exists in different forms. In international business (IB), 
corruption often takes the form of bribery. It is also termed ‘foreign bribery’ as these MNCs 
tend to bribery in different jurisdictions. Foreign bribery is, indeed a common and 
widespread means for MNCs to win contracts abroad and to unduly influence policy-making 
(Hellman et al., 2003). According to Hock (2018), third parties who become involved in the 
corrupt schemes, complicate this type of foreign bribery. There is much speculation as to 
why firms engage in corporate corruption and how to curb it. However, management 
researchers have carried out relatively little theoretical or empirical work on corporate 
corruption and no studies have investigated situational factors contributing to corporate 
corruption in developmental projects.  
With few comprehensive theories on corporate corruption, it is difficult for researchers to 
identify conditions that lead to corporate corruption. Additionally, a common assumption in 
the literature on corporate illegality has been that individuals are the perpetrators of the 
offences (Hellman, 2017). With recent corporate scandals of firms involved in MDB-
financed projects, it is imperative to understand the new frontier of anti-corruption research. 
Perhaps the definition of corruption as advocated by MDBs, which define it as ‘using public 
office for private gain’ (Bhargava, 2015) is the major reason why these multilateral donors 
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have focused predominately on the demand-side of corruption. Against this backdrop, there 
is need for thorough research in shaping anti-corruption discourse and policy prescription. 
With more aid flowing to countries with weak governance structures, containing the risks 
of corruption is becoming an ongoing battle for MDBs. In light of their development agenda, 
the MDBs have a responsibility to ensure that funds are not squandered or diverted. 
1.3 The duality of corruption 
A body of literature has classified corruption as a public sector problem (Rose-Ackerman, 
1996; World Bank, 1997). However, some studies have also argued that corrupt practices 
are a major feature of private sector activities (Harsh, 1993; Bakre, 2007; Sikka, 2008; 
Otusanya, 2010). For corporate corruption to occur there needs to be both a receiver and a 
supplier. In these development projects, the demand-side deals with corrupt institutions and 
public officials who, for instance, demand bribes to conduct business transactions, whereas 
the supply-side deals with those who instigate or facilitate the corrupt practices and, thus, 
perpetuate a corrupt system. Government interventions in private organisations is a major 
cause of corruption (Donahue, 1989; Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1991; Lambsdorff, 2006).  
In the dominant IB domain, the common assumption is that governments are instigators of 
corruption to which multinational corporations (MNCs) may have to comply (Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2002; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck and Eden, 2005; Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh and 
Eden, 2006; Brouthers, Yan and McNicol, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Petrou and Thanos, 
2014). For this reason, corruption is treated as exogenous to the MNCs. It is viewed more 
as a feature of the host country environment in which the MNCs’ decision makers are faced 
with the dilemma between risks and opportunities. Admittedly, much of the focus is of the 
impact of host country corruption on the MNCs, with the only dimension of corruption 
examined being bribes or kickbacks demanded by public officials.  
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There has been much debate on this orthodox treatment of corruption, which overlooks the 
‘supply-side’ of the corruption scheme committed for the benefit of the corporate. While it 
is axiomatic, for a corrupt act to occur there should be both the ‘corrupt’, representing the 
demand-side, and the ‘corruptor’, representing the supply-side. In fact, recent studies agree 
that the supply-side - residing in large corporations and multinationals - may play a 
significant role in instigating and facilitating large scale corruption (Murphy, 
2011; Otusanya, 2011; Sikka and Willmott, 2010; 2013; Sikka and Lehman, 2015). 
Arguably, these firms are turning increasingly criminogenic, favouring supply-driven 
corruption. In light of the global importance of tackling the scourge of corruption, it is clear 
that it is an area that needs to be investigated further in order to better understand corporate 
corruption and to ultimately control it. 
1.4 Research gap in the study of corporate corruption 
Given the complexities of corruption at corporate level, a large body of corruption literature 
has underscored the need to examine corruption at the individual level (for example, Brass, 
Butterfield and Skaggs, 1998; Jones and Ryan, 1997; Treviño, 1986). From a public-sector 
perspective, corruption is often portrayed as an individual-driven phenomenon (Banfield, 
1975). On the other hand, from a business perspective, it is depicted as corruption from the 
supply-side. Such corruption transactions are either as unavoidable for firm’s operations, or 
as an investment for privileged treatments from the public sector (Banfield, 1975; Martin et 
al, 2007; TI, 2009). Nevertheless, there are some few studies that have examined corruption 
at a broad corporate level as acts committed on behalf of the corporate and for the corporate 
benefits (for example, Baucus and Near, 1991; Brief, Buttram and Dukerich, 2001; Hill, 
Kelley, Agle, Hitt and Hoskisson, 1992; Sonnerfeld and Lawrence, 1978; Pinto et al., 2008; 
Voliotis, 2017). Yet the corporate perspective remains an area that has been underexplored 
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(David-Barrett, 2017; Shepherd and Button, 2018), simply due to the ignorance that these 
corporates can be instigators or facilitators of corruption for their corporate benefits.  
Moreover, research has predominately focused on the demand-side while the supply-side 
represented by MNCs has received little attention (Beets, 2005; MacMurray, 2006; Vogl, 
1998). Researchers recognise the need to focus on the supply-side of corruption (see for 
example, Sung, 2005; Ashford, Veron et al., 2006) to address it effectively. In contrast, a 
body of literature has documented the role of the private sector in perpetuating corrupt 
practices through a variety of business vehicles (Briloff, 1976, 1981; Tinker, 1985; Bakre, 
2007; Sikka, 2008; Otusanya, 2010). Research in the criminology and business ethics areas 
has considered corporate malpractices from a variety of perspectives. They include the 
following: 
 the organisation as a perpetrator of crime (Sutherland, 1949; O’Leary-Kelly et 
al., 1996; Collins et al., 2009); 
 the agent or employee as a perpetrator of crime (Zyglidopoulos and Fleming, 
2008); and  
 the organisation as a victim of crime (Lacey and Cuganesan, 2004; Den 
Nieuwenboer and Kaptein, 2008).  
Studies recognised the role of the private sector in perpetuating corrupt practices (Briloff, 
1976, 1981; Tinker, 1985; Bakre, 2007; Sikka, 2008; Otusanya, 2010). Given the 
complexity of corruption, understanding bribery at corporate level is also fraught with the 
difficulties of identifying who is to be blamed, who is the beneficiary, who is the victim, 
and what are their respective roles (Button, Shepherd and Dean, 2018). In fact, organisation 
theorists have identified aspects of the organisation that could facilitate corruption (Finnely 
and Lesieur, 1982; Hill et al., 1992; Szwajkowski, 1985; Vaughan, 1983; Waters, 1978). 
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However, these studies focus on corruption practices perpetrated by individuals for their 
self-interest. 
Against the above background, this research seeks empirical contributions to increase our 
understanding of corporate corruption in development projects whereby globalisation and 
financialisation have changed the structure and strategy of MNCs (Yamin and Ghauri, 2010; 
Morgan, 2014; Coe, Lai and Wojick, 2014). 
1.5 Understanding the thesis 
A fundamental question that preoccupies academic research into corruption is: how do 
corrupt relationships arise between the parties involved (Button, Shepherd and Dean, 2018; 
Hock, 2018). This research was influenced by the lack of insight into how corporate 
corruption evolves. While the conspiratorial relationship may not be difficult to establish 
for petty corruption involving individuals (Fletcher and Hermann, 2012; Graycar and 
Sidebottom, 2012), this may not be so for corporates (United Nations, 2013; Graycar and 
Prenzler, 2013; Button, Shepherd and Dean, 2018). The problem is further compounded in 
the international context by legal and cultural variations (Melgar et al., 2010). 
There is a corpus of scholarly work, which addresses the broad field of white-collar crime 
and fraud (Cressey, 1953; Sutherland, 1940). Unfortunately, they focus on a narrower issue 
of corruption and anti-corruption policies based on corruption perpetrated by individuals for 
their own benefit (Brytting et al., 2011; Eicher, 2012; Kubbe and Engelbert, 2018). There 
is, however, very little research into why and how individuals engage in corruption for 
organisational benefit (Mazar et al., 2008; Welsh et al., 2015). 
Despite the very serious and significant impacts that corporate corruption may have on 
society, empirical studies illustrating its negative impact in development projects have been 
very limited (Zahra et al., 2005). However, recently, there have been a few studies that 
highlighted the nefarious effect of corporate corruption and have underscored the need to 
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address it (see for example, Ashford, Gioia, Robinson, and Treviño et al., 2008; Voliotis, 
2016; Turnley et al., 2018). Therefore, the current study not only attempts to fill the gap of 
research on corporate corruption, but also to contribute in providing empirical insights of 
corporate dynamics and to identify the situational factors conducive to corporate corruption. 
While the fraud triangle introduced by Cressey (1953), offers the paradigm to explain the 
corrupt behaviours (Brytting et al., 2011; ACFE, 2014) of perpetrators within organisations, 
it may not be appropriate to explain corporate corruption, which is predominantly for 
corporate benefit, hence the need to identify the main determinants of corporate corruption. 
1.5.1 Rationale of the research 
The motivation of this study derives from the growing concern of donors about the impact 
of corruption in development projects from the supply-side. Empirical research on the 
consequences of corruption confirms that it has a variety of detrimental effects (Khang and 
Moe, 2008; Guo et al., 2014) affecting the poor and vulnerable who most need these 
projects. It has become increasingly apparent that IDP provides a supply-side stimulus that 
encourages corporates to instigate or facilitate corruption (Murphy, 2011; Otusanya, 2011; 
Sikka and Willmott, 2010; 2013; Sikka and Lehman, 2015). While it is axiomatic that ‘it 
takes two to tango’, the supply-side residing in MNCs as facilitators or instigators has gained 
little attention as compared to the demand-side (Murphy, 2011; Otusanya, 2011; Sikka and 
Willmott, 2010; Sikka and Lehman, 2015). 
1.5.2 Aim and objectives of the study 
The goal of this research is to examine the determinants that surround corporate corruption 
for those corporates that are engaged in development projects. In light of the potential 
serious consequences of corporate corruption on development projects, the questions that 
arise are: what are the determining factors that are encouraging corporates to become 
criminogenic? Are corporates instigators or facilitators of corporate corruption? Are 
corporate objectives in line with corporates involvement in corrupt transactions? This study 
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explores the determinants of corporate corruption in development projects financed by 
MDBs. Its focus is on the supply-side of corruption in the realm of IB, with particular focus 
on infrastructural development projects. It aims to add to the body of knowledge regarding 
the corporate dynamic to engage in corporate corruption on financed projects. It will help 
to identify the determinants that contribute to spawn corruption in developmental projects 
from the supply-side. This research will be beneficial to international financial institutions 
and multilateral and bilateral donors that are very much concerned about the risks of 
corruption on projects they are financing but have little ability to control such risks due to 
scant research in the field of corporate corruption. It may also be of interest to the many 
researchers who have focussed their efforts on the demand-side of corruption, thus 
broadening the sphere for further research. 
The main research question that this thesis will address is: 
What are the determinants of corporate corruption in development projects? 
The following sub-questions were developed to address the research gap and to further 
define the research problem while addressing the main research question. Due attention was 
given in ensuring that the sub-questions are clear, specific, answerable and substantially 
relevant (Punch, 2005).  
1.   What are the challenges facing MNCs involved in international development projects? 
MNCs are facing fierce competition in IDPs. It is important to understand the challenges 
facing these MNCs. This research approaches corporates, which have been cross-debarred 
by the MDBs through a survey questionnaire in order to throw more light on the challenges 
they faced during the implementation for the MDB-financed projects and that might have 
influenced these corporates to act corruptly. The unstructured interview, the survey 
questionnaire and the case study method also help in throwing more light of the challenges 
these corporates face. This sub-question is appropriate to understand the motivations of 
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these corporates in engaging in corporate corruption. It is directly linked to the main 
question. 
2. How effective are the MDBs sanctions regimes in mitigating corruption risks? 
With MDB’s sanction regimes, corporates and consultants debarred by one MDB are 
automatically cross-debarred by others, thus restraining them from obtaining future 
contracts financed by any MDB that is party to the Agreement of mutual enforcement of 
debarment decisions during the debarment period. This form of sanctioning addresses in 
particular the supply-side of corruption. The sanction regime is considered effective if it 
acts a strong deterrent to corrupt practices. The continual debarment of corporates by MDBs 
may be indications of the ineffectiveness of the sanction regime. It deems appropriate to 
look at how effective the sanction regimes are in mitigating corruption. The survey 
questionnaire and the unstructured interview are used to capture the perception about the 
effectiveness. The responses obtained through the different methods used in this research 
are helpful in identifying the determinants of corporate corruption. 
3. How is the definition of project success conducive for corporates engaged in 
development project to controlling corporate corruption? 
In the light of the potentially serious consequences of corporate corruption, the question 
arises of how and to what extent is this risk managed? In line with these approaches, this 
study investigates what measures/ tools corporate actors have in protecting the corporates 
from corporate corruption. A qualitative content analysis is used to demystify the definition 
of project success as referred to in the project management (PM) literature. 
4. How is corporate corruption triggered by corporates representing the business side? 
Corporate corruption is essentially a corrupt act initiated by the corporate actors. The 
findings to this research question are important in identifying the instigators and the 
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facilitators of such type of corruption. The flow of the corrupt transactions would be helpful 
to explain the determining forces facilitating such transactions. The findings will also 
identify the active and passive actors who are involved in the corrupt schemes. The 
combinations of methods help to understand how corporates instigate or facilitate corporate 
corruption. 
1.5.3 Methodological approach 
In order to empirically investigate the determinants of corporate corruption, it is imperative 
to have a research design that will capture the multidimensionality and complexity of the 
phenomenon. In order to grasp the challenges posed by the research, a mixed-method 
approach was most appropriate to capture the different perspectives of the phenomenon 
under study. In a similar vein, it is important to understand the different individuals, third 
parties, agents and organisations that connive in orchestrating these corrupt schemes 
(Button, Shepherd and Dean, 2018; Hock, 2018; Tillman, 2009) in order to conjure up the 
full scheme of corporates’ involvement in corporate corruption. This research builds upon 
the feedback and comments received following the author’s presentations of different 
conference papers related to this study at international conferences. 
In fact, the new approach to research in corruption encourages researching the phenomenon 
from a macro-level perspective instead of the individualistic self-interest perspective 
(Hellman, 2017). The methodology used requires the identification of the different 
stakeholders who can contribute their different perspectives to the research.  
 The quantitative survey targets sanctioned firms which have been cross-debarred3 
by the MDBs but which have not entered into a negotiation agreement process prior 
to being sanctioned. With the survey questionnaire, there is opportunity to 
                                                 
3 A firm that has been debarred from participating in aid projects by one MDB is also forbidden to bid for aid 
projects financed by other MDBs signatories to the Agreement of the Mutual. 
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investigate the perception of sanctioned corporates and to understand better their 
motivations for corporate corruption. 
  A case study method is used to understand the ‘how’ and ‘why’ firms4 engaged in 
corrupt practices using real case scenarios (Yin, 1994). According to Reeves-Latour 
and Morselli (2018), case studies can offer an empirical assessment of the realities 
of corporate crime in the field of corruption research. In fact, with corruption being 
a secretive process (David-Barrett, 2017), the case study method provides the best 
way to tap information about the mechanisms employed by these firms (van Erp, 
2017). It also offers the possibility to examine the effect of certain patterns under 
controlled conditions, therefore contributing to internal validity (Kriz, 2005). The 
four cases from the AfDB were chosen, as it is the only MDB that has started 
negotiating settlements with sanctioned entities which provides for financial 
penalties. It is a relatively new process that started in 2013. During the conduct of 
this research, only five negotiations were conducted. The justifications for selecting 
these four cases are as following: 
 The cases involve development projects 
 These firms were found guilty of corruption and were sanctioned 
 Information on the cases was available in the public domain  
One of the biggest advantages of this method is that it provides an effective means of 
gathering information in a limited period over a wide geographic area. 
 The qualitative interview method targets professionals who have been 
working for the African Development Bank (AfDB) and have wide 
experience in the oversight of projects.  
                                                 
4 As per the Mutual agreement, negotiation is one method. One requirement is to publicise the information. 
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 Finally, a qualitative content analysis method is used to understand the 
extent to which the definition of project success in PM literature is 
responsive to addressing corporate corrupt risks.  
Given the limitations of a single method, the different methods used for this research 
complement one another. Therefore, we argue that the mixed method approach used to 
answer the research questions is both appropriate and justifiable. 
1.5.4 Significance of the research 
This research looks into the causes of corruption from the supply-side, that is, contracting 
firms engaged in development projects. This research fills a gap in the literature by trying 
to understand why these corporates in particularly are more susceptible to commit 
corruption for their organisational benefits.  
It is also a fact that the PM literature has focused little on international development projects 
(Ahsan and Gunawan, 2010; Ika et al., 2010). However, to tap into the full potential of PM, 
it is essential that appropriate conditions are present in the right situations and in the right 
circumstances (Jugdev and Müller, 2005; Ika, 2009). According to the literature, it is noted 
that while management dimensions such as time, cost and quality are recognised as 
important elements, project impacts5 are given low priority (Diallo et al; 2004, p.19).  
This research will make a valuable contribution to the corpus of knowledge in the field of 
corporate corruption. It aims to contribute to an improved understanding of the underlying 
determinants of corporates facilitating corruption for their corporate benefit. It also 
contributes to a better understanding of the dynamics of corporate corruption in 
development projects. 
                                                 
5 The Bonny Island case and China Communication Construction Company cases 
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1.6 Structure of thesis – outline and methodological choices 
This thesis comprises eight chapters and is organised as follows:  
Chapter 1 puts the research in context. The first section situates the context of the research 
and provides an overview of the research topic. The second section provides the aim and 
scope of the research study. The research questions that guide the study are also defined. 
Chapter 2 examines the contributions made by MDBs in fighting corruption in their 
financed projects. It also examines the experience of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA) in addressing foreign bribery. Finally, it identifies the limitations of MDBs in 
addressing the supply-side of corruption due to the predominant focus on the demand-side. 
The body of work drawing on the theoretical and conceptual background of corruption at 
corporate level is critically examined in Chapter 3. This chapter reviews the available 
literature and shows the gaps in the literature regarding the study of corporate corruption in 
development projects.  
Chapter 4 details the empirical research methodology adopted for this research and 
describes the mixed method approach in more depth. The core of the research is founded on 
the constructionist perspective, seeking to identify the determinants of corporate corruption 
using a combination of methods.  
Chapter 5 reviews the cases of four firms, which have been investigated following 
allegations of malpractices and successfully entered into Negotiated Settlement 
Agreements6 (NSA) with the AfDB. Following the settlements, these firms agreed to pay a 
financial penalty to AfDB in order to compensate for the damages caused due to their 
                                                 
6 A Negotiated Settlement Agreement (NSA) is an agreement between the corporate under investigation and 
the MDB. The corporate agrees to cooperate, provide all required information, and pay a financial penalty 
mutually agreed with mitigating factors. 
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involvements in corrupt schemes. Based on the observed trend, it is argued that the corrupt 
schemes are orchestrated by the corporate brain. 
Chapter 6 analyses the findings of the different methods used in this research. It adds to the 
context of corporate corruption by analysing the phenomenon from its various dimensions 
based on the discussions from Chapter 4.  
Chapter 7 discusses the key research findings building from the mixed methods used and 
examines the results of the thesis. It also explains the whole phenomenon of corporate 
corruption employed by corporates for their corporate benefits. 
Chapter 8 outlines the conclusions of this thesis. It is a reflective account of the processes 
and particulars of the study. This chapter summarises the research findings and concludes 
with why sanctions remain an important tool to counteract corruption in development 
project. It also shows how multinational firms have to revamp themselves in proactively 
addressing corruption risks from the supply-side. While positioning the study in the context 
of corporate corruption, it also identifies the research limitations and opportunities for 
further research. 
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Chapter 2 Contribution of MDBs to fighting 
corruption 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter highlights the key roles of MDBs in financing development projects in their 
member countries. Internationally, the pressure to fight corruption has increased since the 
1990s (Mugiu-Pippidi, 2011). The investigative mandates of these MDBs are explored and 
the key features of the MDB sanctions system are examined. Fighting corruption is now 
part of global actions such as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Economic 
Corporation and Development (OECD), the MDBs and national development discourse. 
MDBs and international organisations have adopted tools and strategies to address 
corruption in all its forms. Foreign bribery is a form of corruption, which MNCs can resort 
to given that they are operating in multiple jurisdictions. 
Foreign bribery involves actions in multiple jurisdictions and affects multiple parties. 
Through extraterritoriality, MNCs can be prosecuted for transnational bribery. In addition 
to being investigated by MDBs, these corporates can also be investigated under different 
national laws. For example, the FCPA asserts territoriality in both national and foreign 
jurisdictions. Its impact will be reviewed, particularly on MDB-financed projects. 
In the pursuit of their anti-corruption agenda, MDBs, together with national agencies, are 
strengthening the enforcement landscape, thus opening corporates operating in the global 
marketplace up to increased prosecution. This chapter also looks at the efforts undertaken 
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by MDBs in tackling the supply-side of corruption. The purpose of the MDBs’ anti-
corruption sanctioning system is to ensure that the funds are not being misused and to avoid 
doing business with entities and/or individuals that have been found to have committed 
prohibited practices, including corruption7. 
2.1 Definition of corruption 
In this study ‘organisation’ refers to the private profit-driven business organisation. It is also 
referred to as ‘firm’ or ‘corporate’. Corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon 
with multiple causes and effects, occurring as it takes on various forms and functions in 
differing contexts. In this thesis, corruption is taken as an illegitimate exchange of resources 
involving public and private corporations for private ends. It includes corruption between 
corporates and government agencies. For this research the term ‘corruption’ is used as 
synonymous to fraud, embezzlement, misrepresentation, conflicts of interest, and other 
malpractices that are committed by corporate actors represented by the private sector on 
behalf of the corporations and for corporate benefit. As a primary form of corruption, 
bribery is the payment in money or kind given or taken in a corrupt relationship. Fraud is 
an economic crime that involves some kind of trickery, swindle or deceit.  
It must be noted that the definition of corrupt acts varies across nations. For instance, the 
US FCPA 1977 defines bribery as ‘the offer, promise or gift of undue pecuniary or other 
advantage, whether made directly or through intermediaries, to a person holding public 
office for that person to commit an act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance 
of official duties’. The World Bank defined corruption as ‘the abuse of public office for 
private gains’ (World Bank, 2001). 
                                                 
7 As defined under the Uniform Framework for Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption (the ‘IFI’ 
Framework). 
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2.2 The scope of the problem 
Corruption is a significant obstacle to international development. It undermines confidence 
in public institutions, diverts funds from those who are in great need of financial support, 
and violates business integrity.  It is ‘like cancer, retarding economic development’ (World 
Bank, 2001). Corruption often transcends borders. Dr. Akinwumi Adesina – the President 
of the AfDB in his speech at World Peace Summit in South Korea in February 2019 
highlighted the problems associated with corruption when he mentioned:  ‘corruption does 
not invest in the future, it kills the future’ (AfDB, 2019). 
In order to tackle this global problem, worldwide cooperation is needed. The World Bank 
(2001) identified corruption as a global challenge and the single greatest obstacle to 
economic and social development. It is estimated that more than $1 trillion flows to bribes 
annually (World Bank, 2004), representing about 5% of the world GDP. Likewise, the 
African Union has estimated the cost of corruption in Africa at $148 billion annually, which 
is equivalent to 25% of Africa’s GDP (OECD, 2014).  
The prevalence of corruption among other institutional factors is recognised to increase the 
costs of firms doing business and to be the cause of a reduction in productivity (World Bank, 
2005). As a result, corruption can be anticipated to increase the cost of investment projects 
and transaction costs (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002). While the capacity of firms to influence 
the procurement process through private payments to political officials and bureaucrats may 
be beneficial to firms, it is considered to be highly injurious to the economy as a whole 
(Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000).  
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2.3 MDBs’ mandates 
MDBs are international financial institutions that provide financial assistance to developing 
countries in order to promote economic and social development. The assistance is typically 
in the form of loans or grants for investment projects and policy-based loans. Project loans 
include large infrastructure projects in the road, energy, water and sanitation sectors and 
other developmental projects. Over the last decades, governments in developing countries 
have made significant improvements in health and education through MDB financing 
(Easterly, 2006). MDBs have played a crucial role in supporting economic development and 
fighting poverty over the 70 years since the creation of the World Bank. Unfortunately, 
these investments come with the potential for fraud and corruption (World Bank, 2015). 
The Addis Ababa Agenda for Action on financing the post-2015 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) called for MDBs to scale up their financing and technical assistance to meet 
these ambitious objectives (UN, 2018b). The SDGs are broader and more ambitious in scope 
than the Millennium Development Goals, covering areas where multilaterals have extensive 
experience, such as the infrastructure and energy sectors (UN, 2015). The MDBs’ role in 
supporting international development and fighting poverty goes beyond the sectors of 
intervention. MDBs tend to channel a higher share of aid to poorer countries than bilateral 
donors (Dollar and Levin, 2005) and they are better at providing information and at 
monitoring recipients’ use of funds (Rodrik, 1996). The negotiations between recipient 
countries and multilateral agencies therefore tend to be less politicised than with bilateral 
donors (Rodrik, 1996). 
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Table 1 : Mandates of the MDBs 
Multilateral development 
banks 
Region 
Covered 
Mandates 
World Bank Worldwide 
End extreme poverty within a generation and boost 
shared prosperity 
New Development Bank Worldwide To foster development in infrastructural project 
African Development 
Bank 
Africa 
Promote sustainable economic growth and reduce 
poverty in Africa 
Asian Development Bank Asia Pacific Eradicate poverty in Asia Pacific 
European Investment 
Bank 
Europe 
Contribute to the development of the internal market 
of the European Union 
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development 
Europe 
Foster the transition towards open market-oriented 
economies and private and entrepreneurial 
initiatives in central and eastern European countries 
Inter-American 
Development Bank 
South 
America 
Promote the economic and social development of 
the developing member states, individually and 
collectively 
Islamic Development 
Bank 
Islamic 
Countries 
Foster economic development and social progress in 
member countries and Muslim communities, 
individually as well as jointly, in accordance with 
the principles of the Shari’ah 
 
The current list of MDBs, their mandates, and the total investments made are shown in Table 
1 and Figure 1 respectively. The World Bank is the largest of the MDBs, followed by the 
regional development banks. MDB financing assistance provided to large emerging 
economies is important because these countries have substantial numbers of people living 
in poverty and MDBs provide financial assistance for projects which governments might be 
reluctant to borrow for. In addition, MDBs assistance helps address environmental issues 
and promotes better governance and provides important technical assistance to which 
emerging economies might not otherwise have access. The Asian Infrastructure Investment 
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Bank8 (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (often called BRICS Bank 9) are the most 
recent MDBs set up to address the financing needs of developing countries.  
  
Source: https://developmentfinance.un.org 
Figure 1 above shows an increasing trend in the total amount disbursed to different 
development projects worldwide. 
 
2.3.1 MDBs’ fight against corruption 
In the last decades, there has been increasing concern about corruption in development 
projects financed by MDBs (World Bank, 2017). Anti-corruption initiatives have gained 
prominence on the global and national political agenda (Navot and Cohen, 2015) because 
of the willingness of donors and governments to address related corruption issues (Hors and 
                                                 
8 AIIB was launched in October 2014 and focuses on the development of infrastructure and other sectors in 
Asia. 
9 The BRICS bank refers to the initials of the five countries that have made finance available to this most 
recent development bank:  Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
Figure 1 : Annual disbursement made by MDBs 
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Tamesis, 1999). MDBs are under increasing pressure to ensure that aid is used for its 
intended purpose. In fact, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee10 (2006), in 
Multilateral Development Banks: Effectiveness of Infrastructure Projects, commended the 
efforts of the MDBs to control corruption in development projects and called for a sustained 
effort in addressing the problem of corruption globally. Aid efforts may not achieve their 
desired objective unless they are offered in an environment that stimulates self-sustaining 
growth and development (Jain, 2001). 
In the landmark case of the World Bank Group v. Wallace (2016), the Supreme Court of 
Canada recognised the roles of state actors and international organisations in their 
cooperation in the increasingly active global fight against corruption. Recent cases of 
sanctions imposed on well-known companies like Siemens AG, Alstom SA, and SNC-
Lavalin Group Inc. by the World Bank and, consequently, cross-debarred by other MDBs, 
have unveiled well-orchestrated corporate corruption schemes operating at the 
organisational level (World Bank, 2018a). Paradoxically, while these sanctioned companies 
have supposedly anti-corruption programmes in place, such measures did not prevent top 
management from engaging in corrupt practices for their corporate benefits. MDBs have 
adopted a procedure to sanction prohibited practices. However, this is an ‘administrative 
remedy’ utilised to disqualify contractors from obtaining public contracts or acquiring 
extension to existing contracts.  
2.3.2 MDBs’ investigative mandate 
MDBs are concerned with the pervasive effects of corruption in the countries and sectors 
they serve. The Articles of Agreements, which set up the different MDBs, require that they 
have fiduciary responsibilities of ensuring proper use of funds. The creation of anti-
                                                 
10 The Foreign Relations Committee began in 2004 with the objective of reviewing US policy towards the 
multilateral development banks. 
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corruption mechanisms enables these MDBs to fulfil their fiduciary duty to ensure that funds 
are not being squandered or diverted. 
MDBs have established sanctions mechanisms and compliance procedures in an effort to 
fight off fraud and corruption in projects they have financed. Contracting firms and 
individual entities found guilty of sanctionable practices by one of the MDBs are 
automatically cross-debarred by the others. Following the adoption of the Agreement for 
Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions, the cross-debarment of sanctioned entities 
among the different MDBs became operational as of April 2010.  
The signatories to this agreement are the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and 
the Inter-American Development Bank. In 2018, MDBs have debarred 73 corporates 
(World Bank, 2018a). As of 31 December 2018, 580 corporates have been cross-debarred 
by the signatories to the agreement (World Bank, 2018b). The sanctions regime 
implemented by these MDBs is quite recent; consequently, their impact in developing 
corruption resilience have yet to be understood.  
2.3.3 MDBs’ enforcement landscape 
The origins of the fight against corruption in MDBs dates back to 1996 when the then- 
President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, acknowledged that corruption was 
pervasive in international development. The IDB and WB systems were heavily influenced 
by the suspension and debarment system of the US Federal Acquisition Regulations 
Systems (FAR). The FAR regulates the way in which US federal agencies exercise their 
discretion in deciding which contractors to exclude from public procurement on the basis 
they are not being ‘presently responsible’. The concept of ‘present responsibility’ provides 
the US government with the necessary tools to avoid doing business with those contractors 
or providers that have not been responsible in fulfilling ‘their legal or contractual 
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obligations’. The purpose of the suspension and debarment system is to reduce the ‘overall 
risk of harm to the procurement system’. 
MDBs have an extensive footprint in developing economies in response to the emerging 
multi-polar enforcement landscape. Among the leading players shaping the enforcement 
landscape are the MDBs that focus on developmental projects. MDBs have a credible 
enforcement capacity with an investigative mandate for examining corrupt cases and 
applying sanctions to corporates found guilty. The authority for these MDBs to sanction 
arises contractually through financing agreements made between a borrower country and 
the financial institution. Figure 2 below shows the number of firms sanctioned by different 
MDBs. Corporates participating in a project that is financed - wholly or partly by MDB’s 
are subject to their sanctioning authority. There is no exception to this authority, and 
therefore corporates can be the subject of an MDB investigation related to a project with 
only marginal MDB financing. 
The definitions of sanctionable practices used by the MDBs are broad and capture a wide 
range of misconduct (PwC, 2016). Moreover, the administrative system is based on a burden 
of proof of ‘more likely than not’ which makes corporates that are subject to an MDB’s 
investigation more vulnerable to being sanctioned. MDBs adopted this concept of cross-
agency ineligibility in 2010 when they signed the cross-debarment agreement, which allow 
signatories to recognise the debarment decisions of any one of them. Under this agreement, 
all MDBs adopted the same definitions of sanctionable practices.  
Chapter 2                                                                              Contribution of MDBs to fighting corruption 
27 
 
Figure 2 : Number of firms sanctioned by MDBs 
2.3.4 Anti-corruption efforts of MDBs 
MDBs are interested in the cause and effect of corruption from a development perspective 
and, as such, tend to sanction companies. However, they are more interested in confronting 
the pervasive effect of corruption in development projects in the countries they serve. MDBs 
are entrusted to ensure that the funds they have received and administer are used only for 
their intended purposes of development.  
The purpose of MDBs’ anti-corruption sanctioning system is to ensure that funds are not 
being misused and to avoid doing business with entities or individuals who have been found 
to commit prohibited practices, including corruption. A prohibited or sanctionable practice 
as defined under the Uniform Framework for Preventing and Combating Fraud and 
Corruption (also known as the ‘IFI’ Framework’) is one that includes:  
(1)  corrupt practice: ‘the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting, directly or indirectly, 
of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another party’; 
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(2) fraudulent practice: ‘any act or omission, including a misrepresentation, that 
knowingly or recklessly misleads, or attempts to mislead, a party to obtain a financial 
or other benefit or to avoid an obligation’; 
(3)  collusive practice: ‘an arrangement between two or more parties designed to achieve 
an improper purpose, including influencing improperly the actions of another party’; 
and, 
(4)  coercive practice: ‘impairing or harming, or threatening to impair or harm, directly or 
indirectly, any party or the property of the party to influence improperly the actions 
of a party.’  
In the case of MDBs, investigations and sanctions procedures are clearly administrative in 
nature and rooted within the principles of global administrative law (Dubois and Nowlan, 
2010). 
2.3.5 The sanctions process 
The MDBs adopted the General Principles and Guidelines for Sanctions in 2006. It 
harmonises the principles for the treatment of corporate groups. However, there has been 
no harmonisation of the sanction procedures utilised by the MDBs to impose debarments 
and suspension. The base sanction recommended by the General Principles and Guidelines 
is a debarment period for three-years, which may be increased or decreased depending on 
mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Based on the General Principles and Guidelines 
for Sanctions, aggravating circumstances that are considered when determining the 
debarment period include: 
 Severity of the violation; 
 Harm caused to public welfare or to the project; 
 Construction to the investigation process; 
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 Other circumstances, such as past sanction. 
In a similar vein, mitigating circumstances that must be considered and which may decrease 
a debarment period include: 
 Minor role played by party; 
 Corrective action taken by corporate to terminate the sanctionable conduct; 
 Cooperation of corporates in the investigation process. 
The settlement process of these MDBs are broadly similar. The figure 3 below illustrates 
the salient stages in the settlement process. It details the enforcement action by these 
participating institutions. It also prescribes the range of sanctions against sanctioned firms 
or individuals. As per the sanctions guideline adopted by MDBs, the following sanctions 
are applicable: 
 
Figure 3 : Settlement process 
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MDBs adopted the ‘MDB Harmonised Principles on Treatment of Corporate Groups’ in 
September 2012. The following sanctions are provided under this agreement:  
(i) Debarment. This refers to a limited period after which the entity may be released 
from debarment; 
(ii) Debarment with conditional release or reinstatement. This refers to release of 
sanctioned entity from debarment after complying with the conditions imposed by 
the institution; 
(iii) Permanent or indefinite debarment. This is imposed when there are no reasonable 
grounds for the rehabilitation of the sanctioned entity through compliance; 
(iv) Conditional non-debarment. This imposed on entity when it has to comply with 
specific remedies or preventive actions in order to avoid debarment; 
(v) Letter of reprimand. This is issued when there are minor or isolated violations. 
(vi) Restitution/ financial remedies. This is imposed when there is a quantifiable 
amount to be restored following the violations.  
2.3.6 Cross-debarment of corrupt firms 
While the harmonisation of the definitions of sanctionable practices among MDBs has 
contributed to bring uniformity, it has also raised the costs of misconduct. Under the 
Agreement for the Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions signed in April 2010, any 
entity debarred by one of the MDBs may be subject to automatic debarment by the other 
signatories to the agreement. Thus, a corporate found to have engaged in a sanctionable 
practice in one country might face the loss of business opportunities across the entire 
spectrum of emerging markets. Importantly, the automatic nature of cross-debarment 
prohibits a sanctioned entity from contesting the ruling of one MDB in front of the tribunal 
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of another. The Agreement makes provisions for MDBs to engage into NSA with the firms 
under investigation if they are willing to cooperate with the investigation. 
2.3.7 Negotiated settlement agreements 
The recent introduction of a formal settlement mechanism to the MDB sanction process is a 
welcome development that, in theory, provides a less costly, more expedient method for 
resolving an investigation. However, the value proposition of a settlement should be 
evaluated carefully on a case-to-case basis. The terms included in MDB settlements can 
often be quite onerous, with past agreements containing substantial fines, periods of 
debarment, commitments to align internal business process with MDB guidelines, and the 
retention of costly third-party monitors. In fact, in Chapter 5 the four case studies analysed 
are those, which have been investigated by the AfDB before entering in NSAs. During the 
investigation process, parties who do not fall under the mandate of the MDBs to investigate, 
like the involvement of public officials are referred to the national authorities for 
investigation. 
2.3.7.1 Referral to national authorities 
Recently, MDBs are developing a closer relationship across jurisdictions. It is common for 
MDBs to refer cases to national authorities for investigation by anti-corruption agencies 
leading to prosecution and/or sanctions. In some cases, referral reports are submitted even 
before the MDBs substantiate allegations of misconduct. In the case of Alstom, while 
conducting the investigation, the World Bank also referred the case to the national authority 
in Canada for criminal investigation (World Bank, 2018a). Consequently, corporates may 
have to face multiple enquiries simultaneously. With multiple authorities pursuing a case 
based on the same underlying facts, there is no restriction by the double jeopardy safeguards. 
With the emergence of a multi-polar enforcement environment, corporates may face 
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administrative actions by more than one MDB while at the same time they can face civil or 
criminal liabilities in their national jurisdictions.  
2.4 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
The FCPA enacted in the United States of America (USA) in 1977 makes it illegal for 
companies and their supervisors to attempt to influence foreign officials with personal 
payments or rewards. The FCPA can apply to conduct anywhere in the world and extends 
to publicly traded companies including their officers, directors, employees, stockholders, 
and agents. Agents include third-party agents, consultants, distributors, joint-venture 
partners, and others. The FCPA applies to any person who has a certain degree of connection 
to the USA and engages in foreign corrupt practices. Figure 4 shows the different parties 
that have been sanctioned under the FCPA. 
 
Figure 4: Distribution by parties sanctioned 
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The nationality principle of the act makes it applicable to any act by US businesses, foreign 
corporations trading securities in the US, American nationals, citizens, and residents acting 
in furtherance of a foreign corrupt practice, whether or not they are physically present in the 
US. Since 1998, the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA now also apply to foreign firms 
and persons who cause, directly or through agents, an act in furtherance of such a corrupt 
payment to take place within the territory of the US. The SEC and the Department of Justice 
(DoJ) are jointly responsible for enforcing the act.  
The FCPA has criminalised foreign bribery and created special accounting provisions to 
address the corresponding accounting irregularities generated by the payment of bribes 
(Porrata-Doria, 1986). Two main provisions are the driving force of the FCPA: (a) an 
enforcement mechanism that criminalises the payment of bribes to foreign government 
officials, enforced by the DoJ; and (b) an accounting requirement to properly reflect 
transactions in order to help prevent corruption, designed as a civil enforcement tool. It also 
requires corporates whose securities are listed in the USA to meet its accounting provisions. 
 
Figure 5 : Number of cases received under the FCPA 
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Corporations covered by the provisions are required to (a) make and keep books and records 
that accurately and fairly reflect the transactions of the corporation and (b) devise and 
maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls. The sanctions for FCPA 
violations can be significant. Civil enforcement actions can be brought against issuers and 
their officers, directors, employees, stockholders, and agents for violations of its anti-
bribery or accounting provisions. Corporates and individuals that have committed violations 
of the FCPA may have to renounce their ill-gotten gains and in addition pay civil penalties. 
In recent years, the DoJ and the SEC have demonstrated more interest in investigating FCPA 
violations (Huskin, 2008). For the 2017, firms have paid a total of $10.71 billion as penalty 
fees for allegedly paying bribes to foreign officials to the amount of $4.9 billion (FCPA, 
2017). 
 
Figure 6 :  Yearly sanctions and total bribery payment under the FCPA 
 
The above figure shows the trends of the yearly number of cases involving bribery of foreign 
officials.  
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Source: World Bank Office of Suspension and Debarment 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter sets the scene for the research. MDBs have adopted policing measures through 
the establishment of compliance and sanctions procedures to combat fraud and corruption 
in development projects. This chapter examines the mechanism that MDBs have in 
sanctioning corrupt firms or individuals. With the adoption of the Agreement for Mutual 
Enforcement of Debarment Decisions, sanctions decisions are recognised and enforced 
among the MDBs. The compliance landscape on legislations like the FCPA, which have 
extraterritoriality regarding bribery of foreign officials by firms in different jurisdictions, 
has been examined as corporates sanctioned by these MDBs have also been sanctioned by 
the SEC. 
While the sanctioning of firms through debarment and cross-debarment can be effective in 
eliminating the ‘bad apples’ from the basket, there appear to be no strategies among MDBs 
to address the root cause of the scourge of corporate corruption. The following chapter will 
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Figure 7 : Distribution of FCPA cases by types of corruption 
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identify the literature gap and the dearth of knowledge on corporate corruption to develop 
an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon. 
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Chapter 3 Review of literature on 
organisational corruption 
3.0 Introduction 
Underpinning this research, in order to provide the background for the identification of the 
research gap and to thereafter express the research problem and formulate the research 
questions, a comprehensive review of the relevant literature was undertaken.  
This chapter identifies and discusses the theoretical perspectives of the phenomenon of 
organisational-level corruption in development projects. This chapter situates the study 
within the contemporary context and provides a framework for the thesis. The first part of 
this chapter explores the available literature underpinning corruption in organisations. A 
holistic or dynamic understanding regarding the interplay of environmental, organisational, 
and individual forces, which gives a macro view, helps to understand the evolution of 
corporate corruption in development projects. This systemic view is also important because 
corruption appears to thrive in particular organisations, industries and national 
environments (Ashforth et al., 2008). The impact of the private sector and the extent to 
which its practices are convergent with corrupt practices (de Sousa and Freitas, 2012; p. 
491) is then explored further.    
Corruption is not just the behaviour of a single individual but includes organisations and 
industries. In this research, organisational corruption is based on the definition of Anand et 
al. (2004) and Sherman (1980) as abuse or misuse of authority for personal, sub-unit, or 
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organisational benefit. This chapter examines the extent to which the research aims have 
been addressed by the existing literature. Finally, it assesses the relevance of the existing 
literature and research in addressing organisational corruption in development projects. The 
review provides a critique of the theoretical concepts in order to highlight a number of areas 
for further research. It also summarises the current gaps in knowledge.  
3.1 Understanding the phenomenon of corruption 
The consensus is that a comprehensive definition of corruption is lacking in the literature. 
Corruption has been defined in many different ways based on the perspectives from which 
it is viewed. While scholars dispute the definition, no one disputes that corruption needs to 
be controlled. The World Bank (2010) defines corruption as ‘the abuse of public power for 
private benefit’. Some scholars tend to associate the term ‘corruption’ with ‘the misuse of 
public office for private ends or private gain’ (McMullan, 1961; Nye, 1967; Klitgaard, 1998; 
Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Clearly, these definitions preclude corruption within the private 
sector although it is clear that such corruption exists (Tanzi, 2002). In fact, most definitions 
of corruption are gleaned from public sector perspectives (Friedrich, 1993; Rose-Ackerman, 
1996; Shleiter and Vishny, 1993; World Bank, 1997) and overlook corruption from the 
supply-side, that is, from a private sector perspective. In this view, corruption is referred to 
as ‘abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (TI, 2015). 
There is a strand of the theoretical literature arguing that corruption can have a positive 
impact on the development process (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968). According to Fazekas 
(2017), corruption may allow contractors to circumvent bureaucratic procedures such as red 
tape. Beck and Maher (1986) also share this point of view; they posit that corruption may 
even serve to ensure that projects are awarded to the most efficient firms. However, 
empirical studies clearly illustrate the negative effects of corruption (Mauro, 2002; Tanzi, 
1998; Akindele, 2005; Sikka, 2008). Some of the literature condemns it as it institutionalises 
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negative practices by pushing up costs and excluding poorer people from social activities 
(Wrath and Simpkins, 1963; Sikka, 2008; Bakre, 2008; Otusanya, 2010). Corruption has 
also degraded the governing system, which has threatened the hope of people for a better 
quality of life and a more promising future (Wolforwitz, 2007). Scholars argue that 
corruption may destroy the functioning of vital organs of a nation state (Akindele, 2005; 
Kunicova, 2006; Sikka, 2008). Recognising the multidimensional and elusive phenomenon 
of corruption, Zakiuddin and Haque (2002) note: 
‘Corruption is not identifiable as a single, separate, independent entity, which can 
be isolated and destroyed. Corruption is a complex set of processes involving 
human behaviour and many other variables, some of which are difficult to 
recognize or measure. Even though corruption manifests itself as a force on its own 
and often generates its own momentum, it is linked to many other factors and it is 
by understanding these factors that we can hope to understand corruption.’ 
Based on the observations made by Zakiuddin and Haque (2002), it is clear that corruption 
cannot only be limited to the public sector. The justification for including private corruption 
is because corruption occurs at the interface between the private and public sectors, with 
government officials and companies seeking competitive opportunities in their quest to 
maximise profit (Akindele, 2005; Sikka, 2008). 
3.1.1 Corruption in development projects 
Corruption is considered a major impediment to development as it diverts resources away 
from public services (Dellicour and Sacaze, 2012, p. 552) and erodes the foundations of fair 
business practices (OECD, 2006). Corruption diverts funds, resulting in services of poor 
quality or services that are simply unavailable (Lukito, 2015; Fletcher and Hermann, 2012; 
Graycar and Sidebottom, 2012). Corruption is socially harmful in that it wastes public funds 
(Sung, 2002). 
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Corruption is considered as one of the biggest global issues of our time and one of the 
world’s most talked about problems (TI, 2016; ACFE 2018), hindering IB (Malgwi, 2016). 
While the exact cost of corruption is difficult to measure (Lambsdorff, 2007), it has been 
estimated that between 10-30% of investment in publicly funded construction projects may 
be lost through mismanagement and corruption and could reach $2.5 trillion by 2020 (CoST, 
2012). Other research has found that estimates of 20-30% of project value lost through 
corruption is widespread (Wells, 2014; Stansbury, 2005). According to the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2009; 2016), it was estimated that in 2004, the 
African continent lost more than $148 billion to corruption, representing approximately 
25% of its gross domestic product. In addition, the AfDB estimated that some $30 billion 
in aid for Africa ends up in corruption (AfDB, 2006, p. 7).  
Given the above, corruption is considered as an undesired phenomenon (Andersson and 
Heywood, 2009; Della Porta and Vannucci, 2012; Lambsdorff, 2007; Rothstein, 2011) with 
a negative social and economic impact on projects. For the example, the Padma Bridge 
Project in Bangladesh financed by the World Bank is tangible evidence of the impact of 
corruption on a development project following which the contracting firm - SNC-Lavalin - 
was sanctioned (World Bank, 2013). Mitigating corruption is beneficial for investment 
(Guetat, 2006), it reduces public spending (Delavallade, 2006) and the cost of doing 
business decreases in a less corrupt environment (Tekin-Koru, 2006). According to Rose-
Akerman, (1999, p. 9), corruption is seen by many as one of the principal impediments to 
the development of an efficient government system, since it is conceived as a ‘symptom that 
something has gone wrong in the management of the state’. Corruption is a multilevel 
phenomenon involving individuals, organisations, nationalities and nations (Ashforth, 
Gioia, Robinson, and Treviño, 2008).  
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3.1.2 Aid versus corruption 
Studies have found varying effects of foreign aid on corruption. Some scholars assert that 
aid fuels corruption (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016; Busse and Groning, 2009; Brautigam 
and Knack, 2004; Knack, 2001) while others assert that it reduces corruption (Mohamed, 
Kaliappan, Ismail, and Azman-Saini, 2015; Okada and Samreth, 2012; Tavares, 2013). 
Some studies even found that foreign aid does not have any significant effect on corruption 
(Ear, 2007; Menard and Weill, 2016). Consequently, the link between development aid and 
corruption remains uncertain. According to David-Barrett (2017), these contradictions are 
due to serious theoretical and methodological difficulties in analysing the relationship.  
Researchers have long recognised the corrosive effect of corruption on the cultural, political 
and economic fabric of society (Akindele, 2005; Kunicova, 2006; Sikka, 2008). The 
negative impact it has on developing countries can also be explained due to the lack of 
effective mechanisms in place to deter and root out corruption. Some researchers have even 
argued that the inability of the state to develop and enforce regulations to counter corruption 
is because of corrupt public officials (Bakre, 2007; Otusanya, 2010). 
3.1.3 The concept of corporate corruption 
Corruption is becoming widespread and deeply embedded in business thoughts and 
practices (Ashforth et al., 2008). In fact, corruption at the nexus between business and 
government is viewed as rampant in most economies (Luo, 2005). According to Neu, 
Everett and Rahaman (2015), government officials engaged in corrupt practices form the 
demand-side of corruption and the private sector the supply-side. While the extant literature 
predominantly focuses on the demand-side of corruption (Tanzi, 1998) involving public 
officials, there is very little literature on the supply-side of corruption in the private sector 
(Hellman et al., 2003; You and Khagram, 2005). Few studies have considered the role of 
the private sector in facilitating corruption (Harsh, 1993; Hellman et al, 2003; Otusanya, 
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2010; Sikka, 2008; You and Khagram, 2005). Flowing from this logic, it can be argued that 
contractors and consultants working on development projects would be considered as 
vehicles of corruption facilitating corruption from the supply-side. While there is scant 
research on the causes of corruption on development projects, it is clear that recipient 
countries should not be solely blamed for it. The interactions between private organisations 
and government institutions can be conducive to corrupt practices. 
A body of literature has documented the role of the private sector in perpetuating corrupt 
practices through a variety of different mechanism, including misrepresentation of 
information and other fraudulent practices (Briloff, 1976, 1981; Tinker, 1985; Bakre, 2007; 
Sikka, 2008; Otusanya, 2010). However, successive governments in developing countries 
have done little to bring culprits to justice due to poor regulation and ineffective sanctions 
(Bakre, 2007; Otusanya, 2010). However, more recently, research has focused on corruption 
in private firms (Aguilera and Vadera, 2008; Argandona, 2003; Ashforth and Anand, 2003; 
Bayar, 2005; Pellegrini, 2011; Shore and Haller, 2005). Della Porta and Vannucci (2012) 
posit that for the corruption scenario to exist there should a contractual relation between at 
least one of the corrupt party and the organisation from which the resources are extracted. 
It has been further argued that, in some cases there could be more than two parties involved 
(Pellegrini, 2011; Varese, 2000). Interestingly, Johnston (1997) includes private parties in 
his definition by defining it as ‘the misuse of public roles and resources or the use of 
illegitimate forms of political influence by public and private parties’.  
Governments procure goods, works and services, involving huge amounts of money. Public 
procurement systems are the bridge between public requirements and private sector 
providers. Due to the huge amount of money involved in procurement activities, this is a 
fertile ground for corruption (Hawkins et al., 2011; Søreide, 2002; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 
While there have been many efforts to regulate the conduct of government officials in 
government procurement through anti-corruption legislation and procurement reforms, it 
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remains vulnerable to corruption (OECD, 2016; UNOCD, 2012). Sikka and Lehman (2015, 
p. 9) refer to public officials as ‘greedy, deviant, opportunistic and lacking in self-control’. 
While many controls are in place from the demand-side, there is little effective control from 
the supply-side. Galang (2012) asserts that the differing effects of corruption across 
countries has varying consequences on the performance of contractors. This can be 
attributed to differing national attributes, such political structures, cultural norms and 
history (Husted, 1999; La Porta et al., 1999) which have a direct influence on the supply-
side of corruption in these funded projects.  
3.1.4 Impact of corruption on projects 
According to Wei (2000), the prevalence of corruption in a recipient country discourages 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Rajeev (2003) notes that corruption is a common feature 
for most developing countries because of inadequate government policies to counter it. He 
further asserts that firms are enticed into a vicious cycle of corruption because the likelihood 
of being caught is negligible when compared to the benefits that can be gained. In fact, 
empirical studies point to the negative impact corruption can have on development: 
researchers claim that corruption can skew public spending on basic infrastructure 
(Delavallade, 2006) and even increase the cost of development (Tekin-Koru, 2006; Guetat, 
2006).  
Corruption is deleterious to economic and institutional development (World Bank, 2000). 
While the exact volume and extent of corruption is difficult to estimate (Serra and 
Wantchekon, 2012), endeavours have been made to quantify it. The European Commission 
(2011) estimated it to be around $2.6 trillion a year. Clearly, this figure is significant enough 
to have a serious social and economic impact on the lives of citizens (Sikka and Lehman, 
2015). According to Bhargava (2006, p. 5), corruption is perceived as a ‘cost reducing 
growth and development through the diminution of investments made at the domestic and 
international levels’. 
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3.1.5 Corruption in victimology 
Corruption has many victims: the state, competing firms, the community, and even societies, 
including the actors who indulge in corruption. While some studies view corporate crime as 
a ‘victimless crime’ (Croall, 2001, pp. 8-9; Wells, 2014, p. 26), some empirical studies 
consider it to have a negative impact on the poor and vulnerable. A culture of competition 
coupled with a complex set of organisational values and beliefs can have a ‘criminogenic 
effect on organisations’ (Coleman, 1995, p. 363). While competition produces maximum 
economic value for society as a whole, this demand for success and the pursuit of wealth is 
seen by criminologists as criminogenic in itself (Punch, 1996). Even, globalisation is 
considered as contributing to a criminogenic development, which multiplies, intensifies, and 
activates ‘criminogenic asymmetries’ that lie at the root of corporate crime (Passas, 1998).  
3.2 Incentives to commit fraud 
Existing literature provides an explanation on the motivations of individuals who commit 
fraud for their individual interests (Cressey, 1953). Experts in the field of fraud have 
conceptualised fraud in organisations by referring to the ‘fraud triangle’. The three points 
that are referred to are: the opportunity to act fraudulently; an incentive or pressure to do 
so; and rationalisation of their actions (see figure 8). The three elements should be present 
for a fraudster to commit the fraud. Clearly, the fraud is motivated for individual gain 
(Morales et al., 2014). However, organisational fraud is conceived of, as a dual failure, one 
in individual morality, and the other in the organisation’s endeavours to control individual 
probity (Morales et al., 2014). Based on Berger’s (2011) classification, Sutherland provides 
a micro-sociological perspective on his analysis of white-collar crime, whereas Cressey 
focuses on an individualistic explanation. According to Cressey’s individualistic theory, 
embezzlement is an act committed by the individual for the sake of his own financial 
interest. Cressey argues that the motivation is due to an individual problem. When 
Chapter 3                                                                       Review of literature on organisational corruption 
45 
considering the spectrum of perspectives in the field of academic criminology, Cressey’s 
thinking appears to be rather restricted. His analysis does not extend beyond the individual 
perspective. 
 
Figure 8 : The Fraud Triangle 
 
Cressy is not interested in identifying external factors that may explain why certain 
problems become ‘non-shareable’. Overall, Cressey’s (1953) findings do not tell us much 
about the sociological causes of ‘fraudulent’ violations. Mainly, they focus attention on the 
idea that embezzlement is committed when an individual considers that his situation makes 
the act of misappropriation feasible. Cressey focuses on phenomena located within the 
individual – perceptions, opinions and justifications that one gives to oneself. In so doing, 
his theorising is consistent with individualistic explanations of criminal behaviour (Berger, 
2011, p. 30), overlooking the micro-sociological as well as macro-sociological explanations 
and marginalising social environments and circumstances. 
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3.2.1 Critics of the fraud triangle 
Coleman (1985) criticises Cressey for his non-shareable financial problem as he undermines 
external factors that could presumably explain it. Clearly, Cressey identifies individualist 
motives based on moral deviance and downplaying socio-political roles. Nevertheless, it 
has been used as a justifiable argument to explain organisational fraud (Abbott, 1988). From 
Cressey’s perspective, the organisation is solely responsible for ensuring that there is a 
proper system of internal control within the organisation. As such, when a fraud occurs in 
an organisation, both the individual and the organisation are to share the blame (Morales et 
al., 2014).  
Notwithstanding the above shortcomings, several researchers have drawn heavily on the 
fraud triangle to elaborate their conceptual framework (Cohen et al., 2010; Murphy, 2012; 
Murphy and Dacin, 2011; Srivastava, Mock and Turner, 2009; Stuebs and Wilkinson, 
2010). Some argue that the basic principles and assumptions stand good and can even be 
used to predict the presence of fraud within an organisation (Cohen et al., 2010; Murphy, 
2012; Murphy and Dacin, 2011; Wilks and Zimbelman, 2004) while others argue the 
effectiveness of the fraud model to be unconvincing (Strand et al., 2010; Wilks and 
Zimbelman, 2004). The main weaknesses are internal control and the morality of 
individuals. 
Subsequent studies draw on the modified version of the fraud triangle. For instance, 
Fitzsimons (2009) and Murdock (2008) have instead used the terms pressure, motive and 
need. Many authors replace opportunity with the effectiveness of internal control (Albrecht 
et al., 2004, 2010; Alleyne and Howard, 2005; Clayton and Ellison, 2011; Fleak et al., 2010; 
Hillison et al., 1999; Kelly and Hartley, 2010; Peterson and Gibson, 2003; Ravisankar et al., 
2011; Srivastava et al., 2009; Strand Norman et al., 2010). According to Albrecht et al. 
(2010), this neglect is justified as the three branches of the fraud triangle are correlated. 
Some authors even talk about a fourth dimension which is the capability to commit fraud 
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(Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004; Dorminey et al., 2010; McKnight et al., 2008). In some cases, 
the fraud triangle is even enhanced in conjunction with a theory, namely the routine activity 
theory (Ramamoorti, 2008) or the attribution theory (Wilks and Zimbelman, 2004). Ethical 
organisations and those that purport to be ethical, have an onus upon them to show that their 
efforts are both humanitarian and that ethical failure on the part of a humanitarian 
organisation could well result in diminished contributions and a lessening of effectiveness. 
Both efficiency and moral probity are essential for such organisations. 
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) introduce a fourth factor, namely the capability of the 
perpetrator to perform the corrupt acts. Dellaportas (2013) proponed that the diagrammatic 
representation might be misleading as it may infer equal weightage of the factors and reject 
the fourth dimensions as proposed by Wolfe and Hermanson (2004). Morales et al. (2014) 
have criticised the fraud triangle model for its inexplicit and unconvincing empirical 
assumptions. The empirical findings of this research identify four key determinants to 
explain corporate corruption (see figure 26 above). These results find an echo in the 
conclusions of Morales et al. (2014) who highlights that ‘by applying the fraud triangle 
some important influences, such as capitalist competition and external societal pressure, 
may be missed out.’ This study proves this assertion to be correct. 
3.3 Criminological theories on organisational corruption 
Research in organisational corruption is anchored in and built upon different theories. 
Depending on which perspectives the researcher is looking at, these theories can be used to 
partially or fully explain the phenomenon under study. Some of the theories below have 
been used to explain the organisational involvement in corrupt practices, albeit in different 
set up. 
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3.3.1 Strain theory 
Strain theory could predict rule breaking in any organisation, at every level. On the basis of 
a meta-analysis of studies of the effectiveness of deterrence of corporate crime, Simpson 
(2006) concludes: ‘The evidence is far from conclusive regarding whether corporate 
violators should be criminally prosecuted or whether other justice systems (civil or 
administrative) produce higher levels of corporate compliance or if sanctions should be 
directed toward the company, responsible managers, or both’. This is the limitation of the 
effectiveness of criminal law: you can put them in jail, but you cannot put them out of 
business (Huisman and Nelen, 2007). 
3.3.2 The rational choice approach 
The rational choice approach argues even more explicitly, that corporate crime, like all other 
organisational acts, is based on an assessment of costs and benefits made in connection with 
the efforts to attain the objectives. According to this theory, corporate crime can occur even 
where an organisation has no problem in achieving its objectives. Rules are broken if this 
would be more advantageous than observance and the benefits easily outweigh the risks – 
for example, the risk of being caught and sanctioned. The establishment of an organisation 
creates a boundary with the outside world and results in a distinction between what is 
important and what is not important to the functioning of the organisation (van de Bunt, 
2010).  
3.3.3 Social disorganisation theory 
Social disorganisation theory is a macro-level criminological theory intended to explain 
how aspects of a community contribute to deviant and criminal behaviour among its 
residents. The theory traces its roots to Parks and Burgess (1925). Shaw and McKay’s 
(1942) social disorganisation theory is an expansion of Burgess’s (1925) concentric zone 
model aimed at identifying the facets of the community that lead to crime and delinquency. 
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Shaw and McKay (1942) assert that these facets do not directly cause crime, but rather 
impair the ability of residents in the area to engage in both formal and informal social control 
of their neighbours to prevent crime and deviant behaviour. Sutherland (1937) avers the 
causes of criminality do not lie in the psychological traits of the individual, but instead in 
the socialisation and cultural traits that allow certain individuals to indulge in criminal 
behaviours. He further postulates that criminology greatly underestimates (or even 
obscures) the violations of law perpetrated by persons of the upper socio-economic class 
(Sutherland, 1983). His hypothesis highlights socialisation and learning process as central 
explanations of criminal behaviour, in contradiction to the traditional theories of crime that 
ascribe criminal behaviour to poverty and its associated pathologies (Shapiro and Schall, 
1990). According to Sutherland (1949), employees perform unethical or even illegal acts as 
they discover that their professional success will depend on this. As Berger (2011, pp. 6-7) 
points out, Sutherland’s broader definition of white-collar crime also includes violations of 
non-criminal law. 
3.3.4 Dimensions of national culture 
Many theories have been advanced in an attempt to delineate the relationship between 
corruption and national culture. Various approaches to the theory of governance such as 
organisational theory (Heady, 2001), cultural theory (Parsons, 1951), structural-functional 
theory (Almond and Coleman, 1960), and political elasticity theory (Werlin, 2003, 2007) 
have attempted to explain the relationship between general governance and the cultures of 
different nations. However, the explanations offered by these theories have been inadequate. 
More specific theories have attempted to address the dimensions of particular national 
cultures by reviewing frameworks of national culture (Hofstede, 1980; Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck, 1961; Ronen and Shenkar, 1985; Schwartz, 1994; Triandis, 1995; Trompenaars, 
1993; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1998). 
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3.3.5 Different labels for corruption at organisational level 
3.3.5.1 White-collar crime  
White-collar crime that characterises the field of criminology has spurred much 
disagreement over its nature (individual or collective) and cause (moral or sociological) 
(Benson and Simpson, 2009; Berger, 2011; Coleman, 1985; Colvin et al., 2002; Poveda, 
1994). Accordingly, Berger (2011, p. 27) suggests distinguishing between macro-
sociological, micro-sociological, and individualistic models in the studying of white-collar 
crime. Macro-sociological theories focus on the broader historical, economic, and political 
factors that impact organisations, while micro-sociological theories ‘focus on the link 
between individual actors and their immediate organisational circumstances’ (Berger, 2011, 
p. 117). For their part, individualistic theories ‘focus on the causes of crime that are located 
within the individual rather than the social environment’ (ref needed again). 
In 1939 Sutherland introduced the criminological concept of white-collar crime and defined 
it as a ‘crime committed by a person of respectability or high social status in the course of 
his occupation’ (Sutherland, 1961, p. 9). Interestingly, he pointed out that it can be 
committed on the individual or the organisation’s behalf. According to Sutherland, all forms 
of white-collar crime do not necessary fall under criminal law and thus can also be resolved 
using civil procedures or disciplinary actions. As such, it may not fall under criminal law 
offences. He also mentions the ability of organisations to commit white-collar crime without 
being perceived as criminal or without being detected or prosecuted. He explained this by 
the cultural homogeneity of people working for government.  
The problem associated with corruption is its covert nature. It operates like a vicious cycle 
whereby the problem is magnified over time - the greater the ability to corrupt, the greater 
the ability to remain invisible (Beare, 1997, p. 68). Contrary to the individual pathology of 
corrupt offenders, from a macro perspective, white-collar offenders are psychologically 
‘normal’ (Coleman, 1998, p. 178). The limitation of legislations in countries with 
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anticorruption laws yields less optimistic results as criminal sentences are limited (Huberts 
and Nelen, 2005) or the cases end up with disciplinary sanctions or being dismissed for lack 
of evidence (Slapper and Tombs, 1999, p. 87). This problem is even more acute in the 
private sector. 
3.3.5.2  State-corporate crime 
Government corruption involves officials using public resources and authorities for their 
personal gain (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, and Eden, 2005). However, most research in 
government corruption is anecdotal and lacks theoretical grounds on the mechanisms on 
which it operates (Berkovich, 2016). State-corporate crime provides a framework for 
studying forms of organisational deviance created or facilitated by the intersection of 
political and economic institutions (Kramer and Michalowski, 2006, p. 18). The state, as 
participant in the commission of corporate crime, acts either as a facilitator or as the initiator. 
However, as noted by Kramer et al. (2002), certain behaviours committed at the intersection 
of corporate and state are not regarded as criminal even though they may cause social harm. 
Corruption can therefore be a casual factor or a result of this nexus of state-corporate 
relations leading to deviant behaviour. In fact, the concept of state-corporate crime reflects 
the fulfilment of mutually agreed objectives of a public agency and a private entity achieved 
through cooperative illegal activity (Friedrichs, 2007, p. 147). 
Normally, state-facilitated activities occur when government institutions fail to restrain 
illegal acts because of collusion between the state and corporate actors. Arguably, as 
observed by researchers, for the deviant action to occur, there needs to be some assistance 
from the other party (Kramer et al.; 2002, p. 270; Aulette and Michalowski, 1993, p. 173; 
Green and Ward, 2004, p. 28; Whyte, 2003, pp. 579-580).  
Kramer et al. (2002) provide an overview of the origins of the concept of state-corporate 
crime, a term that views the harmful actions of state regimes as a type of corporate 
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offending. Many of these offences would not be treated as criminal by the justice system, 
but some researchers may label the behaviours as criminal (Machin and Mayr, 2013; 
McMullan, 2006; Wright et al., 1996). Kramer et al. (2002) contend that the integrated 
theoretical model of state-corporate crime provides criminal or deviant behaviour at the 
organisational level. They argue that the pressure for goal attainment, perceived 
attractiveness of illegitimate means, and an absence of effective social control (Kramer et 
al, 2002, p. 274) can be ingredients for criminal events. However, this model has been 
criticised by Mullins and Rothe (2007) for failing to take account of other social dimensions 
that are instrumental to the crimes of the powerful. The criticism is based on the assertion 
that the international sphere is a real and important layer of social reality that can both 
facilitate and inhibit state criminality.  
3.3.5.3 Organisational crime  
Organisational crime is defined as a ‘type of white-collar crime that is enacted by 
collectivities or aggregates of discrete individuals in the context of complex relationships 
and expectations among board of directors, executives, and managers, and among parent 
corporations, corporate divisions, and subsidiaries’ (Baker and Faulkner, 1993, p. 842). 
However, Schrager and Short (2014) also include individual action in their definition. 
Sherman (1980) disagree with this definition. According to him, it should include top 
management as the main actors. Subsequently, Ermann and Lundman (2002) talk about 
organisational elites as facilitators of organisational crime 
The literature on organisation studies identified a competitive environment as a 
precondition, which can encourage an organisation’s members to engage in corrupt 
activities (Baucus, 1994; Baucus and Near, 1991; MacLean, 2001; Szwajkowski, 1985; 
Zahra et al., 2005). This competitive environment in turn lures organisations to encourage 
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their employees to behave illegally to attain organisational financial goals (Ashforth and 
Anand, 2003; Brief et al., 2001; Vaughan, 1983; 1996). 
3.3.5.4 Occupational corruption 
Occupational corruption is precisely what Sutherland (1953) claimed about organisations 
despite his definition of white-collar crime being criticised. Clinard and Quinney (1973, p. 
188) originated the concept of occupational crime. The other part of white-collar crime is 
organisational crime or crime committed by an organisation or a member of an organisation 
in the interest of the organisation. The lack of clear definition of corruption, coupled with 
the difficulties of leaving the criminal law borders behind, have impeded criminologists to 
research corruption at the organisational level.  
3.3.5.5 Corporate Crime 
Studies have shown conflicting results regarding the causes of corporate illegality. Some 
studies indicate that large firm size (Bacus and Near, 1991; Cochran and Nigh, 1987; Dalton 
and Kesner, 1987; Simpson, 1986), environmental scarcity (Staw and Szwajkowski, 1975), 
and poor financial performance (Cochran and Nigh, 1987) may lead to corporate deviances. 
Contrastingly, other research shows that large firms do not commit proportionately more 
violations than smaller firms (Clinard et al., 1979), and that poor performance is not a cause 
of corporate illegality (Baucus and Near, 1991).  
Researchers agree that traditional criminological theories may not apply to corporate crime. 
Typically, traditional criminological theories ignore organisational factors, while 
explanations for corporate offending must consider these same factors to fully understand 
corporate offending. The societal response to corporate offending tends to minimise the 
seriousness of these offences. Calavita and Pontell (1993) suggest that corporate crime 
should be conceptualised similarly to organised crime with a focus given to the organisation 
rather than the status of the offenders. Moreover, Passa (2005) points out that some 
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corporate misdeeds may not technically be illegal according to criminal law. Many 
researchers recognise that a definition of a behaviour as illegal by the justice system does 
not necessarily label that behaviour as criminal.  
Some authors define corporate crime as an illegal way to achieve legal objectives (Shover, 
1978; Finnery and Lesieur, 1982; Kramer, 1982). Interestingly, they are committed 
individually or in groups by employees of the organisation within the context of the normal 
operation of organisational activities. Normally, in the case of corporate crime, employees 
of the organisation are the perpetrators who act in their capacity as dedicated members of 
the organisation to commit the crimes. Corporate crime is becoming an ongoing reality and 
no organisation is immune to its destructive effects (Said and Johari, 2016). Therefore, it is 
imperative to understand the patterns of corporate crimes and why the corporate actors are 
willing to engage in corrupt transactions. 
For criminologists, corporate crimes extend beyond the legal boundaries of crime. From a 
criminological perspective, it includes behaviours, which can be socially harmful, but which 
are not necessarily criminal offences under the law per se. Van de Bunt (1994) recognises 
the damaging effects of corporate crime. He proposes to curb harmful behaviours by 
fostering social responsiveness. Sutherland (1949) failed to recognise that power buttresses 
social status. By failing to recognise this power factor, Sutherland did not distinguish 
between individual and corporate crime. This idea is based on a number of theoretical 
assumptions about the causes of corporate crime. The well-known anomie theory of Merton 
(1938) still serves as an important source of inspiration in this connection: organisations are 
primarily geared to achieving specific objectives, in most cases, maximising profits. They 
always operate in an uncertain environment, are continually in competition with other 
organisations and are tempted to resort to illegal methods if these would make it easier to 
achieve their objectives. 
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Numerous case studies confirm that organisations can indeed be induced to engage in 
criminal behaviour through specific, adverse market conditions (Bensman and Gerver, 
1963; Leonard and Weber, 1970; Calavita and Pontell, 1990). However, this explanation is 
incomplete since corporate crime also occurs in other conducive circumstances. Indeed, 
there are a few empirical indications that there is a greater likelihood of corporate crime 
when the problems of attaining objectives increase. 
3.3.5.6 Economic Crime 
The concepts of economic crime and corruption vary across societies and perhaps rank as 
amongst the costliest of all criminal activities. Economic crime and corruption can be 
overlapping concepts. Grabosky (2001) argues that economic crime is among the costliest 
of all criminal activities. He generally refers to economic crime as fraud in its various 
manifestations. Major forms of economic crime are fraud against governments, insurance 
fraud, fraud against employers, fraud against shareholders, bribery and corruption, money 
laundering etc. One of the ways in which economic crimes differ from conventional crimes 
is that the detection and investigation of these crimes has been, and still is, the concern of a 
wide range of regulators (Grabosky, 2001). 
3.3.5.7 Political corruption 
Political corruption is the abuse of entrusted power by political leaders for private gain, with 
the objective of increasing power or wealth. Political corruption does not necessarily involve 
money changing hands; it may take the form of ‘trading in influence’ or granting favours 
that poison politics and threaten democracy. Political corruption is an obstacle to 
transparency in public life due to the secretive connections it entails. It involves a wide 
range of crimes and illicit acts committed by political leaders before, during, and after 
leaving office. It is distinct from bureaucratic corruption insofar as it is perpetrated by 
political leaders or elected officials who have been vested with public authority and who 
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bear the responsibility of representing the public interest. In other words, political corruption 
takes place at the highest levels of political authority where policy formulation and 
legislation are tailored for the economic gain of both the politicians and the legislators 
(Bakre, 2008). In a survey conducted by OECD in 2016, it was found that among companies 
around the world, many indicated that undue political pressure was used to gain business 
advantage, despite legislation that aimed to level the international playing field.  
3.4 Organisational dimension of corruption 
Graycar and Prenzler (2013) identify three corruption involvements, namely:  
 corrupt individuals;  
 corrupt groups; and  
 corrupt organisations.  
According to Graycar and Jancsics (2017), when actions influence public policy, we need 
to focus on the organisational dimension. According to Graycar and Jancsics (2017), bribes 
reallocate organisational resources in order to serve organisations’ goals, enhance their 
business, and guarantee their long-term survival. 
3.4.1 The criminology of corruption 
Criminology is a scientific discipline, which studies crime as a phenomenon. According to 
criminologists, using a criminological perspective to study corruption, gives a better 
understanding of corruption as a criminal phenomenon. Different concepts have been used 
for the study of corruption as a criminal phenomenon, namely, organised crime, 
occupational crime and organisational crime, depending on the research perspective. 
Corruption is an elusive phenomenon conceptually (Jancsics, 2014) and is predominantly 
perceived to be a deviation from social rules (Friedrich, 1993; Huntington, 1968; Serra and 
Wantchekon, 2012). Corruption is also a multidimensional phenomenon. There have been 
different theories of corruption, which address: 
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 the role of the economy (Campos et al., 1999; Mauro, 1995); 
 the state (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Holmes, 2000; Riley, 1993: Jomo and Khan, 
2000); and 
 society (Gupta, 1995; Pavarala, 1996; Ledeneva, 1998).  
From a micro-level perspective, many studies have attributed corruption to the individual’s 
predispositions, including: 
 a lack of integrity (Frost and Rafilson, 1989);  
 moral identity (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Reed and Aquino, 2003); 
 self-control (Marcus and Schuler, 2004); 
 empathy (Eisenberg, 2000); 
 low levels of cognitive moral development (Kohlberg, 1969; Treviño, 1986; 
Treviño and Youngblood, 1990; Weber and Wasieleski, 2001); and 
 diagnosable psychopathology (Babiak and Hare, 2006).  
From a macro-level perspective, studies have shown that unethical organisational climates 
(Victor and Cullen, 1988) and cultures (Treviño, Butterfield and McCabe, 1998) can 
influence the propensity of an individual to commit corruption. Empirical evidence suggests 
that motivations for corruption are wide-ranging and can be explained by a number of 
criminological perspectives, including: 
 strain theory (Merton, 1938, 1957); 
 rational choice theory (Becker, 1968, 1976; Clarke and Felson, 2004); 
 differential association (Sutherland, 1947); and  
 social disorganisation theory (Shaw and Mckay, 1942).  
Jancsics (2014) classifies the different studies of corruption into three main categories:  
 a micro-level perspective, whereby the individual actors make the decision to 
corrupt;  
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 a macro perspective that focuses on social norms and the structural 
arrangements that encourage corruption; and  
 a relational approach that examines social interactions and networks among  
corrupt actors.  
A micro perspective gives a restricted understanding of how the organisational environment 
becomes corrupt over time and how individuals are interlinked in the corrupt networks. 
Corruption is not only a state but also a process (Ashforth et al., 2008). As such, it is a 
dynamic disease and can evolve in complex ways. Moreover, corruption is an emergent 
phenomenon that is difficult to predict. Therefore, individual traits and organisational 
characteristics measured in a snapshot fashion are unlikely to depict the true corruption 
scenario.  
The dynamics between government and corporate organisations has spurred much debate 
(Ring, Bigley, D’Aunno, and Khanna, 2005) and there is an increasing literature in 
organisation studies focusing on corruption, either as an individual or as an organisational 
issue (Coleman, 1987; Sherman, 1980; Wheeler and Rothman, 1982; Hellman, 2017). From 
a structural perspective, it is agreed that that corruption is not an individual act or decision 
but rather a phenomenon that is institutionalised and embedded into a social structure 
(Anders and Nuijten, 2008). Consequently, individuals are enticed into corruption because 
organisations produce a culture that encourages deviation from formal rules and procedures, 
which becomes normalised in the long term (Vaughan, 1996). 
3.4.2 Corporate responses to corruption 
Galang (2012) avers that firms are not passive responders to government corruption. 
Through their strategic activities, they are actually active contributors in abetting or resisting 
government corruption. A firm’s strategic reaction to corruption builds on a framework first 
proposed by Austin (1990). Most firms react by conducting activities that primarily benefit 
themselves at the expense of other economic players: this reaction can worsen the impact 
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of corruption (Galang, 2012). The interplay between external political institutions and social 
norms with the internal organisational structure can play a vital contingent role in inducing 
individual firm reactions to corruption (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002; Zahra et al., 2005). 
Differences in each firm’s corporate culture and structure determine the receptivity of 
individual managers to external pressures and thus influence the firm’s decision on how to 
react to these perceived pressures (Delmas and Toffel, 2008). Prior research points to board 
composition, organisational culture, and senior leadership as among the more influential 
factors affecting the individual employees’ probability of engaging in illegal activities 
(Zahra et al., 2005). 
3.4.3 The causes of corruption in organisations 
An explanation for the causes and occurrence of corrupt activity is usually found in the 
interaction of individual and social structures. The causes of corruption have been examined 
from a variety of perspectives; for example: public choice; ‘bad apple’; organisational 
culture; clashing moral values; and the ethos of public administration. With regard to public 
choice theory, the individual is portrayed as a rationally calculating person who decides to 
become corrupt when the expected advantages of the corrupt activity outweigh its expected 
disadvantages (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Klitgaard, 1988; Graaf, 2007). There is a causal 
chain from bad character to corrupt act; in other words, the cause of corruption is found in 
defective human character and a predisposition toward criminal activity (Punch, 2000; 
Graff, 2003). Organisational culture theories focus on the culture and structure of the 
organisation within which the agent is working.  
Mbaku (1991) has argued that in societies where public service remuneration levels are 
relatively low, a significant part of the public employee’s total compensation may be derived 
from engagement in outside activities, resulting in a significant increase in bureaucratic 
corruption. People’s behaviour is shaped by their culture (Mbaku, 1996; Akindele, 2005). 
As Mbaku (1996) notes, corruption in developing countries is often believed to arise from 
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the clash or conflict between traditional values and the imported norms that accompany 
modernisation and socio-political development. The vacuum created by this conflict opens 
up opportunities for individuals to behave in a manner justified by neither modern nor 
traditional norms (Bayley, 1966; Alam, 1989; Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1991). Some have 
argued that government intervention in private sector activities is a major cause of 
corruption (Donahue, 1989; Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1991; Lambsdorff, 2006). 
It has been argued that, as corruption is a social practice perpetrated by individuals and 
organisations, it is an inherently difficult task to measure the involvement of these social 
actors (Dreher et al., 2004; Seligson, 2006; Urra, 2007; Sikka, 2008). Developing countries 
cannot be accused of being corrupt without the connection of corrupters- the supply-side 
(Varese, 2000; Sikka, 2008). Thus, corruption has been theorised using a variety of 
methodological frameworks in order to throw light on the practice as a social and a political 
problem. (Bakre, 2007) argues that anti-social practices cannot easily be perpetrated without 
the involvement of intermediaries and professionals. 
3.4.4 Social norms in shaping organisational behaviours 
Social norms are the general behavioural expectations that people hold in a given context 
and represent one of the most powerful ways that people influence each other’s behaviour 
(Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno, 1991). People are eager to behave in socially approved ways, 
and, as a result, attend both consciously and unconsciously to myriad environmental and 
social cues in search of guidance (Betterhausen and Murnighan, 1985; March, 1994; Weber, 
Kopelman and Messick, 2004). These findings suggest an intersection between social norm 
theory and social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982). Essentially, people copy the behaviour of 
in-group members. 
Some commentators have described organisations as inherently amoral – that is, incapable 
of attending to the moral implications of their actions (Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Brief, 
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Buttram and Dukerich, 2001; Clinard and Quinney, 1973; Gross, 1978, 1980). Gross (1978) 
even claims that ‘all organisations are inherently criminogenic’. Others have asserted that 
organisations frequently develop cultures that tolerate violations of the law that benefit them 
(Apel and Paternoster, 2009; Jacklall, 1988; Sutherland, 1983). 
3.4.4.1 Socialisation 
Organisational socialisation sets up role expectations for individuals, communicates which 
organisational goals are important, and establishes appropriate ways to achieve them. 
Socialisation processes are agnostic about questions of morality. However, when 
individuals are new to an organisation or when a pre-existing organisational culture re-
socialises them to new institutional demands, they look for cues from others to identify 
appropriate behaviour (Bettenhausen and Murnighan, 1985; Weber et al. 2004). They may 
acclimatise to norms that are morally corrupting (Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Brief et al., 
2001; Coleman and Ramos, 1998; Shweder, Mahapatra and Miller, 1990). Thus, through 
socialisation processes, organisations can reinforce social facilitators of moral neglect 
(Ashforth and Anand, 2003). 
3.4.4.2 Organisational goals 
Fundamental to organisational life, goals are often set for individual, team, and firm-level 
activities and are then regularly monitored and assessed to maximise performance. The 
evidence that goals motivate behaviour is overwhelming (Locke and Latham, 2009). 
However, concern that goals can degrade moral behaviour is growing (Barsky, 2004, 2008; 
Ordonez et al., 2009; Schweitzer et al., 2004). Individuals appear to be more likely to behave 
unethically when goals have been set for them compared to when they have been asked 
simply to ‘do their best’, particularly when they just ‘missed’ those goals (Schweitzer et al., 
2004). Goals often involve profit targets, driven by a ‘bottom-line mentality’ (Wolfe, 1988) 
in which self-interest is the primary motivation and profit the primary objective.  
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At the individual level, when employees engage in corruption for the benefit of the 
organisation, they are expecting a variety of benefits, such as a promotion, a raise, or a bonus 
(Stevenson and Wagoner, 2011). Goals promulgated by organisational authorities may 
cause employees to neglect the moral implications of the actions they take to meet these 
goals through a phenomenon called goal shielding. By mobilising and focusing our 
behaviour toward specific ends, goals lead us to neglect other (often desirable) behaviour 
(Shah et al., 2002). Goals and incentives can both telescope our attention toward an outcome 
and blind us to the reasons the goals or incentives were set up in the first place. 
3.4.4.3 Group loyalty 
As Ashforth and Anand (2003) note, group loyalty is a fundamental facilitator of moral 
justification. If the main intrapersonal consequence of moral neglect is a failure to 
acknowledge or integrate moral considerations into decision-making and behaviour, moral 
justification prompts us to reconstrue immoral choices as morally innocuous or even 
morally righteous. Organisations can reinforce social influences that lead to moral inaction 
or immoral action because they are commonly structured in ways that allow employees to 
minimise moral agency for their actions. 
3.5 Organisational corruption 
Corruption in organisations is a complex phenomenon (Ashforth et al., 2008). It is described 
as an organisational pathology that results from built-in features of governance interactions 
and impediments created by a bureaucratic structure (Ackerman, 2001). From this 
perspective, corruption based on the organisational level is perceived to be less about 
individual transactions and more about networks of factors (Schmidt, 2016).  
Pinto, Leana, and Pil (2008) distinguish between ‘organisations of corrupt individuals and 
corrupt organisations’. The propensity for employees in an organisation to commit fraud 
and corruption increases in the absence of concrete sanctions at organisational level (Button 
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et al., 2015). This is particularly true for those contracting organisations that are called upon 
to implement development projects in aid-recipient countries because malpractices and 
corruption thrive in weak control environments and where the risk of detection is weak 
(Dorminey et al., 2010, p. 558). From a criminological perspective, the commission of an 
act of corruption involves a decision-making process (Prabowo 2014, p. 310) where a 
number of variables are taken into consideration prior to its commission. It is also argued 
that human action is organised around calculative strategies aimed at utility maximisation 
relevant to the employees of these contracting organisations (Hayward, 2007, p. 223).  
Arguably, it is individuals who are the vehicles facilitating corrupt practices. From a micro 
perspective, the predominant explanation for corruption resides in the attributes of 
individuals or groups of individuals colluding. However, there is wide recognition that 
internal forces within the group or the organisation influence individual behaviours. This 
view shifts the focus from corrupt individuals within organisations to corrupt organisations. 
3.5.1 The two dimensions of corruption in organisations 
Researchers have used different theoretical perspectives from disciplines such as 
economics, political science, criminology, sociology, and management studies to explain 
organisational corruption. Among the different perspectives are: 
 (individual) the principal-agent models (Banfield, 1975; Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-
Ackerman, 1975; Tirole, 1996); 
 (group) social networking (Brass et al., 1998; Nielsen, 2003); 
 ethical decision-making frameworks (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Jones, 1991; Jones 
and Ryan, 1997; Treviño, 1986; Treviño and Youngblood, 1990); 
 models of corporate crime (Albanese, 1988; Braithwaite, 1984; Clinard and Yeager, 
1980; Pearce and Snider, 1995); and  
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 normalisation of corruption (Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Brief et al., 2001; Gioia, 
1992).  
While there is a rich body of literature on corruption based on a variety of perspectives, the 
dynamics of corruption remain difficult to explain because of the often-overlapping 
concepts (Simpson, 1986). 
 
 
According to Pinto, Leana and Pil (2008), it is important to assert whether the individual or 
the organisation is benefiting from the corrupt activity. This is an important dimension to 
be considered as the organisational level of analysis (Finney and Lesieur, 1982). While an 
organisation may put in place appropriate structures to prevent corruption within and against 
it, it can encourage corruption on its behalf (Ashforth and Anand, 2003). The organisation 
is still considered the primary and direct financial beneficiary (Wheeler and Rothman, 
1982). Researchers into organisational corruption - where the actions directly rebound to 
the benefit of the organisation and its owners/shareholders - have recognised its negative 
impact (Baucus, 1994; Daboub et al., 1995; Schrager and Short, 1978). They have classified 
it in various ways as: 
Figure 9 : The two dimensions of organisational corruption 
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 illegal corporate behaviour (Clinard, Yeager, Brisette, Petrashek and Harries, 
1979); 
 unlawful organisational behaviour (Vaughan, 1983);  
 corporate crime (Albanese, 1988; Braithwaite, 1984; Clinard and Yeager, 1980; 
Pearce and Snider, 1995); 
 business crime (Clarke, 1990); 
 corporate fraud (Comer, 1998); and  
 corporate deviance (Ermann and Lundman, 2002).  
What is common in this type of organisational corruption is that it is carried out by 
organisation’s members (Baucus, 1994; Daboub et al., 1985; Schrager and Short, 1978). 
 
  Figure 10 : Different forms of organisational corruption  
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3.5.2 Collusion among corporate members 
According to Pinto et al. (2008), collusion among organisational members is an essential 
component of corporate corruption. It can either be top management (Daboub et al., 1995; 
Kesner, Victor, and Lamont, 1986) or a group of an organisation’s members (Braitwaite, 
1982; Clinard, 1983). It is clear that corporate crime is usually a top-down phenomenon in 
which organisation members who are in position of power, organisational elites (Ermann 
and Lundman, 2002) or the top management team undertake, directly or through their 
subordinates, collective and coordinated corrupt actions that directly benefit the 
organisation. This is an organisational-level phenomenon where the organisation is both the 
primary beneficiary and responsible for the corrupt act. Pinto (2008, p. 532) termed this as 
a ‘top-down phenomenon where the organisational elite has embraced corrupt ways of doing 
business for its own clique’s benefit or to benefit the whole organisation’. He further asserts 
that this corruption typically involves third parties or external actors. 
However, Schrager and Short (1978, p. 411) come up with a controversial definition of 
organisational crime. They define it as acts committed by ‘an individual or a group of 
individuals in a legitimate formal organisation in accordance with the operative goals of the 
organisation’. This perspective of including individual action is debatable. Here, the 
argument of Sherman (1980) is shared given the difficulties that could arise in assessing the 
intent of individual action, thus blurring the definition. There is no much consensus among 
researchers that the collusion among organisational members is an essential component of 
corporate corruption.  
3.5.2.1 Organisation of corrupt individuals 
According to Pinto et al. (2008), corruption at the organisation level can manifest itself 
through two distinct dimensions: organisations of corrupt individuals and corruption 
organisations. An organisation of corrupt individuals is an organisational behavioural 
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phenomenon where the individuals or groups of individuals are the primary beneficiaries. 
Researchers have described it as a bottom-up phenomenon because it represents the 
behaviour of lower grades of staff (Brief et al., 1993; Kozlowski and Klein, 2000).  
Social literature considers the corrupt organisations phenomenon as involving a group rather 
than an individual actor. When organisations are being investigated for corruption, the first 
defence of senior management is often an attempt to scapegoat the individual members who 
have been found to be directly involved in the corrupt behaviour (Ermann and Lundman, 
2002). Indeed, according to Ashforth and Anand (2003), organisational structures and 
processes are often contrived to isolate senior managers from blame. 
3.5.2.2 Corrupt organisations 
There is much literature on collusion among members of the organisation (Brass et al., 1998; 
Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Jones, 1991; Jones and Ryan, 1997; Robinson and Bennett, 
1995). However, a few studies confirm the existence of collusion between members of the 
organisation for the benefit of the individual at the cost of the organisation (Ashforth and 
Anand, 2003; Chang and Lai, 2002; Mars, 1974). Corporate crime and organisational crime 
are enacted by an organisation’s members, which can either be top management (Daboub et 
al., 1995; Kesner, Victor, and Lamont, 1986) or a subset of employees (Braithwaite, 1982; 
Clinard, 1983). According to Pinto et al. (2008), some senior management may be unaware 
because of group-level structural holes. 
Corrupt organisations are described as a discrete top-down phenomenon (Pinto et al., 2008) 
where influential members of the organisation influence lower-level employees to act in a 
particular way (Kozlowski and Klein, 2000) and coordinate corrupt actions that primarily 
benefit the organisation. While the organisation is the primary beneficial of such corrupt 
actions, it is also the culpable entity. According to Needleman and Needleman (1979), the 
corrupt organisation phenomenon could be the result of either crime-coercive or crime-
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facilitator crime facilitation. In a crime-coercive situation, pressure is exerted on the 
member to commit the act for the benefit of the organisation, whereas in a crime-facilitator 
situation, the organisation is indirectly encouraging the corrupt behaviour. Farberman 
(1975) used the term criminogenic mechanism to describe the conducive environment that 
allows or encourages criminal activity. 
There are strong arguments that this phenomenon not only encourages corrupt behaviour 
for organisational benefits but also normalises and perpetuates corruption in the 
organisation (Anand, Ashforth and Joshi, 2004; Ashforth and Anand, 2003). When 
members put themselves at legal and reputational jeopardy to engage in corrupt practices 
that primarily benefit the organisation, it is likely that they identify with the organisation 
strongly to begin with, and that identification is further strengthened by the corruption (Pinto 
et al., 2008). In fact, it is considered that there should be combination of persons and 
situations that is most likely to result in organisation-level corruption (Kidder, 2005; Ryan 
et al., 1997; Pinto et al., 2008). The corruption mechanism in corrupt organisations 
necessarily involves the internal employee and third parties who are external to the 
organisation (Baker and Faulkner, 1993; Geis, 2002). 
If corrupt behaviour does spread through the organisation, it is more likely to permeate 
vertically through superior-subordinate relationships, termed crimes of obedience and 
routinisation (Hamilton and Sanders, 1999; Kelman and Hamilton, 1989). Industry 
mindsets, sometimes termed industry culture (Baucus and Near, 1991; Christensen and 
Gordon, 1999) or industry recipes (Spender, 1989), may result in many organisations 
(within a particular industry) adopting similar corrupt organisation-type practices. 
Criminogenic mechanisms refer to mechanisms that allow or encourage criminal activity 
(Farberman, 1975). The management literature has examined a variety of criminogenic 
mechanisms, such as transaction systems (Vaughan, 1982), organisations (Waters, 1978), 
market structures (Farberman, 1975), industries (Denzin, 1977; Tillman and Pontell, 1995), 
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and governments (Glasberg and Skidmore, 1998). Daboub et al. (1995, p. 141) have posited 
that firms in certain industries are more likely to commit corrupt acts (Baucus and Near, 
1991; Simpson, 1996) and that firms in certain sectors have similar rates of corrupt activity 
(Cressey, 1976). Svensson (2003) explains these differences across industries through legal 
structures, regulations, government monitoring and different opportunities for wrongdoing. 
Black (2004) identified building construction as vulnerable to corrupt organisation (CO) 
type corruption. 
Competition could provide the motivation for attaining the desired levels of performance 
(Sethi and Sama, 1998; Vaughan, 1983; Waters, 1978). It has been argued that even in the 
CO model, corrupt behaviour can permeate the organisation (Hamilton and Sanders, 1999; 
Kelman and Hamilton, 1989). In general, organisations adopt CO practices to be in line with 
the industry ‘mindset’ (Baucus and Near, 1991; Christensen and Gordon, 1999). In fact, 
when the members of an organisation engage in corrupt practices that primarily benefit the 
organisation, they are putting themselves at legal and reputational risk. Pinto and el al. 
(2008) assert that this is possible when the members identify strongly with the organisation. 
He also warns that organisation engaged in CO run the risk of eventual extinction. To date, 
theory and research on corruption in organisations has primarily focused on its static 
antecedents. Fraud is contagious and corrosive and ‘allow[s] small frauds to escape 
unpunished and they will soon grow’ (Comer, 1985). Some sort of process must have taken 
place in these companies through which they turned increasingly corrupt over time.  
Much theoretical and empirical research has been conducted into the causes of corruption 
in organisations (Baucus and Near, 1991; Daboub et al., 1995; Treviño and Weaver, 2003; 
Vardi and Weitz, 2004). Weick (1979), however, holds that when factors are highly 
interdependent – as many organisational processes are (Masuch, 1985) – focusing on a 
single factor obscures the fact that organisational degradation processes may grow in scale 
Chapter 3                                                                       Review of literature on organisational corruption 
70 
over time. Robinson and Greenberg (1998) made a case for examining the dynamics of 
corruption in organisations followed by Treviño et al. (2006).  
3.5.2.3 The corporate dynamics of corruption defined 
Following Sherman (1980), Ashforth and Anand (2008) define corruption as the misuse of 
authority for personal, subunit, and/or organisational gain (2003). They interpret misuse of 
authority as violating organisational and/or societal norms by way of using whatever one is 
entrusted with in the course of performing one’s job. The focus is on organisational factors. 
As organisational factors are embedded in the structure and culture of the organisation, as 
such, they may stimulate or impede employee corruption. The relationship between 
organisational factors and corruption is usually depicted as a static relationship. It is further 
exploited in different studies: ethical climate (Peterson, 2002); role-set configurations and 
opportunities (Vardi and Weitz, 2004); and impact of leadership (Sims and Brinkmann, 
2002). There are also studies based on a number of factors (Brief et al., 1995; Giacalone and 
Greenberg, 1997; Treviño and Weaver, 2003). 
3.6 Project management principles in development projects 
PM is the process that enables a project to be completed successfully (Turner, 1993) while 
Atkinson et al. (2006, p. 23) suggest that ‘the objective of PM is to mitigate risks in projects 
while ensuring that the specified objectives are met’. Turner (1993, p. 75) defines a project 
as ‘an endeavour in which, human, material and financial resources are organized in such a 
way as to undertake a scope of work, of particular specification, within the cost and time 
constraints, so as to achieve beneficial change defined by quantitative and qualitative 
objectives’. PM involves techniques and concepts that can play an important role in the 
management of projects. 
While PM offers useful methodologies, approaches, tools and techniques for it may not 
necessarily lead to project success because of inherent obstacles. Ika (2012) identifies the 
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following three major obstacles: political; organisational; and cultural. Out of the three 
obstacles, he identifies the cultural trap as the one that has greatly influenced project 
success. Because of the different cultures of countries, the PM approach should be tailored 
to overcome these obstacles (Stuckenbruck and Zomorrodian, 1987). According to Mir and 
Pinnington (2014), organisations involved in development projects should invest in PM for 
increased project success.  
3.6.1 Definition of project success 
By their very nature, each development project is different. Since no two projects are similar 
in complexity, the criteria for measuring success of a project vary (Müller and Turner, 
2007). In fact, there is no universally agreed criteria for measuring the success of a project 
(Westerveld, 2003). According to Müller and Jugdev (2012), the crux of the problem is 
because a clear and standard definition of project success does not exist. Taking into 
consideration the problem of finding a clear definition of project success, there is consensus 
of the importance of developing a meaningful and measurable construct of project success. 
Moreover, stakeholders interpret project success differently (Cleland and Ireland, 2006; Lim 
and Mohamed, 1999). There is scant literature on the drivers of success of funded projects 
(Khang and Moe, 2008; Diallo and Thuiller, 2004, 2005; Ika et al., 2010). These projects 
are characterised by their own specificities (Diallo and Thuiller, 2004, 2005) and, 
consequently, the PM literature is unable to address these specificities (Diallo and Thuiller, 
2005; Khang and Moe, 2008; Ika et al., 2010; Ika et al, 2012). 
3.6.2 Project governance 
Fighting corporate corruption requires continuous intervention of the organisations 
implementing the project during the project life cycle. This is true for all levels of 
management and for all subcontractors. Sitorus and Scott (2009) rightly indicate that to 
eliminate corruption there should be organisational adaptation. The challenge for corporates 
is therefore to reconcile the management of projects with the overall governance structure 
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so that PM techniques and tools for different projects are aligned with the strategic 
objectives of the organisation (Too and Weaver, 2014). It is recognised that a lack of 
appropriate governance structures during project developments is a major constraint 
(Crawford et al., 2008; Sargeant, 2010). In order to respond to the project and organisational 
project governance should be aligned to the overall PM techniques throughout the project 
lifecycle (Sanderson, 2012). 
Governance is central for an organisation in ensuring that corrupt behaviour is kept at bay. 
It is, therefore, important that governance should run from the board level; top management 
down to the operational level (Klakegg et al., 2008). With an appropriate governance 
system, the contours of structures used by the organisation is defined. It also ensures that 
rights and responsibilities are allocated within those structures and management is operating 
with the parameters of the defined structures. Many researchers have rightly argued that the 
main objective of project governance is about the creation of accountability frameworks 
(Knode, 2004: Ross and Weill, 2002). 
There should be effective support of the organisation’s management system for the project 
governance system to operate. Too and Weaver (2014) refer to the role of management as 
the mirror image of governance to illustrate the strong management commitment that should 
exist for the governance system to work effectively. Consequently, the success or failure of 
a project is strongly dependent on the support of top management (Young and Jordan, 2008; 
Lechler and Cohen, 2009). 
3.6.3 Corporate factors 
While much corrupt behaviour could be based on characteristics of the fraud triangle, there 
remains some corruption that remains ‘mysterious’ and ‘difficult to understand’ (Ashforth 
et al., 2008, p. 670). In recent years, increasing attention is being devoted to examining fraud 
in organisational settings (Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Collins et al., 2009; Palmer, 2008; 
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Zahra et al., 2005). The framework begins with an individual who is not predisposed 
towards fraud and has not knowingly committed fraud before, facing both the opportunity 
and motivation to commit fraud. For example, it can be used to explain how fraud becomes 
normalised within an organisation, consistent with Ashforth and Anand (2003). In the first 
phase, top management makes a ‘rational’ decision to commit fraud that outweighs the 
costs. 
By interviewing persons convicted of embezzlement, Cressey (1973) categorised conditions 
in fraudulent financial activities into pressure/incentive, opportunity, and 
attitude/rationalisation. The fraud triangle indicates pressure/incentive to perpetrate fraud, 
opportunity to carry out the fraud, and attitude/rationalisation to justify fraudulent action. 
Such events or conditions are referred to ‘fraud-risk factors.’ Although these fraud-risk 
factors do not necessarily imply the existence of fraud, they are often present in 
circumstances where fraud exists. 
3.7 Concluding remarks 
There is a clarion call to move the research agent beyond the individualistic acts of deviant 
behaviour (Della Porta and Vannucci, 2012; Hellman, 2017). Criminologists agree that in 
order to understand the phenomenon of corporate corruption, there is a need to focus on the 
larger institutional environments in which they operate that facilitate their crimes and how 
those environments were created. There is in fact a lack of extant literature on how 
corruption evolves at organisational level (Jávor and Jansics, 2016).This thesis focuses on 
corporate corruption by focusing at the macro-level perspective. By focusing on a macro-
level associated with corporations coupled with the research strategy as set out in Chapter 
4, the dynamic and complexity of corporate corruption will be studied. This will provide a 
more comprehensive picture of how the organisational structure, component characteristics, 
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and relationship dynamics shape the opportunity and motive for corporate corruption in 
development projects. 
The literature on corruption provides an individualistic vision of corruption and there is a 
dearth of studies on the organisational aspects for organisational benefits. While the factors 
in Cressey’s theory (1973) may still be present in the corporate setting, the predominating 
determinants are not the same. The motivations of the corporate actors do not necessarily 
hinge on individual pressure but instead on other factors beyond the individual perspective 
that will be investigated in this research.   
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Chapter 4 Research Methodology 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the methodology used in this research, starting with a restatement 
of its aims and objectives. The literature review identified the research ‘gap’, which set the 
road map for this research in order to empirically identify determinants of corporate 
corruption. The different data collection tools used to achieve the research objectives are 
explained. The discussion that follows focuses on the rationale of each data collection tool 
and the reasons for its use with particular reference to relevant literature. The ethical 
considerations identified in this methodology, and the methods employed to mitigate them, 
are also considered. Finally, the chapter reviews the limitations of the methodology and its 
possible impact on the ability to achieve the research’s aims and objectives. 
4.1 Aim of this thesis 
The aim of the research project has been stated as: 
To identify the determinants of corporate corruption in international developmental 
projects.  
In order to achieve this aim, the following four subsidiary research questions have been 
examined: 
 What are the challenges facing MNCs engaged in international development 
projects? 
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 How effective are MDBs’ sanctions regimes in mitigating corruption risks? 
 How is the definition of project success conducive to controlling corporate 
corruption? 
 How is corporate corruption triggered by corporates representing the business side? 
 
The literature review developed in chapter 4, identifies areas of prior scholarship and locates 
the research within the context of existing literature. It reveals gaps that exist in the literature 
and points to a need for further research to better understand corporate corruption. The 
overarching research question provides the general direction in understanding the research 
problem. It also serves as a basis for the emerging four sub-questions of the research.  While 
the main question allows to capture the basic goals of the study, the four subsidiary 
questions that emerged were helpful in reorienting the study design and collection of data. 
These sub-questions narrow the broader focus of the overarching question while giving 
direction to the different type of data that need to be collected. 
 The first question seeks to identify the challenges facing MNCs involved in 
international development projects. This sub-question is appropriate in 
understanding the motivations of these corporates in engaging in corporate 
corruption. While researchers have identified the external corporate environment as 
conducive to corruption, there is a lack of empirical research regarding the 
challenges facing these MNCs. 
 The second question looks at the effectiveness of the sanction regimes in mitigating 
corporate. It will also help to understand whether the sanctions regime has to be 
reviewed to better address the phenomenon of corporate corruption. There are no 
prior research done on the effective of the sanction regime of MDBs. 
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 The third question seeks to identify whether the definition of project success is 
conducive for corporates to controlling corporate corruption. This is a gap that this 
study will address. 
 The fourth question helps to understand how these corporates instigate or facilitate 
corporate corruption. Based on the literature review, there is a death of research on 
corporate actors’ involvement. This question will throw more light on the modus 
operandi of the corporate actors. 
4.2 Complexity of research in the field of corruption 
As a criminological researcher, it is essential to identify different forms of evidence, data or 
information in answering the research questions (Crowther-Dowey and Fussey, 2013) raised 
by the research. In undertaking criminological research, it is incumbent upon the researcher 
to develop detailed and sophisticated understanding of the different methods to be adopted 
in addressing the research questions. However, there is also a prior question that needs to 
be addressed: how can the nature of corruption be studied? Treisman (2000) points out the 
difficulty of empirically studying corruption because its determinants tend to change so 
quickly that its cause and effect become inextricably interwoven. Moreover, Jávor and 
Jancsics (2016) warn of the difficulties in capturing the complexity of organisational 
corruption with a single perspective. In general, researchers agree that a more 
comprehensive understanding of corruption requires an interdisciplinary perspective 
(Ashforth et al., 2008; Getz 2006). This research adopt such perspective. 
4.2.1 Challenges and benefits of being an insider researcher 
In the context of this research, the researcher is an insider-researcher, working as a Senior 
Investigator for the AfDB. Insider-researchers are those who choose to conduct research 
within the organisation to which they belong to (Breen, 2007). In the process of determining 
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the research questions, the insider status of the researcher affected the process. While the 
main research question emerged from the researcher’s passion and interests in the topic, the 
subsidiary research questions emerged through a reflective and reflexive process and the 
ethical stand taken by the researcher. As an insider researcher, it is imperative that ethical 
issues related to anonymity of the organisation and participants to the study as well as 
compliance and access to privileged information that emerged throughout the research 
process are properly addressed (Smith and Holian, 2008). 
Conducting insider research is a complex process with many benefits, but it also poses 
significant challenges and opportunities. The merits and demerits of insider research has 
been probed quite extensively in the literature. Scholars have identifies advantages of being 
an insider-researcher. Some of the advantages identified in conducting of this research are:- 
 Ability to ask meaningful questions and to identify non-verbal cues as well as 
the ability to project a more truthful, authentic understanding of the culture under 
study (Merriam, Johnson-Bailey, Lee, Kee, Ntseane, and Muhamad, 2001; p. 
411); 
 Researcher has greater understanding of the culture being studied (Bonner and 
Tolhurst, 2002); 
 Expediency of access for the researcher (Chavez, 2008, p. 482); 
 Acceptance by participants to participate in the research (Dwyer and Buckle, 
2009); 
Some of the constraints of conducting research as insider-researcher identified by scholars 
are :  
 Researcher’s prior knowledge can be considered a bias (DeLyser, 2001; Hewitt-
Taylor, 2002); 
 A deterrent to objective perception and analysis (Aguiler, 1981, p.15); 
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 Inherently biased being too close to the culture (Merriam et al., 2001); 
 Insider’s privileged access (Drake, 2010); 
 Insider researcher may become privy to confidential information about colleagues 
and/ or institution (Bell, 2005). 
In order to mitigate any potential bias as a result of the researcher status, trustworthiness of 
data gathered was ensured through accurate data collection. 
4.3 Research philosophy 
In designing criminological research, it is not only necessary for the researcher to appreciate 
different research methods but also to understand the philosophical assumptions 
underpinning the methodologies adopted and their implications for the nature of the 
knowledge to be produced (Denscombe, 2010, p. 116). The epistemological approach 
adopted to the research needs to be justified, taking into consideration its limitations and the 
sourcing of information. Whilst, for some, the choice of research paradigm may be couched 
on ideological commitments, for others, a pragmatic approach to the appropriateness of the 
research prevails (Denscombe, 2010, p. 128; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  
Epistemology is concerned with ‘how we know what we know’ about the social world 
(Baille, 2003, p. 94), while ontology is concerned with observing and understanding the 
social world. Researchers can take a positivist or an interpretivist position depending on 
their perception of the social and physical worlds. The epistemological position and the 
ontological perspective of the research tend to be associated with particular methodologies.  
In the case of this research, initial explorations indicated that a constructionist perspective 
was the most appropriate. According to Berger and Luckman (1966, p. 30), in order to grasp 
the reality of society, the researcher needs to focus on how reality is constructed. The focus 
of this research is the multidimensional nature of corruption and the interaction of different 
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actors within and outside the corporates involved. As such, the constructionist paradigm is 
considered most appropriate in understanding the perspectives of the participants through 
observing their meaning, habits, routines and categorisations (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 
2009). The overriding principle in constructionism is to maximise research objectivity in 
inherently subjective sociological questions. An adaptive mixed method approach is 
considered the most appropriate to answer the multidimensional and elusive concept of 
corruption in organisations (Denscombe, 2010, p. 134). 
4.3.1 Research strategy 
The research strategy adopted in this thesis is guided by the research questions. Using 
quantitative methods has the advantage of providing a holistic picture of the different 
questions raised in this research and will engender greater focus when using the qualitative 
methods (Morgan, 1998; Morse, 1991) at a later stage. In embarking on the research 
questions, the different research methods and strategies were analysed. The benefit of using 
combined both quantitative and qualitative methods have been assessed to be very useful 
(Branner, 2005). The main premise of mixed methods is that it is possible to use different 
data collection methods to look at the same issue. 
The research method consists of how the researcher collects, analyses, and interprets the 
data (Creswell, 2009). From the outset, it was clear that this research study demanded a 
robust research strategy to demystify the supply-side of corruption emanating from the 
business side. The research environment influenced the research process (Brannen, 2010). 
For the purpose of this study, the findings were collected, scrutinised and reviewed 
holistically in line with the research questions (Remenyi et al., 1998). Corruption thrives on 
secrecy, hence the need to adopt different methods so that the research questions are 
answered using the different perspectives (Getz, 2006). In line with Evertsson (2017), the 
research process adopted helps to understand the problem under scrutiny in a holistic way. 
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Quantitative research alone does not seem to tell the whole story about the nature of 
corporate corruption. It ignores the characteristics and details of the context of the 
corruption cases. Quantitative research cannot account for contingency, which is so 
important for social research – and especially corruption research. This is because of the 
complexity of the phenomenon of corruption. Consequently, it says little about the causes 
of corruption (de Graaf, 2007) and seldom leads to policy advice. 
The quantitative element of the research is an important component that supports the 
qualitative endeavour by targeting firms aggrieved by being sanctioned/ cross-debarred by 
MDBs. The quantitative procedure involves one component: a survey questionnaire 
addressed to firms which have been debarred and have not engaged into a NSA with the 
MDB.  
The deeper qualitative research employed three components: 
 Semi-structured interviews provided data from a broad range of perspectives 
involving different actors within the AfDB. 
 A multi-case study of four firms which have engaged in NSAs with the AfDB. 
 A qualitative content analysis gave an in-depth understanding of project 
governance in MDB-financed projects, including whether firms are equipped to 
address corporate corruption risks effectively and to ultimately achieve project 
success. 
Due to scant literature on corporate corruption, an explorative and inductive research 
strategy was chosen. Specifically, a multiple case study design was used, which focuses on 
the dynamics present within single settings (Eisenhardf, 1989; Herriott and Firestone, 1983; 
Yin, 1989) to generate a theory in the shape of propositions (Gersick, 1988; Harris and 
Sutton, 1986). This method is fitting when not much is known about the phenomenon that 
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is being researched and/ or when the phenomenon is complex. In fact, researchers 
recommend this line of action (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Hoffling, 2002).  
It is essential that the research questions are addressed from an objective point of view to 
yield constructive findings. Moreover, to obtain valid and reliable findings the research 
methods have to be appropriate and achievable (Bryman, 2012). The research 
methodologies used were influenced by the researcher’s epistemological and ontological 
assumptions. The researcher’s interpretivist stance is that the social world is different from 
the physical world in that its realities are socially generated, implying the need to study the 
people involved in its processes.  
4.4 Using mixed methods for this study 
Rossman and Wilson (1985) identified three reasons for combining quantitative and 
qualitative research:  
 Firstly, combinations are used to enable confirmation or corroboration of 
each other through triangulation; 
 Secondly, combinations are used to enable or to develop analysis in order to 
provide richer data; and 
 Thirdly, combinations are used to initiate new modes of thinking by 
attending to paradoxes that emerge from the two data sources. 
By examining published research, Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989) inductively 
identified the following five broad purposes or rationales of mixed methodological studies:  
(a) triangulation (seeking convergence and corroboration of results from different 
methods studying the same phenomenon),  
(b) complementarity (seeking elaboration, enhancement, illustration, and 
clarification of the results from one method with results from the other 
method),  
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(c) development (using the results from one method to help inform the other 
method),  
(d) initiation (discovering paradoxes and contradictions that lead to a reframing of 
the research question), and  
(e) expansion (seeking to expand the breadth and range of inquiry by using 
different methods for different inquiry components). 
It is agreed that pragmatism is a well-developed and attractive philosophy for integrating 
perspectives and approaches. It offers an epistemological justification (i.e., via pragmatic 
epistemic values or standards) and logic (i.e., to use the combination of methods and ideas 
that helps one best frame, address, and provide tentative answers to one’s research 
questions) for mixing approaches and methods. 
Furthermore, the mixed methods research paradigm offers an important approach for 
generating important research questions and providing warranted answers to those 
questions. This type of research should be used when the nexus of contingencies in a 
situation, in relation to one’s research question(s), suggests that mixed methods research is 
likely to provide superior research findings and outcomes. 
Based on a survey of research method literature (Beurig and de Vries, 2015; Silverman, 
2013; Bryman, 2008; Robson, 2011; Jupp, 1989; Mc Neill and Chapman, 2005), the 
research questions addressed in this thesis were achieved by using a mixed method 
approach, as follows: 
(i) An online questionnaire survey; 
(ii) A qualitative interview schedule; 
(iii) A case study; 
(iv) A qualitative content analysis. 
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Prior to starting the study, several possible data-gathering approaches were considered. 
Clearly, the schemes, preferences and motivations of offenders represented by the corrupt 
firms are directly important to this study. However, direct access to offenders for interviews 
is problematic as they are virtually inaccessible in terms of post-event research. An online 
survey questionnaire was administered and is considered an efficient and effective means 
of reaching the intended audience as the link to the survey could be emailed to the sanctioned 
firms with an attached covering letter explaining the objective of the research and the 
importance of their responses. 
4.4.1 Justifications for using mixed methods 
Guided by the research questions above, this research used mixed methods to appreciate the 
multidimensionality of the phenomenon under study. The benefits of combining methods is 
well recognised by many researchers (Branner, 2005). Moreover, attributing specific 
quantifiable values to continually changing social phenomenon is a key challenge for 
criminological research (Crowther-Dowey and Fussey, 2013).  
As noted by Hobbs (1998, p. 14), using a range of quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies has merits in criminological research as it can forcibly be helpful in finding 
the link between criminality and control. In a similar vein, Ziedonis (2004) proposes to use 
qualitative methods to build an initial theoretical framework, followed by a quantitative 
method to test and build on the theory proposed. This approach has the merits of providing 
a holistic picture of the different questions raised and it can test hypotheses. The mixed 
method approach also has the merit of providing an analytical framework to uncover the 
micro-level interactions of individuals while considering macro-level institutional 
embeddedness (Bandelj, 2012; Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994). The principles and rationale 
for using of the qualitative and quantitative tools are outlined below. A mixed method is 
broadly defined as: 
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‘Research in which the investigator collects and analyses data, integrates the 
findings and draws inferences using both qualitative and quantitative approaches or 
methods in a single study or a program of inquiry.’ (Tashakkori and Creswell, 2007, 
p. 4).  
The different tools for data collection are used in a well-coordinated manner. Moreover, the 
use of a mixed method approach allows the triangulation of results and thus remains an 
effective approach in testing the validity and reliability of data collected (Greene et al, 1989, 
p. 256). Individual data collection methods inherently have advantages and limitations 
when compared with other methods. The use of a mixed method approach exploits the 
strengths of each method used (Jick, 1979, p. 604) while mitigating deficiencies (Greene, 
2008, p. 17). These selected data collection methods provide specific types of data and lead 
to better quality results (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 15) and throwing more light 
to the phenomenon of corporate corruption. 
4.4.2 Reflexivity 
Recruiting of participants and negotiating access to organisations for the conduct of research 
are often difficult, particularly when the topic is sensitive, or the subjects are vulnerable 
persons (Kalof, Dan and Dietz, 2008, p. 116). Usually, researchers are complete outsiders, 
which means they have to win the trust of the participants or their gatekeepers to gain initial 
access and then maintain that trust throughout the research (Clark, 2011). However, there 
are cases when the researchers are complete insiders (for example, Holdaway, 1997), or 
temporary insiders (for example, Ditton (1977)). For the outsiders, the level of scrutiny, 
trust and consequent access may be contingent on the race, ethnicity, religion, gender and 
socio-economic group of the researcher in relation to the subject participant or group 
(Lumsden and Winter, 2014, p. 5).  
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It is essential that the research questions be addressed from an objective point of view so 
that constructive findings can emerge through the process. To yield valid and reliable 
findings the research methods have to be appropriate and achievable (Bryman, 2012). The 
research methodologies are based on the reflection of the author’s epistemological and 
ontological assumptions. For the purpose of this research, the participants were not 
interviewed as representatives of their organisation but more as individuals. 
4.5 Using triangulation 
Triangulation is a technique that is used to validate data through cross verification from two 
or more sources (Bogdan and Biklen, 2006). Cohen and Manion (2000) define triangulation 
as an ‘attempt to map out, or explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human 
behaviour by studying it from more than one standpoint’. In particular, it refers to the 
application and combination of several research methods in the study of the same 
phenomenon. Triangulation is recognised to be beneficial for increasing the understanding 
of the studied phenomenon (Olsen, 2004), increasing accuracy of the study (Campbell, 
1966; Denzin, 1978; Smith and Kleine, 1986; Webb, 1966) and clarifying disparate results 
(Mertens and Hesse-Biber, 2012). To address the research questions identified in this 
research from different angles and in different ways, the concept of triangulation was 
applied (Denzin, 1970, p. 300). More specifically, cross-method triangulation, which 
concentrates on the use of different data collection methods for addressing the research 
questions, was used.  
The use of triangulation depends on the researcher’s philosophical position. However, when 
such is the case, the researcher has to justify the use of this strategy in their research (Knafl 
et al., 1996). With triangulation strategy, multiple methods, including qualitative and 
quantitative methods, are used to study a research question (Jick, 1979). Howe (2012) 
submits that triangulation puts the data into a more explanatory framework. As advocated 
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by Denzin (1978), triangulation enables the researcher to increase the accuracy of the study 
while enhancing the viability and reliability of the research findings (Maguire, 2000). As 
identified by Shih (1998), the two reasons for using triangulation for this research hinge on 
the purposes of confirmation and completeness. Triangulation is also used for validating 
quantitative studies by the qualitative studies. This is generally the case when the research 
phenomenon under study has little theoretical underpinnings. 
4.5.1 Methodological triangulation 
The primary philosophy of mixed method research is that of pragmatism. Mixed method 
research is ultimately an approach to knowledge that considers multiple viewpoints, 
perspectives, positions, and standpoints. The convergence of findings stemming from two 
or more methods ‘enhances our beliefs that the results are valid and not a methodological 
artefact’ (Bouchard, 1976; p. 268). Denzin (1978; p. 14).) recommends the use of between-
method triangulation, contending that by utilising mixed methods, ‘the bias inherent in any 
particular data source, investigators, and particularly method will be cancelled out when 
used in conjunction with other data sources, investigators, and methods’ and ‘the result will 
be a convergence upon the truth about some social phenomenon’.  
Morse (1991) outlined two types of methodological triangulation:  
 simultaneous triangulation represents the simultaneous use of qualitative and 
quantitative methods in which there is limited interaction between the two sources 
of data during the data collection stage, but the findings complement one another at 
the data interpretation stage.  
 sequential triangulation is used when the results of one approach are necessary for 
planning the next method. Conversely, at the design stage, qualitative data can assist 
the quantitative component of a study by helping with conceptual and instrument 
development. At the data collection stage, quantitative data can play a role in 
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providing baseline information and helping to avoid ‘elite bias’ (by talking only to 
high-status individuals). 
4.6 Case study 
A case study is various defined as a method, methodology, or research design (Bassey, 1999; 
Merriam, 1988, Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg, 1991; Yin, 1994). Some researchers depict it as 
as a research strategy and not as a method (Hartley, 2004; Titscher et al., 2000). The 
objective of using case studies as a research strategy stems from the desire to understand a 
complex social phenomenon (Yin, 2003b). As highlighted by Yin (1981), case study 
strategy allows the researcher to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-
life events while understanding complex social phenomena. 
Case study is used as a rigorous qualitative research strategy (Hartley, 1994; 2004) and is 
considered as one of the most common examples of qualitative research (Stake, 2000). It is 
an approach to research which allows for a closer look and understanding of the multiple 
facets of the phenomenon being researched (Baxter and Jack, 2008) by answering ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ types of questions. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), a case is a 
phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context. 
By adopting an explorative case study design, it allows to study the way in which firms 
become corrupt. Compiling a longitudinal history of each firm, including its violations, top 
management involvement in the activities, and the corporation’s responses to the 
illegalities, will allow a closer examination of the relationships between leadership 
behaviours by top executives and patterns of corporate illegality. This method provides 
svaluable information about the firms, particularly when researchers cannot gain access into 
the corporates. These case studies provide a unique opportunity which otherwise would not 
have been possible. Therefore, a case study seems appropriate to study the phenomenon of 
corporate corruption and the business interactions, because it allows for an in-depth analysis 
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of the roles and activities of different actors and their relations. Moreover, it allows the 
researchers to study the interconnectedness of factors in explaining the phenomenon under 
study. 
According to Van Wynsberghe and Khan (2007) a case study is a ‘transparadigmatic and 
transdisciplinary heuristic that involves the careful delineation of the phenomenon from 
which evidence is being collected’. Therefore, a case study can be used irrespective of one’s 
research paradigm and discipline orientation. Case studies offer the advantage of richer 
details of actual cases and their contextuality. Coupled with the within-case analysis is a 
cross-case search for patterns (Eisenhardt, 1989, 540). Yin (2014) identifies the three 
necessary conditions for using a case study method as follows: ‘doing a case study would 
be the preferred method, compared to the others, in situations when  
(1)   the main research questions are ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions;  
(2)   a researcher has little or no control over behavioural events; and  
(3)   the focus of study is a contemporary phenomenon’.  
All three conditions are present in this research. Using a case study method allows for the 
exploration and understanding of complex issues of the corruption scenario through an in-
depth investigation. It has been used by researchers as a research method in education 
(Gulsecen and Kubat, 2006), sociology (Grassel and Schirmer, 2006) and community-based 
problems (Johnson, 2006). This method enables the researcher to gain a better insight of 
behavioural conditions through the actor’s perspective. It has the merits of explaining both 
the process and outcome of a phenomenon through complete observation, reconstruction 
and analysis of the cases under investigation (Tellis, 1997).  
According to Yin (1994), generalisation of results from case studies, from either single or 
multiple designs, stems from theory rather than populations. By replicating the case through 
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pattern-matching, a technique linking several pieces of information from the same case to a 
theoretical proposition (Campbell, 1975), multiple-case design enhances and supports the 
previous results. This helps raise the level of confidence in the robustness of the method. 
Inevitably, a careful design of a case study is therefore very important for efficiency and 
viable results. 
4.6.1 Case study for this research 
The AfDB through its investigative department, investigates allegations of fraud and 
corruption on its funded projects. Firms or individuals found guilty of malpractices are 
sanctioned and as such are ineligible to be awarded contracts depending on the sanctioned 
period. In 2010, MDBs have signed an agreement known as the ‘Uniform Agreement for 
Cross-Debarment’, which renders a firm or an individual debarred by one of the MDBs to 
be automatically cross-debarred by other development banks. Firms which have engaged in 
a NSA with the AfDB have been selected as the case study could be readily be accessed as 
a result of the author’s professional practice and ‘insider’ relationship (Vinten, 1994, p. 30). 
An aspect of this restricted nature was overcome through the insider positioning of the 
researcher. It is an intensive study and required extremely good planning and design and a 
robust approach to data analysis. 
As part of the agreement, a firm, which is under investigation, may enter into a negotiation 
with the MDB undertaking the investigation by paying a financial penalty and consequently 
obtaining a reviewed sanction. In the case of the AfDB, this NSA requires the full 
collaboration of the firms under investigation during the investigation process. While NSAs 
are not very common, from January 2012 to August 2017, five NSAs have been negotiated 
between the AfDB and firms found guilty of fraud and corruption. Out of the five firms, one 
firm was involved in the procurement of goods while the remaining four were involved in 
development projects. The four companies involved in developmental projects are used as 
case studies in this research. When the NSAs were completed, much information on the 
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companies became available in the public domain. Given the secretive nature of corruption, 
tapping this information may prove to be very beneficial in understanding the corruption 
scenario from the business side. The case studies are used to better understand the 
mechanism employed by these MNCs in international development projects. According to 
Vaughan (2006), while case studies can be useful to study corruption, they may not 
necessarily provide an insider’s understanding, as the cases uncovered may be biased by 
political interests. This is echoed in the findings of the case studies. 
Detailed case studies of corporate corruption is an appropriate way to study the process 
through which corporates become corrupt. As a result, the case study methodology adds to 
the quantitative research. Moreover, the case studies will allow us to study the phenomenon 
within their context. This could provide a way to move with policy formulation in the 
context of the research. In fact, researchers (Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996; Della Porta, 
1997; Hoffling, 2002) recommend this approach. Each case study represents a corrupt 
corporate scenario, including the modus operandi in carrying out the corrupt scheme. The 
four cases for this research were chosen from the cases investigated by the Investigation 
Department of the AfDB, as of September 2017, which had been successfully brought into 
NSAs. Four cases were chosen to help understand the dynamics present within single 
settings (Eisenhardt, 1989; Herriot and Firestone, 1983; Yin, 1989). They enable a cross-
case search for patterns (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 540) to tease out the predisposed causes of 
corporate corruption. Conversely, it is argued that a single case study will provide the 
triggering causes instead of the predisposed causes (de Graaf, 2009).  
In fact, case studies generate a mass of data that, when analysed and organised, will probably 
provide a way to move forward with policy experiment (Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996). In 
this research, the four corruption cases are studied within their context, which provides a 
way to move to policy formulation (Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996; Della Porta and 
Vannucci, 1997; and Hoffling; 2002). 
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4.6.1.1 Challenges of this research  
It must be noted that there are considerable difficulties involved in collecting data on corrupt 
activities because corruption is, by its very nature mutually beneficial dishonesty, which is 
very difficult to investigate. Moreover, it involves secrecy of actors. For these reasons, it is 
extremely unusual for any individual acts involved to volunteer to provide details during 
the research process. Therefore, an empirical or practical descriptive work provides the most 
valuable way in developing our knowledge and understanding of the processes and practices 
that mark corruption. The guiding logic of this analysis is that understanding who were 
involved in these schemes leads us to an understanding of how these schemes were carried 
out. This will ultimately move to better understanding the broader institutional 
arrangements that lead to epidemics of corporate corruption. 
The researcher’s in-depth knowledge of and immersion within a case may lead more 
readily to confirmation bias than in some other forms of study. While the researcher is 
engaged with the literature, the formulation of the research question emerges. This 
engagement grounds the study and informs the study design, including the case selection. 
It provides insight where it was previously impossible. The nature of the case, its 
boundaries and features and why it was selected should be set out clearly (Gerring, 2004). 
Case studies are particularly prone to selection bias (Geddes, 2005). They are considered 
more useful when seeking to derive descriptive rather than causal inferences. Descriptive 
inferences are the process of using the facts we know to learn about facts we do not know. 
Researchers are prone to make mistakes when undertaking a deductive study to test the 
congruence of rival hypotheses in a context where they have insufficient knowledge about 
the independent variable causes. Case study findings are reached through a process of 
logical valid inferences regardless of whether the data collected and analysed is 
qualitative, quantitative or both (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). The analysis may also 
allow for causal interferences to be made that explain what effects would be expected to 
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occur if certain conditions were fulfilled in this and another context. However, the case 
study method is structured with triangulation of data at the fore, allowing the researcher 
to reach robust findings reached by integrating analysis from multiple data points 
gathered using different methods. 
4.6.1.2 Case selection and adequacy of sample size 
The case study approach has been used extensively in IB research to investigate numerous 
topics (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1987; Johanson and Valhne, 1977; Porter, 1990). The 
qualitative sampling is about appropriateness, purpose and access to good information 
(Coyne, 1997; Hilebrand, Kok and Biemans, 2001). Critics of the case study method believe 
that the study of a small number of cases can offer no grounds for establishing reliable or 
generalizable findings. Moving from this, a small number of cases or subjects may be 
extremely valuable and represent adequate numbers for a research project. This is especially 
true for studying hidden or hard to access populations such as deviants or elites. The 
adequacy of sample size in case study research is relative and dependent on the purpose of 
the study, where different sample strategies require different minimum sample sizes 
(Sandelowski, 1995). Dubois and Gadde (2002) argue that the choice of the number of cases 
depends on the type of research question. Researchers argue that using a greater number of 
cases brings more breadth but less depth (Rajin and Becker; 1992) 
According to Eisenhardt (1989), four to ten cases work well in generalisation of theory while 
Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that a maximum of 15 cases is appropriate for high 
complexity. In fact, there are no precise rules regarding the number of cases to be selected. 
Scholars highlight that, where a phenomenon is in question, only a single case is required 
to show that it does exist (Easton, 1998; McKeown, 1999). 
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4.6.2 Shortcomings of case study method 
While the use of a case study makes the findings and analysis context specific (Abercrombie 
et al, 1984, p. 34), it can nevertheless negatively impact the ability to make generalisations 
based on the findings (Gerring, 2004, p. 346). A limited ability to make generalisations has 
the potential to limit the relevancy and impact of a piece of research.  
From the outset, this research sought to obtain a better insight into organisational corruption 
by collecting real and detailed cases of the corrupt transactions involving the different 
actors. Of particular interest were factors such as hiding mechanisms and collusion that 
might contribute to ‘successful’, undetected corruption. According to Hartley (2004), case 
study research is a detailed investigation with the aim of providing an analysis of the context 
and processes for the theoretical issues being studied. Case studies can be used to generate 
hypotheses and build theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hartley, 1994; 2004). In order to avoid 
pitfalls associated with case study, researchers recommend that there are boundaries to limit 
any research questions that are too broad (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003a). The boundaries indicate 
the breadth and depth of the study. Different approaches have been suggested so that the 
study remains reasonable in scope, namely time and place (Crewell, 2003), time and activity 
(Stake, 1995), and definition and context (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Case study research can be used with other research strategies addressing related research 
questions in different phases of a research project. Hartley (1994) proposed that a case study 
be used followed by survey-based research to test the emerging findings. Guided by the 
research questions, it is important to identify the type of case study that is most adapted 
(Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003a). In this research, a multiple-case study approach is chosen as it 
will help to understand similarities and differences between cases. It will also enable the 
replication of findings across cases. Data is collected and analysed in an iterative process 
which ultimately allows for theory development based on the empirical evidence obtained 
(Hartley, 1994; 2004). 
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4.6.3 Philosophical underpinnings of case study method 
According to Yin (2003), a case study design should be considered when the focus of the 
study is to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. Case studies are widely used in organisational 
studies and across the social sciences, and there is suggestion that the case study method is 
increasingly being used with a growing confidence as the case study is a rigorous research 
strategy in its own right (Hartley, 1994). According to Yin (2003a, p. 2), ‘the distinctive 
need for case studies arises from the desire to understand complex social phenomena’ 
because ‘the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events’ such as organisational and managerial processes.  
A key decision for the researcher is to decide whether the research will be based on a single 
case study or on multiple cases (Hartley, 2004, p. 326). In fact, evidence for case studies 
can be sourced from documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, 
participant-observation, and physical artefacts (Yin, 2003a). Besides, a careful description 
of the data and the development of categories in which to place behaviours or processes 
have proven to be important steps in the process of analysing the data.  
The data may then be organised around certain topics, key themes, or central questions, and 
finally the data needs to be examined to see how far they succeed or fail to fit with the 
expected categories. Yin (2003) maintains that data analysis consists of ‘examining, 
categorizing, tabulating, testing, or otherwise recombining both quantitative and qualitative 
evidence to address the initial propositions of a study.’  
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Table 2 : Documents referred to in the case study 
 
Documents referred to in the case study 
AfDB Annual Reports  
AfDB Press Releases  
Affidavits  
Annual Reports of Companies under negotiation 
Courts Judgements 
 Journal Articles  
Newspaper Articles 
Press Releases 
 
4.6.4 The four case studies referred to in this research 
The four cases were selected as empirical cases as they have undergone negotiated 
settlements with the AfDB following an investigation conducted by the Integrity and Anti-
Corruption Department (IACD). These corporate scandals have international reach as these 
firms were also sanctioned. In addition, they paid a financial penalty and were eligible to a 
reduced debarred period which also made them eligible for cross-debarment from other 
MDBs. The mechanisms employed by these firms in perpetrating the corruption schemes 
will be studied and will definitely contribute to the literature. Case study is used as a rigorous 
qualitative research strategy (Hartley, 1994, p. 2004) and is considered as one of the most 
common forms of qualitative research (Stake, 2000). It is an approach to research which 
allows for a closer look and understanding of the multiple facets of the phenomenon being 
researched (Baxter and Jack, 2008) by answering ‘how’ and ‘why’ types of questions.  
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According to Miles and Huberman (1994), a case is a phenomenon occurring in a bounded 
context. According to Hartley (2004), case study research is a detailed investigation with 
the aim of providing an analysis of the context and processes for the theoretical issues being 
studied.  
4.7 Qualitative content analysis 
Content analysis is a popular research method used for qualitative research in the health 
sector. It is a flexible method for analysing text data (Cavanagh, 1997). It focuses on the 
characteristics of language as communication with attention to the content or contextual 
meaning of the text (Lindkvist, 1981; McTavish and Pirro, 1990; Tesch, 1990). The text 
data can be in verbal, print or electronic form. It includes a range of analytic approaches 
from impressionistic, intuitive, interpretive analyses, to systematic, strict textual analyses 
(Rosengren, 1981). Weber (1990) claims that the specific type of content analysis approach 
depends on the theoretical and substantive interests of the researcher and the problem under 
investigation. The objective of using content analysis is ‘to provide knowledge and 
understanding of the phenomenon under study’ (Downe-Wamboldt, 1992, p. 314). 
Qualitative content analysis is a method used to interpret qualitative data. Content analysis 
is described as a method to classify written or oral materials into identified categories of 
similar meanings (Moretti et al., 2011). Content analysis is primarily used as a quantitative 
research method. However, this method has been criticised because it can simplify and 
distort meaning as a result of breaking down text into quantifiable units in the analytical 
process. Kracauer (1952) advocates a qualitative approach to content analysis in which 
meanings and insights can be derived from the text more holistically. Qualitative content 
analysis is flexible in the use of inductive and deductive analysis of data depending on the 
purpose of one’s studies (Elo and Kyngas, 2008). 
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A researcher who uses qualitative content analysis aims to ‘systematically describe the 
meaning’ of materials that the researcher specifies from the research question (Schreier, 
2012, p. 3). Qualitative content analysis is frequently employed ‘to answer questions such 
as what, why and how, and the common patterns in the data are searched for’ by using a 
consistent set of codes to organise texts with similar content (Heikkila and Ekman, 2003, p. 
138). 
Table 3: Content analysis based on Hsieh and Shannon’s approach 
Types of Content 
Analysis 
Aim 
Appropriateness of 
approach 
Result 
Conventional 
To describe a 
phenomenon 
When existing theory or 
research literature on a 
phenomenon is limited 
Concept 
development or 
model building 
Directed 
To validate or 
extend conceptually 
a theoretical 
framework or 
theory 
Existing research on the 
phenomenon is incomplete 
Offer supporting 
or non-supporting 
evidence to a 
theory 
Summative 
To analyse 
manuscript types 
Combine the above 
Combine the 
above 
 
Hsieh and Shannon (2005) have identified three approaches for qualitative content analysis, 
namely conventional, directed and summative, which are used to interpret text data from a 
naturalistic paradigm. In a summative approach to qualitative content analysis there is an 
identification and quantifying of certain words or content in texts with the purpose of 
understanding the contextual use of the words or content (see table 3 above). This approach 
may also include latent content analysis, which refers to the process of interpretation of 
content (Holsti, 1969). The focus in this analysis is to discover the underlying meanings of 
the words or the content (Babbie, 1992; Catanzaro, 1988; Morse and Field, 1995). The data 
analysis begins with searches for occurrence of the identified words to allow for the context 
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associated with the use of the word or phrase. It is an unobstructed and non-reactive way to 
study the phenomenon of interest (Babbie, 1992). However, it is noted that the findings from 
this approach may be limited by their inattention to the broader meaning. 
4.8 Using qualitative methods – the interview schedule 
In answering the research questions, the most appropriate participants for the qualitative 
interviews are professionals with wide working experience at the AfDB. 23 interviews were 
conducted. These professionals have a wealth of experience in procurement of aid-financed 
projects in Africa. This fits with the view that the only way of discovering anything about 
the lived realities of crime, deviance and social control is to talk to the people have 
experienced and understand it (Cromwell and Olson, 2003; Cromwell, 2010; Caless, 2011). 
Undoubtedly, this enables the researcher to delve into deeper thoughts and feelings 
(Crowther-Dowey and Fussey, 2013). 
In this research, a semi-structured interview schedule was developed in order to ensure an 
objective interview structure. All the interviews were conducted by the author between 
March and August 2016. The interview was done in both English or French depending on 
the language the participants is comfortable. Due to the nature of the interviews, they were 
not recorded digitally and the participants were informed about it. However, transcripts 
were made that were subject to content analysis, coding and thematic classification. 
Interviews are an effective method of collecting qualitative data on a one-to-one basis. This 
method allows for a rich data collection using open-ended questions (Caplow, 1956, p. 165), 
which are an opportunity for the researcher to probe further for clarification based on 
responses obtained from respondents. In selecting this data collection tool for this research 
project, it was envisaged that this tool would be used to expand on the quantitative questions 
posed in the questionnaire, thus following the mixed method approach (Halcomb and 
Davidson, 2006, p. 40). Semi-structured interviews with professionals engaged in 
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development projects (see table below) were used to identify and categorise substantive 
statements (Gilham, 2005, p. 136) and relevant themes. The interviews with different 
categories of staff covered their perceptions of corruption in the field of development. In 
answering the research questions, the most appropriate participants for the qualitative 
interviews were investigators, internal auditors and procurement specialists at the AfDB. 
These professionals have wide experience in working with MNCs in aid-financed projects 
in Africa. However, it is also recognised that these professionals may only provide insight 
from the MDB’s perspective. The table below shows the total number of interviews 
undertaken as the grade of the interviewees. 
Table 4 : Grades of staff interviewed 
Grade of interviewee Number 
Directors and Managers 3 
Procurement Specialists 8 
Investigators and Integrity Specialists 7 
Internal Auditors 5 
Total 23 
 
The sample was not intended to be representative of the population but to ensure a sensible 
breadth of perspectives. The overriding objective was to recruit participants who were 
directly involved in one way or the other with developmental projects in different countries. 
As the topic was of a very sensitive nature, the participants were interviewed in their 
personal capacities and not on behalf of the organisation they are representing. In fact, it 
was explicitly mentioned at the beginning of each interview that whatever responses they 
were going to give would not be attributed to the organisation they were working for. The 
interviews were not recorded so as not to embarrass the participants due to the confidential 
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nature of corruption. However, all responses obtained were noted down and transcribed. 
Approximately 25 hours of interviews ranging from 50 to 75 minutes each were transcribed. 
The coding process was guided by the research questions. Thirteen (13) interviews were 
done in English while ten (10) interviews were done in French.  
Two prospective participants who were approached to participate in the interviews 
withdrew at the beginning of the exercise. At the start of the interview process, they were 
asked if they were confident and were willing to continue. The two prospective participants 
raised anonymity concerns as a staff of the AfDB. The process was clearly explained to 
them and they were informed that they could withdraw from the interview any time. 
Consequently, they choose not to participate in the interview exercise. The geographical 
distribution of the interview participants are shown in the table below. Among the 23 
participants, 10 participants were female representing 43.5% and 13 were male, representing 
56.5%.  73.9% of respondents have more than 12 years of working experience while the 
remaing 20.8% have between 7 to 12 years of working experience with MDBs. 
Table 5 : Distribution of participants by region 
 Region No. of interviewees 
1 North Africa 5 
2 South Africa 5 
3 East Africa 5 
4 West Africa 4 
5 Central Africa 4 
Total 23 
 
The professionals participated in the interviews willingly. Some were passionate about the 
topics and elaborated at length. Their confidence was boosted by not recording the 
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interviews. Most of the interviews were conducted out of their office. Seven interviews were 
conducted in the cafeteria while six were conducted at the interviewee’s home. The 
remaining ten interviews were conducted via Skype as they were located in different 
countries. The method supported a non-judgemental, relaxed atmosphere that allowed the 
interviewees the leeway to express themselves freely and willingly. 
Unlike written data collection methods, the conducting of interviews was affected by 
various factors, such as location and the comfort of the interviewee, and verbal/non-verbal 
cues from the interviewer (Dexter, 1956, p. 157). However, effective pre-planning reduced 
such negative effects and selecting a location which was quiet, comfortable and free from 
interruption, greatly increased the effectiveness and flow of the interview. Conducting 
interviews was a time-consuming process and therefore the total number of interviews was 
limited. As a result, a manageable number and range of interviewees were selected (Goldie 
and Pritchard, 1981, p. 64). An information sheet (see Appendix III) to gain informed 
consent was designed and given to interviewees at the start of the interview. This document 
explained the nature of the interview and the types of questions that would be asked. The 
interviewees were told that they could pass on any question that they were uncomfortable 
with or did not wish to answer. 
The use of an interview schedule allowed for information on specific points of interest to 
be obtained but also allowed for additional unexpected information to be gathered which 
could prove beneficial during analysis. The semi-structured nature of the interview 
therefore relies on a series of prepared prompts and sub-questions to ensure that ‘the 
interview does not go off on a tangent’ (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006, p. 315). The 
interviewee-led nature of the interview meant that the interviewee should be more relaxed 
and therefore more willing to supply in-depth answers to the questions asked. 
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4.8.1 Using Skype as an interview tool 
Out of the twenty three (23) participants interviewed for this research, ten (10) participants 
were interviewed via Skype, representing 56.5% of the interviewees. With internet-based 
methods of communication influencing our daily lives, researchers have new possibilities 
to contact participants situated in different geographical locations (Rowley, 2012, p. 264) 
breaking down the barrier of 'time and space' (Burkitt, 2004, p. 222). The internet is 
becoming a powerful tool for future research (Illingworth, 2001) as it provides 'new 
horizons for the researcher' (Coomber, 1997). Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) 
technologies (such as Skype and FaceTime) give researchers the possibility to interview 
research participants using voice and video across the internet via a synchronous (real-time) 
connection. However, such VoIP technologies, in spite of their growing importance in 
everyday life, have had very limited coverage so far in terms of academic research. There 
have been very few articles covering qualitative interviews using video and audio VoIP 
tools as their main topic (Cater, 2011; Deakin and Wakefield, 2013; Hanna, 2012; 
Janghorban et al., 2014; Seitz, 2015; Sullivan, 2012). 
The essence of qualitative interviews is to enable the researcher to engage with participants 
on a deeper level, to understand how they view corruption. As highlighted by Rowley (2012, 
p. 262), 'interviews are useful when: the research objectives centre on understanding 
experiences, opinions, attitudes, values, and processes'. Indeed, engaging with participants 
via Skype enables the sample to be purposeful (Mason, 2002; Sparkes and Smith, 2014) and 
the researcher to 'explore multiple facets of a problem and investigate issues holistically' 
(Sparkes and Smith, 2014, p. 70) and 'select persons … that… represent the range of 
experience of the phenomenon' (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994, p. 57).  
Skype and other VoIP technologies provide a platform that moves us towards an opportunity 
for a more democratic research process. Fleitas (1998, p. 286) argues that 'distance is a 
variable that prevents an international representation of participants in most qualitative 
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studies. The internet eliminates this barrier'. Kozinets (2009, pp. 70-71) highlights the 
problems faced by researchers, stating that: ‘once someone clears the financial and technical 
hurdles required for aptitude at computer-mediated searching and communication, an 
extremely wide array of social interactions is made accessible to them’. 
Online social interactions manifest this ethos through the general democracy and 
inclusiveness of many, if not most, online social groups. Deakin and Wakefield (2013, p. 5) 
correctly posit that Skype provides 'an opportunity to talk to otherwise inaccessible 
participants'. In fact, without Skype it would have been impossible to reach out the 
interviewees for this research as they are scattered geographically. Research findings by 
Carr (2001) suggest that synchronous online methods may be just as effective as more 
traditional methods. On the other hand, as Seitz (2015) argues, technical difficulties may 
create a loss of intimacy. However, in the context of these interviews, there was no problem 
regarding rapport with participants.  
According to Hesse-Biber and Griffin (2012, p. 56), nonverbal cues such as 'tone of voice, 
and gestures, all provide a certain richness to qualitative data'. Cohen et al. (2007, p. 153) 
agrees on the importance of nonverbal cues, stating that, because of the absence of such 
cues, 'telephone interviews can easily slide into becoming mechanical and cold'. Novick 
(2008, p. 5) further highlights this point in saying that 'nonverbal data, which includes 
responses such as facial expressions and body language' can be lost in some forms of 
interview, such as when using telephone interviews. According to Talja and McKenzie 
(2007, p. 102) 'paralinguistic cues such as gesture, facial expression, and tone of voice can 
both convey emotion and provide the hearer with clues for interpreting the meaning of an 
utterance'.  
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4.9 Quantitative method: the survey questionnaire 
Questionnaires provide a useful data collection tool to obtain large-scale quantitative data, 
which can be analysed statistically, and graphically (Murray, 1999, p. 148). Given the large 
numbers of participants scattered worldwide, this data collection tool was identified as 
appropriate to gain standardised responses. A semi-structured questionnaire was designed 
(Appendix IV). These questions were aimed at examining the experiences of firms 
sanctioned by MDBs and their perception about corruption emanating from the supply-
side. 
The standardised nature of this data collection tool means that it could easily be understood 
by respondents and effectively reproduced across different environments (Boynton and 
Greenhalgh, 2004, p. 1313). The fixed nature of the questionnaire format provided an 
opportunity for extensive refining through piloting of the draft questionnaire and redrafting 
to ensure the questions were relevant and written in plain English (Rattray and Jones, 2007, 
p. 237). The fixed nature of the tool means that changes to questionnaire cannot be made 
after the fact, meaning that effective piloting and drafting is required before the 
questionnaire is deployed (Boynton, 2004, p. 1372).  
Moreover, given the geographical spread of these sanctioned firms, it was not feasible and 
practical to visit each firm, as this would prove too costly in terms of finance and time. 
SurveyMonkey - an online survey tool was used for the conduct of the survey. The link to 
the questionnaire was e-mailed to participants and the responses collected and analysed 
online (Appendix V). As part of the author’s Advanced Research Technique module of the 
Professional Doctorate Part I, the quantitative method was tested in a small-scale study. A 
questionnaire was designed and piloted. Feedback was used to fine-tune the questionnaire 
for the main research, which targeted 125 debarred firms. These contractors were selected 
from the list of debarred entities posted on the AfDB’s website and available on the websites 
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of other MDBs.  For the purpose of this research, the survey was an appropriate mean to 
establish the perception of corporates on the sanction of MDBs and to provide their 
appreciation of the sanctioning process. The survey also enabled us to glean information on 
the drivers of corporate corruption and in conjecture with other methods enable us to answer 
the main research questions addressed in this research. 
4.9.1 Limitations of the study 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the determinants of corporate corruption by 
analysing the dynamics of corporate corruption in implementing international development 
projects. From the outset, two significant limitations emerged. The first limitation was that 
the research was limited to multinational firms engaged in infrastructural projects 
worldwide, as these firms represent a significant percentage of firms awarded MDB-
financed contracts in different countries. The research does not consider local firms as the 
main contracting agents, though it may be understood that in some cases these local firms 
may be acting as subcontractors for the MNCs.  
The second limitation was the obvious difficulties associated with research into corruption, 
that although having been extensively researched, it continues to retain a secretive existence 
making the full demystification of the phenomenon extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
Corporate corruption remains a secretive process. Again, although extensively documented, 
the increasingly sophisticated mechanism and ingenuity employed by corporates together 
with the involvements of different actors make it difficult to identify every aspect of the 
process nature without generalising particular aspects, sometimes based only upon 
suggestive evidence.   
As elaborated, the research study used a constructivist approach involving different 
perspectives of corruption occurrence in organisations. The author took the position that the 
specific research issue justifies the use of mixed methods. This position supports the choice 
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of mixed methods because of the need to collect information about multiple perspectives in 
answering the research questions. 
4.9.2 Ethical considerations 
The approach to research ethics is based on the guidance issued by the British Psychological 
Society (BPS, 2010). The practices and processes required by the University of Portsmouth 
were followed. Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethical Committee (see Appendix 
VI). The key ethical issue related to the collection of confidential organisational information 
and limited personal data. It is essential under these circumstances that disclosures do not 
cause harm to the participants or their organisations (BPS, 2010, s2.4). The BPS (2010, s3) 
recommends undertaking an ethical risk analysis. The participants freely and willingly 
provided all of the responses. No vulnerable individuals were involved to necessitate 
additional precautions.  
One of the main ethical considerations presented during the design of this research project 
was the nature of corruption. However, throughout the design and data collection phases, 
there was no reference to confidential materials or information garnered based on the 
researcher’s experience as an Investigator. The interactions with professionals were handled 
sensitively due to the subject matter. Given the range of data collection tools used it was 
important to inform respondents of both what purpose the data was collected for and who 
would have access to it. In order to reassure participants, the interviews were not recorded 
because of the sensitive nature of corruption dealt with in this study. Moreover, this 
provided anonymity to the participants. This was an essential criteria for their participation. 
The issue of the anonymity of respondents was dealt with differently for each data 
collection tool. The questionnaires did not ask any personal and identifying questions. The 
protection of anonymity was further enhanced through conducting the interviews after 
office hours in private places. At no time were the names of the interviewees, and the 
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organisations they represent, recorded; the interview transcripts were labelled only with the 
code of the participants.  
It is important that ethical considerations be taken into consideration in the conduct of a 
social research project ‘from its design to conclusion’ (Fossey et al., 2002, p. 723). 
Professional researchers have an obligation to act ethically (Kalof et al., 2008). In fact, it is 
crucial that the researchers give due considerations to any ethical concerns that may arise at 
every stage of the research design in order not to undermine the findings of the research 
(Holloway, 1997). The overall objective of such considerations on the part of the researchers 
is to protect all potential research participants from ‘harm and risk, while respecting 
vulnerable populations’ (Cresswell, 2003, p. 64). Noaks and Wincup (2004) argue that there 
is a need to protect the rights of the participants while seeking to achieve the informed 
consent and the promises of confidentiality made by the researchers. 
Ethical considerations vary depending on the position of the researchers. While it may be 
much easier to anonymise records in quantitative research (Fossey et al., 2003), it may be 
more challenging in qualitative research as the researchers have to deal with a variety of 
ethical issues such as the sensitivity, feelings and thoughts of participants which can 
undermine the anonymity of the informant in the research. Holloway (1997) argues that the 
issue of protection of anonymity is important where the researcher is part of a profession or 
organisation, which can give rise to conflicting expectations. It is incumbent upon the 
researcher to ensure that these issues are properly addressed. 
Corruption research has the potential to raise ethical issues based upon its confidential 
nature and protection of insider information (Tilley, 2009). The research methodology also 
presents several ethical considerations, ranging from using insider information, to the ability 
to influence the research process. Accessibility presented a significant challenge for this 
research given the confidential nature of the investigation process. The adoption of the 
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research methodology implies that the researcher has acquired an internal perspective for 
the conduct of the research. This ‘internal perspective’ provides opportunities for ethical 
breaches. To circumvent this issue, all the information used was available in the public 
domain and participants were allowed to withdraw from the research at any point. 
The survey questionnaire was disseminated through SurveyMonkey, which was in fact an 
ideal platform as it kept the respondents anonymous. In drafting the questionnaire, questions 
relating to details and information about the company, which could make them identifiable, 
were deliberately skipped (Fossey et al., 2002). Subsequent interviews endeavoured to 
secure the identity of the participants. The questions asked were specific to the research 
questions and refrained from asking about the personal experiences of the participants 
(Creswell, 2003). To ensure full anonymity, a numerical code represented each participant. 
4.10 Concluding remarks 
This chapter covers the research process, the data collection phase and the ethical dilemmas 
faced in this research process. The adoption of a mixed method perspective to conduct the 
study was the result of pragmatism. The primary interest of this study was to test a new 
concept, which has not been thoroughly addressed in the literature. The research questions, 
which are of the ‘what’ and ‘how’ type, are appropriate for mixed methods analysis 
(Tashakkori and Creswell, 2007, p. 207). Table 5 below summarises the key methodological 
choices used to answer the research questions based on the objectives set out in this research. 
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Table 6: Data collection methods relevant to each research question 
Aim of research 
What are the determinants of corporate corruption in international developmental projects? 
Objectives Data Collection Methods 
What are the challenges facing MNCs engaged in 
international development projects? 
 Survey Questionnaire 
 Interview 
 Case study 
How effective are the MDBs sanctions regimes in 
mitigating corruption risks? 
 Survey Questionnaire 
 Interview 
 Case study 
How is the definition of project success conducive in 
controlling corporate corruption? 
 Qualitative Content 
Analysis 
How is corporate corruption triggered by corporates 
representing the business side? 
 
This objective will draw upon all 
the data collection methods as 
outlined in this methodology 
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Chapter 5 Case studies of sanctioned firms 
5.0 Introduction  
It is instructive to examine a few scenarios, based on real events, in which the mechanism 
for corporate corruption can be understood and analysed. Following investigation of alleged 
corruption cases by the AfDB and full admission of guilt, five companies agreed to engage 
in a negotiation process with the AfDB. The option of payment of a financial penalty and a 
restricted debarment period were offered to them as mitigating factors for their 
collaboration. Out of the five firms, one firm was involved in procurement of goods while 
the remaining were involved in development projects. The four companies sanctioned by 
the AfDB are used as case studies in this research.  
As recommended by Seawright and Gerring (2008), the cases are selected in a sound 
manner. Case studies are a good way to understand the processes involved and it affords the 
opportunity to observe the sequence of events that lead to certain outcomes (Peters, 1998). 
These four case studies were selected to demonstrate how motivations and opportunities for 
corporate corruption develop within these corporates. They also highlight the roles of the 
different actors in the process. These cases were selected following preliminary data 
analysis according to three criteria. Firstly, they were identified as important and clear cases 
of corporate corruption that could be referred as ‘revelatory cases’ (Yin, 2013, p. 27). 
Secondly, the cases are MDB-financed projects in the developmental area. Finally, in order 
to ensure the integrity of the research process, it is essential that information pertaining to 
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the cases be obtained from the public domain in order not to compromise the whole process. 
The cases referred to in the case study have gone through the negotiation settlement 
agreement that requires all information to be in the public domain after the investigation 
was conducted, hence information on the cases was easily accessible. With case study 
methodology, a combination of data sources is used to derive in-depth insight of the 
phenomenon of corporate corruption in real-life context. This combination provides robust, 
reliable and valid inferences about the phenomenon under investigation.  
5.1 Case study one: the Bonny Island Affair 
5.1.1 Companies involved in the project 
Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. is based in the Netherlands and provides oilfield services. 
It operates as a wholly owned subsidiary of Snamprogetti S.p.A - an Italian Engineering 
Procurement and Construction contract (EPC) company that was subsequently, acquired by 
Saipem S.p.A. In 1990, a joint venture of four companies was formed for bidding on the 
Bonny Island Project in Nigeria. The joint venture (TSKJ) consisted of the following 
companies:  
1. Technip S.A; 
2. Snamprogetti; 
3. Kellogg, Brown and Root Inc; and  
4. JGC Corporation - an EPC Company.  
5.1.2 The project 
The AfDB had contributed $ 100 million in financing to the project for an overall contract 
volume of $ 6 billion (AfDB, 2014). Between 1995 and 2004, Nigeria LNG Ltd - a public 
body created specifically to develop the Bonny Island project - awarded four EPC contracts 
to the joint venture (FCPA, 2010). The project consisted of building liquefied natural gas 
Chapter 5                                                                                          Case studies of sanctioned firms 
113 
(LNG) facilities on Bonny Island. While the first contract was awarded through a 
competitive tender, the three remaining contracts were awarded directly to the joint venture, 
which include a consortium of four companies (Narrainen, 2018b). 
5.1.3 The corruption scenario 
The joint venture hired agents to assist them in winning EPC contracts. Mr Tesler – a citizen 
from the United Kindom - and a Japanese Consultancy Company were appointed as agents 
to negotiate contracts. They engaged into networking with high-level public officials and 
channelled bribes to high-level Nigerian government officials. Tri-Star Investments Ltd – a 
company incorporated in Gibraltar, represented by Mr Tesler and the Japanese Company - 
was used as a vehicle to channel the bribe money from the joint venture to government 
officials (AfDB, 2014).  
5.1.4 Admission of guilt 
Following allegations of corruption, AfDB instigated an investigation against TSKJ. 
Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V admitted to have engaged in corrupt practices by affiliated 
companies from 1995 until 2004 in relation to the award of AfDB-financed services 
contracts for liquefied natural gas production plants on Bonny Island, Nigeria. In fact, from 
1995 to 2004, the TSKJ companies made improper payments totalling $180 million to 
government officials in return for the award of the Bonny Island contracts (AfDB, 2018). 
The payments were channelled through two joint ventures to bribe Nigerian government 
officials to obtain engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contracts.  
5.1.5 The Bribery Scheme 
Snamprogetti and its joint venture partners conspired to pursue lucrative contracts through 
a massive bribery scheme (NLNG) between 1995 and 2004 to build LNG facilities on 
Bonny Island. The government-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 
was the largest shareholder of NLNG, owning 49% of the company. Snamprogetti 
Chapter 5                                                                                          Case studies of sanctioned firms 
114 
authorised the joint venture to hire two agents - Mr Jeffrey Tesler and a Japanese trading 
company - to pay bribes to Nigerian government officials (including top-level executive 
branch officials) in order to assist Snamprogetti and the joint venture in obtaining the EPC 
contracts (Narrainen, 2018a). Before the award of the EPC contracts, Snamprogetti’s agents 
met with top-level public officials of the Nigerian government in order to request a 
representative with whom the joint venture should negotiate bribes on behalf of Nigerian 
government officials. The joint venture paid an approximate amount of $ 132 million to a 
Gibraltar corporation controlled by Mr Tesler and more than $ 50 million to the Japanese 
trading company during the course of the bribery scheme.  
5.1.6 Debarment and sanctions by AfDB 
Following allegations of corrupt practices, a thorough investigation was conducted by the 
Investigation Department of the AfDB. Snamprogetti recognised the facts and was willing 
to settle the case through a negotiated settlement with the AfDB against a reviewed 
debarment period and payment of a financial penalty. Consequently, it was agreed that the 
three joint ventures would be debarred for a period of three years each (see table 6) and a 
total of $22.7 million to be paid as a financial penalty to the AfDB (see table 7). These 
corporates were also cross-debarred by other MDBs.  
Table 7 : Debarment period imposed by AfDB 
  
Firms debarred by AfDB 
Debarment 
period 
1. Serviços de Engenharia Lda 3 
2. 
TSKJ II – Construções Internacionais Sociedade 
Unipessola Lda 
3 
3. LNG – Serviços and Gestão de Projetos Lda 3 
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5.1.7 Financial penalties paid to the AfDB 
Table 8 : Penalty fees paid to AfDB 
 
 
5.1.8 Charges under the FCPA 
Snamprogetti was charged in the US District Court for the Southern District of Texas for 
violating the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA regarding illegal payments made to 
foreign officials to facilitate the award of future contracts obtained in connection with the 
Bonny Island project. Snamprogetti agreed to pay a $ 240 million criminal penalty to resolve 
related charges under the FCPA. 
Kellogg Brown and Root LLC was ordered to pay a $ 402 million fine and to retain an 
independent compliance monitor for a three-year period in order to review the design and 
implementation of its compliance programme. Mr Tesler was indicted in February 2009 on 
charges related to the FCPA for his alleged participation in the bribery scheme. 
 
Companies 
Country of 
incorporation 
Financial 
Penalty 
$million 
1 Kellogg Brown and Root 
LLC 
US 
6.5 
 
2 
Technip S.A. France 
5.3 
 
3 JGC Corp. Japan 5.2 
4 Snamprogetti Netherlands 
B.V 
Netherlands 
5.7 
 
Total 
22.7 
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Snamprogetti reached a settlement of a related civil complaint filed by the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), charging Snamprogetti with violating the FCPA’s anti-
bribery provisions, falsifying books and records, and circumventing internal controls. As 
part of that settlement, Snamprogetti and Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) - its parent 
company - jointly agreed to pay $ 125 million in disgorgement of profits relating to those 
violations (FCPA, 2014). 
5.1.9 Negotiation with Nigerian authorities 
Nigerian authorities also investigated the Bonny Island case. Snamprogetti Netherlands B. 
V. entered into a settlement and non-prosecution agreement with the Nigerian authorities in 
connection with contracts to build liquid natural facilities on Bonny Island. It agreed to pay 
a criminality penalty of $ 30 million and a legal reimbursement fee of $ 2.5 million. 
5.1.10 Key outcomes of the Bonny Island Case 
The case demonstrates a deliberate intention of the corporate to secure advantages for 
corporate benefits. The following salient issues emerged from the case: 
 Top representatives of the firms orchestrated the bribery scheme 
 The use of third parties to channel the bribe does not absolve the company 
of wrongdoing 
 The corporates do not claim ignorance of the practice and hence becomes 
party to it. 
 Corporate benefits were obtained through future contracts  
5.2 Case study two: Medupi Case 
5.2.1 The Company 
Hitachi Ltd is a Japanese multinational with its headquarters in Japan. The company has 
more than 330,000 employees around the globe. The company is diversified and operates in 
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different business segments, including amogst others, the energy sector. In 2005, Hitachi 
created a subsidiary company - Hitachi Power Africa (HPA) in South Africa to establish its 
presence in that country and to bid for any public and private contracts, including 
government contracts to build two new major power stations.  
In 2007, HPA won a $ 1.6 billion contract to provide boilers for the Medupi power station, 
while Alstom, a French company, was awarded a $1.01 billion contract to supply the 
turbines for the Medupi plant (AfDB, 2018). Later, the newly created subsidiary - HPA sold 
25% of its stock to Chancellor House Holdings (Pty) Ltd (Chancellor) - a local South 
African company - that served as a cover-up for the African National Congress (ANC), 
which is the South Africa’s ruling political party. Undoubtedly, this arrangement gave the 
front company and, indirectly, the ANC, the ability to share the profits from any power 
station contracts that Hitachi secured. Soon after the arrangement, Hitachi was awarded two 
subsequent contracts to build power stations in South Africa and $ 5 million was paid as 
‘dividends’ based on profits derived from the contracts to ANC through the Chancellor. It 
was also found that Hitachi paid the front company an additional $ 1 million in ‘success 
fees’ that were recorded as consulting fees in its books and records. 
5.2.2 The project 
On 30 October 2007, Eskom – a public utility owned and operated by the South African 
government - awarded the AfDB-financed Medupi power station boiler works to the 
consortium of HPE and HPA for a total amount of $ 1.6 billion. The project comprised the 
design, manufacture, supply, erection and commissioning of six coal-fired steam generator 
units for the Medupi plant in South Africa.  
5.2.3 The corruption scenario 
The SEC found that Hitachi had paid Chancellor House about $1 million, which was 
essentially an incentive for Chancellor House to influence tenders for the award of future 
projects to Hitachi. Hitachi concealed the ‘success fee’ arrangement made with the ANC for 
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funding Chancellor House as a consultancy fee in its books and records for the year ended 
on December 31, 2008. The inaccurate books and records of Hitachi’s subsidiary were 
reflected in Hitachi’s financial statements for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2009, which 
were filed with the commission. 
This case raised the serious issue of manipulation of contracts behind the scenes in order to 
influence the process. The arrangement made by Hitachi gave Chancellor – and, by 
extension, the ANC - the ability to share the profits from any power station contracts secured 
by the awarding company. It was found that Hitachi entered into an undisclosed ‘success 
fee’ arrangement with Chancellor. This ‘success fee’ was in fact a form of reward for the 
Chancellor’s engagement in providing future contracts.  
During the bidding process, Hitachi was fully aware that Chancellor was a funding vehicle 
for the ANC. Hitachi, nevertheless continued to collaborate with Chancellor in order to be 
under its political influence. This political connection helps to obtain government contracts. 
Because of this arrangement, it was noted that Hitachi was awarded power station contracts 
in South Africa worth approximately $ 5.6 billion in Medupi and Kusile. In April and July 
2008, Hitachi paid Chancellor ‘success fees’ totalling approximately $1 million. In its books 
and records, for the year ended December 31, 2008, this was deliberately recorded as 
‘consulting fees’ instead of ‘success fees’.  
Furthermore, it was noted that in 2010, Hitachi Power Africa also inaccurately recorded a 
dividend worth over $1 million to be paid to Chancellor, its 25% shareholder. This was 
recorded as dividends in the books and records for the year ended 31 December 2010 of the 
subsidiary when in fact it was an amount due for payment to a foreign political party in 
exchange for its political influence in assisting Hitachi in getting two government contracts. 
The subsidiary’s inaccurate books and records were consolidated into Hitachi’s financial 
statements for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2011. Eskom’s decision to award Hitachi the 
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contract was the subject of much criticism. The chairperson of Eskom’s board was a member 
of the ANC’s national executive committee and a trustee of Chancellor House Trust.  
5.2.4 Consequences of the Medupi corrupt transactions 
The Medupi plant was scheduled to be in full operation by the end of 2011. However, as a 
result of a number of reports on defective welding in the boilers manufactured by Hitachi 
and failed software trials by Alstom, the assignments could not be completed in time leading 
to delays in the construction and completion of the station. 
5.2.5 Settlement with SEC 
In September 2015, the SEC charged Hitachi Ltd with violating the FCPA for inaccurately 
recorded and improper payments to South Africa’s ruling political party in connection with 
contracts to build two multi-billion-dollar power plants. 
Hitachi’s misconduct violated the books and records and internal accounting controls 
provisions of the federal securities laws, specifically Sections 13(b) (2) (A) and 13(b) (2) 
(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The US SEC charged Hitachi for allegedly 
making ‘improper payments’ which were ‘inaccurately recorded’ under the US FCPA to the 
ANC in connection with the $2 billion Medupi power plant deal. Hitachi agreed to pay $19 
million to settle the case. According to the SEC’s complaint filed in the US District Court 
for the District of Columbia: 
 Hitachi knew that Chancellor House Holdings (Pty) Ltd was a funding vehicle for 
the ANC during the bidding process. 
 Hitachi nevertheless continued to partner with Chancellor and encourage the 
company to use its political influence to help obtain government contracts. 
 Hitachi paid ‘success fees’ to Chancellor for its exertion of influence during the 
Eskom tender process pursuant to a separate, unsigned side-arrangement. 
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5.2.6 The outcome of the AfDB’s investigation 
The AfDB undertook an investigation into the alleged sanctionable practices of the 
consortium of Hitachi companies – the German-based Hitachi Power Europe GmbH (HPE) 
and its South African subsidiary Hitachi Power Africa (Pty) Ltd (HPA) in the power station 
boiler works contract of Medupi. The investigation revealed that HPE in Germany and its 
South African subsidiary, HPA engaged in corrupt transactions in order to be awarded the 
boiler works contract. The AfDB successfully entered into a negotiated settlement with 
Hitachi in November 2015. 
A settlement was reached between the AfDB and Hitachi Japan for a twelve-month 
debarment with conditional release upon HPE and HPA respectively. It was also agreed that 
AfDB would terminate debarment as soon as Hitachi implements its integrity compliance 
programme to the standard set by the AfDB’s Integrity Compliance Guidelines. Moreover, 
Hitachi voluntarily agreed to pay a financial penalty to AfDB, which will be used to fund 
worthy anti-corruption causes on the African continent (AfDB, 2014). However, the amount 
paid to the AfDB remains confidential. 
5.2.7 Key outcomes of the Medupi case 
The case study shows that the corrupt scheme was orchestrated at corporate level in order 
to secure corporate benefits in the form of future contracts. The following issues were 
identified in this case study: 
 Influential and secretive contacts were established between top management 
representatives and the bribe-takers. 
 The bribery was camouflaged as payment of consultancy fees in order to avoid 
detection. 
 The bribe receivers had direct privileged contacts with the government of the 
day. 
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 The bribe supplier obtained corporate benefits in the form of future contracts. 
5.3 Case study three: the Batshamba-Tshikapa Road case 
5.3.1 Case background 
China First Highway Engineering Company Ltd (CFHEC) established in April 1963 is a 
major contractor for Chinese highway projects in China and abroad. CFHEC is affiliated to 
China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and is located in Beijing. CCCC 
was founded by the China Communications Construction Group (CCCG) and was 
incorporated in 2006. The company and its subsidiaries are mainly engaged in the design 
and construction of transportation infrastructure, dredging, and heavy machinery 
manufacturing. 
5.3.2 The Fraudulent scheme 
CFHEC submitted its bid for the construction of the Batshamba-Tshikapa road project in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo following floating of bids for international tender. The 
bid submission provided for the bid, the company misrepresented information in the bid 
document by fraudulently claiming that it was involved in a similar type of work in Congo 
(AfDB, 2014). In fact, the Congo project referred to in the Bid document submitted was an 
AfDB financed project. The project was not undertaken by CFHEC as it claimed. This fraud 
was identified during the evaluation of the bids and this triggered an investigation by AfDB. 
5.3.3 AfDB’s sanctions imposed 
Following the investigation process. The company agreed to settle the case through a 
settlement agreement with AfDB. The AfDB debarred CFHEC for corruption. A three-year 
debarment was imposed on China First Highway Engineering Co Ltd (CFHEC) following 
admission of fraudulent and collusive practices in the AfDB-financed project. As part of the 
settlement agreement and in accordance with the AfDB’s sanctions procedures, the AfDB 
debarred CFHEC for a period of three years with conditional release. As per the Agreement, 
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the debarment period could be reviewed to 24 months if CFHEC complied with all 
conditions of the agreement. The company agreed to pay a financial penalty of $ 18.86 
million. This supports initiatives for preventing and combating corruption in AfDB’s 
member countries on the African continent. The AfDB also reprimanded CCCC, which is 
the CFHEC’s parent, for a lack of oversight regarding a subsidiary’s bid for an AfDB-
financed project. The debarment of CFHEC qualifies for cross debarment under the April 
2010 Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions entered into by MDBs.  
5.3.4 The Batshamba-Tshikapa project  
In 2012, CFHEC submitted a bid for a contract in the context of the AfDB-financed 
Batshamba-Tshikapa Road Improvement Project in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 
an attempt to make CFHEC’s project performance experience appear more substantial, the 
company fraudulently represented that it had been awarded another AfDB-financed contract 
in the past and submitted forged documents in their bid documents. In addition, CFHEC 
engaged in a collusive practice by sharing preparation of bids with a competitor while 
bidding on the same project. 
5.3.5 Debarment by the World Bank 
In July 2011, the World Bank debarred CCCC Limited, and all its subsidiaries, for 
fraudulent practices under Phase 1 of the Philippines National Roads Improvement and 
Management Project. CCCC was ineligible to engage in any road and bridge projects 
financed by the World Bank Group for a period of 6 years and 6 months until 12 January 
2017. 
5.3.6 Key findings of the Batshamba-Tshikapa Road case  
 The misrepresentation in the bidding document involved top-level management 
representatives. 
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 The objective of this fraudulent scheme was to secure the contract; that is, to obtain 
a corporate benefit. 
5.4 Case Study four: Marrupa-Kazo case 
5.4.1 The company 
Founded in 1911, SNC-Lavalin is one of the leading engineering and construction groups 
in the world and a major player in the ownership of infrastructure. From offices in over 50 
countries, SNC-Lavalin’s employees provide EPC and EPCM services to clients in a 
different industrial sectors, including mining and metallurgy, oil and gas, infrastructure and 
power. SNC-Lavalin also combines these services with its financing and operations and 
maintenance capabilities to provide complete end-to-end project solutions. 
5.4.2 The project 
SNC-Lavalin Inc (SNCLI) was awarded a contract in October 2008 to supervise the 
construction of the 66-kilometre road and bridge construction project between Marrupa and 
Litunde in Niassa Province, Mozambique. In December 2010, the company was awarded 
another contract by the Uganda National Roads Authority to supervise the upgrading of the 
75-kilometer Kazo-Kamwenge road running from Nyakahita to Kamwenge in Uganda. 
Both projects were financed by the AfDB. 
5.4.3 Prior sanction by the World Bank 
In April 2013, the World Bank Group announced the debarment of SNCLI - in addition to 
over 100 affiliates - for a period of ten years following the company’s misconduct in relation 
to the Padma Multipurpose Bridge Project in Bangladesh. SNCLI is a subsidiary of SNC-
Lavalin Group, a Canadian company, and represents more than 60% of its business. The 
debarment was part of a Negotiated settlement between the World Bank and SNC-Lavalin 
Group following a World Bank investigation into allegations of bribery schemes involving 
SNCLI and officials in Bangladesh. 
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While the investigation was ongoing, the World Bank’s investigative department also 
learned of misconduct by SNCLI in relation to the World Bank-financed Rural 
Electrification and Transmission Project in Cambodia. One condition of the settlement 
agreement was that the debarment period can be considered for a reduced period of eight 
years if the companies comply with all conditions of the agreement. The remainder of the 
SNC-Lavalin Group has been conditionally non-debarred for the same period. Moreover, it 
was agreed that the remainder of SNC-Lavalin Group faces debarment if they fail to comply 
with the terms and conditions of the agreement. 
5.4.4 The corrupt scheme 
Employees of SNC-Lavalin ordered illicit payments to public officials in connection with 
contracts awarded in 2008 and 2010. Following investigation by AfDB, a settlement was 
concluded with SNC-Lavalin in October 2015. The settlement followed an investigation 
pertaining to contracts awarded to SNC-Lavalin on two AfDB-financed projects in Uganda 
and Mozambique. The agreement resolved allegations uncontested by the company of illicit 
payments ordered by SNCLI employees to public officials in order to secure future 
contracts. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the AfDB imposed a conditional 
non-debarment on SNC-Lavalin for a period of two years and ten months. Further, SNC-
Lavalin agreed to make a settlement payment of $1.2 million in support of activities and 
programmes combating corruption on the African continent.  
5.4.5 Investigation by Canadian authorities 
SNC-Lavalin is scheduled to appear in court for a criminal fraud case filed in Canada. The 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) alleges that SNC-Lavalin paid nearly $47.7 
million to public officials in Libya between 2001 and 2011 to influence government 
decisions. It also charged the company, its construction division, and its SNC-Lavalin 
International subsidiary, each with one charge of fraud and one of corruption for allegedly 
defrauding various Libyan organisations of around $129.8 million. 
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SNC has said it will plead not guilty and that the charges stem from alleged activities of 
former employees who face criminal charges. 
5.4.6 Key findings from the Marrupa-Kazo case  
 Top management representatives were involved in the bribery scheme. 
 By agreeing to go through the negotiated settlement, the company recognises its 
fault. 
 The corporate secured further contracts through the bribery scheme. 
 The bribe receivers represent influential public officials. 
5.5 Patterns observed in the case study 
To find cross-case patterns, Eisenhardt (1989) suggests using techniques that require the 
researcher to capture the novel findings that may exist in the data. In order to streamline the 
amount of data obtained in multiple case studies, the important characteristics of the 
phenomenon under study were identified based on the cases (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Patterns were derived before drawing a schematic representation depicting the corporate 
corruption scenario. From the within-site analysis, plus various cross-verification, the 
schematic representation of the corporate corruption scenario emerged. The next step was 
to systematically compare the emergent frame with the evidence from each case in order to 
assess how well or poorly it fits the case data. The central idea is that researchers constantly 
compare theory with data-iteration towards a theory, which closely fits the data. A close fit 
is important to building good theory because it takes advantage of the new insights possible 
from the data and yields an empirically valid theory. 
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In the reiterative process, interviews were used to gain maximum confidence in the external 
validity of the propositions. The interviewees were given a chance to comment on the 
propositions and research findings, helping to make sense of the data 
5.6 Findings and discussion 
The four case studies demonstrate the corrupt schemes that corporates develop in order to 
obtain corporate benefits. Key themes emerged from the case studies and these can be used 
to predict the patterns and future trends. Accordingly, these firms are operating in 
organisational climates that are making them criminogenic by engaging in corporate 
corruption. These findings suggest that those actors involved in the bribery scheme are top 
management representatives and they are acting for corporate benefits. This is in line with 
structural approach, whereby corporate corruption emerges as a phenomenon that is 
institutionalised and embedded into larger social structure (Anders and Nuijten, 2008). 
According to Jansics (2014), social factors influence the way of corporates behave in the 
corporate world while transcends individual actions. 
The research findings on the corporate corruption scenario derived from the four cases found 
the following key themes: i) the corporate set up; ii) the corrupt network; iii) the corporate 
benefit obtained. To complement the findings of the case studies the data that emerged was 
compared with existing knowledge in the corruption literature. 
5.6.1 Key findings 
(i) The corporate set-up 
It is notable that in the four cases, the firms accepted the guilt of corruption offences and 
voluntarily agreed to engage in a negotiation process. Also, it was noted that the 
representatives of top management of the contracting firms were well aware of the scheme 
at the outset. In three cases, the bribes offered were disguised in the form of dividends, 
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consultancy fees, or simply as normal monetary payments. This fact was even concealed in 
the books and records of these companies. In these three cases, there were well-orchestrated 
plans between representatives of the corporates (bribe suppliers) and the bribe receivers. In 
all three cases, the corporate actors act as the assertive bribers. In this scenario, the public 
officials represent the submissive bribe receivers. In the two cases agents/intermediates 
were used in the bribery scheme in order to disguise the motive of the bribes. The cases 
provide no tangible evidence to show that the top management representatives responsible 
for the projects obtained any individual benefit. Often, there are penalties for those who 
work in corrupt networks but refuse to cooperate (Anand and Joshi, 2004; Dohmen and 
Verlaan, 2004; Meeus and Schoorl, 2002) 
(ii) The corrupt network 
It is clear from the cases that the initiative to engage in corruption schemes was initiated by 
the corporate actors. It was also noted that the corruption took place by building in a long-
term relationship. A common characteristic of a corrupt network is confidentiality within 
the relationship and secrecy towards outsiders. In order to build trust within the network, it 
was observed that in two cases, the firms indirectly channelled bribes through an agent or 
used shell companies to channel pecuniary benefits to officials. Corruption tends to become 
endogenous (situations are created that facilitate its existence), tending to grow and 
becoming organised and institutionalised. 
(iii)  Corporate benefit 
It is clear from the four cases that the companies were effectively trying to gain a 
competitive advantage. While in one case the fraud was detected during the bidding process 
(case of Batshampa –Tshikapa), in three cases the corruption scheme continued for a period 
ranging from two to four years. Surprisingly, in these three cases, the companies benefitted 
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from additional contracts or extension of the existing contracts without going through 
competitive process.  
The schema below depicts the trend and pattern that emerged from the four case studies. It 
provides insights into how the benefits obtain from the corrupt transactions can incentivise 
actors from the corporate and the receiving sides to participate in the transactions. It helps 
to have an improved understanding of corporate corruption dynamics. The corruption 
scheme developed by these firms is apparent. They deal mostly with public officials close 
to the political elites through different secretive schemes in order to siphon facilitation 
money to those who are in positions of power to influence future decisions. This corruption 
scheme instigates from the supply-side, whereby the firms engaged in development projects 
prospect the environment and are willing to pay facilitation money for its corporate benefits. 
In all cases, cooperation between public and private actors is critical, reflecting the fact that 
bribery and corruption is typically based on an exchange between these two types of actors 
(David-Barrett, 2017). 
 
Figure 11 : Corruption scenario from the supply-side 
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The findings as illustrated in the schema depicted above, show that the benefits generate 
rationalisations for corruption. This claim is supported by (Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; 
Pinto et al, 2008; Whyte, 2016) who assert that organisations adopt corrupt behaviours when 
they want to gain a corporate advantage. The above illustration provides insights into how 
actors are incentivised in the corrupt transactions. 
5.7 Corporate corruption : beyond individual control. 
There is much debate in the literature on organisational misbehaviour (Vardi and Weitz, 
2004) as to whether the corrupt scheme is more a function of the individuals or the 
organisational and societal variables (Brass, Butterfield and Skaggs, 1998; Treviño and 
Youngblood, 1990). The evidence from the case studies supports the argument of many 
social researchers (see for example, Hoetjes, 1998; Vardi and Weitz, 2004) that an 
explanation of the scheme employed for corporate corruption seem to be caused by factors 
beyond the individual control.  
The cases demonstrate how the corporate corruption occurred and highlight the central role 
of the actors in the process. It is argued here that individual perspectives are integrated in 
the collective brain, which represent the corporate brain. The schemes employed in the case 
studies involved different individuals who have influential power in the hierarchy at 
corporate level. The four cases studies examined confirm this. The corrupt actors  represent 
top-level representatives who have decision-making power. It is also worth noting that they 
act collectively and represent the corporate brain that sets the strategic direction of the 
corporates. Consequently, it represents a collective action that brings benefits to the 
corporate. In fact, it was noted in the four cases that strategic decisions to corrupt were 
orchestrated by top managers. The schema developed above (see figure 11) represents the 
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vicious cycle that occurred in the corporate corruption scenario. It also offers insights in the 
mechanism employed by corporate actors. 
5.8 Concluding remarks 
The case studies provide important insights into the roles and activities of the different 
actors and the causal mechanisms employed by the corporate actors for corporate 
corruption. The synthesis of information performed through these case studies allows not 
only for learning about the paths of corruption, but also the involvement of the actors both 
at corporates and institutional level, in allowing the corrupt transactions to go undetected. 
The case studies provide the how and why of the corporates’ involvement through the 
presentation of the bribery scheme as illustrated in Figure 10 above. The phenomenon of 
corporate corruption has been demystified and key themes have been extrapolated from the 
case studies in describing the phenomenon under review. The case studies reviewed add to 
criminological scholarship by demonstrating that corporate corruption is a phenomenon that 
is orchestrated from the supply-side for the ultimate benefit of corporates. It further depicts 
a secretive scheme with the participation of corporate actors who have decision-making 
powers at management level. The case studies also depict a common trend, whereby 
corporates are becoming instigators or facilitators of corruption from the supply-side. 
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Chapter 6 Findings and analysis 
6.0 Introduction  
This chapter analyses and presents the results obtained through the different methods. These 
methods have been useful in tapping the phenomenon under study and in depicting the 
mechanism employed by corporates engaged in developmental projects. In fact, this study 
confirms the complementarity of the qualitative and quantitative methods by providing 
satisfactory answers to the research questions (Evertsson, 2017). What follows in Chapter 
6 is an insight of the findings and analysis of the specific research data. All data in this 
research study comes from the following sources: 
 Case studies of four firms that have been sanctioned by AfDB and have 
consequently engaged in NSAs (covered in Chapter 5).  
 Qualitative content analysis of selected academic research journals to identity in 
what way project success is associated with development outcomes. 
 43 responses out of 125 obtained from the survey questionnaire (representing a 34.4 
% response rate).  
 23 interviews of professionals with wide experience in MDBs’ operations to capture 
the propensity of MNCs in engaging into corporate corruption. 
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Finally, the findings from the different methods are triangulated and combined to provide a 
framework that can be used to explain the determinants of corporate corruption. This 
framework is specific to corporate behaviour among MNCs in multilateral aid and has been 
created by the author to add to our clarity and understanding of the drivers of corporate 
corruption. 
6.1 Data quality and data analysis 
Following data collection, rich empirical materials about the different aspects of the 
phenomenon were acquired. In the conduct of the research, attention was made to data 
quality (Yin, 2003a), data credibility (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Miles and Huberman, 1994), 
and construct validity (Yin, 2003b). Data obtained in this research were analysed 
concurrently. The quantitative responses from the interviews were analysed using Microsoft 
Excel. Qualitative responses were compiled and grouped by types of questions. The data 
sets from the qualitative and quantitative methods were jointly reviewed and compared. 
From the qualitative data, patterns were identified via a multi-step coding process. Codes 
were assigned to the qualitative data and the results collected were compared with the 
quantitative results. The data sets are connected together and embedded in the results. 
Corroboration was sought between the interview data, case study data, the quantitative 
survey responses and the qualitative content analysis data. Contradictory evidence was 
sought but no major divergence was not found. The credibility and authenticity of data were 
obtained through the triangulation process and validation of interview participants. 
All data obtained were coded according to the main constructs. After the coding process, an 
analytical approach was undertaken to determine patterns and explanations. Key themes 
were identified to establish a meaningful description of the data (Taylor, 2001). The 
illustrative presentation helped clarify the mechanism of corporate corruption and in 
explaining the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the observed phenomenon. 
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The results from the questionnaire were complete, consistent and clear. Respondents 
completed all the questions. The four case studies were representative of the phenomenon 
being studied as they provide for saturation of information. As for the semi-structured 
interview, all participants completed the interview. They voluntarily gave responses to all 
the questions. All the interviewees provided useful information. No interview data were 
discarded. 
 
Figure 12 : Visual diagram of triangulation 
 
The mixed method approach allows for the triangulation of perspectives to understand the 
corporate corruption phenomenon (see figure above). The qualitative and quantitative 
methods used bring real contributions and provide important answers to the puzzle of what 
causes corporate corruption. The results from one data source are reinforced by the different 
sources. This gives more credibility to the analysis as a whole. 
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6.2 Part I: case study method 
The four case studies help to understand the corporate corruption schemes employed by 
these corporates. Detailed information on various facets of the corruption scheme were 
obtained (Yin, 2006). Based on empirical data, an in-depth understanding of the 
phenomenon was used to construct an explanation of the phenomenon under investigation. 
The case narratives were reconstructed from press releases, newspaper articles, annual 
reports, affidavits, and verdicts of the courts.  
6.2.1 Findings 
6.2.1.1 Sophisticated schemes employed by corporates 
The findings illustrate how these corporates use different schemes to disguise the purpose 
and the ultimate recipients of the illicit payments (bribes). They use sophisticated means to 
disguise the corrupt schemes while avoiding detection. In particular, shell companies - as in 
the case of Medupi, reviewed in Chapter 5, and off-the-books ‘slush funds’ were widely 
established and used. The study also observed that the general trend was to use consultants 
and agents as intermediaries to negotiate with the potential recipients of the bribes so as to 
ultimately facilitate and transfer illicit payments to them. This finding confirmed the point 
made by Sikka and Lehman (2015) that corporates operate according to the logics of 
competition and private profit.  
Generally, corporates involved in corporate corruption often reap the advantages in the short 
or medium term through future contract awards. However, once, these malpractices are 
discovered and sanctioned, this usually leads to significant negative publicity. This 
significantly affects corporates’ reputation, status and relationship with customers in the 
long term (Pfarrer et al., 2008; Gillespi and Dietz, 2009; Greve et al., 2010; Lin and Chuang, 
2016). 
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Over the last few years, MDBs have become experienced in sanctioning and cross-debarring 
firms for corrupt practices. This experience has in itself led to firms becoming more aware 
that corrupt behaviour is more likely to lead to more sanctioning in the current period than 
in the past. Naturally, debarment from multinational development works, even for a short 
time, will cause a loss of profits due to loss of future contracts. This will cause them to pause 
and seek other ways to maintain their profits than the current emphasis on corrupt practices. 
Unfortunately, the findings seem to confirm that this could eventually lead to new forms of 
corruption that need the attention of MDBs to strengthen their counter-measures. 
The case study and the survey also provide the first indication of the dynamics of capture at 
play. The findings illustrate that capture of public decisions in contracts can be achieved 
through instruments such as corporate corruption. The findings of this research also provide 
further support that undue influence by corporates can be exercised without direct 
involvement of private actors with the representatives of the public sectors. 
6.2.1.2 Involvement of top management 
In all the four cases studied, it was noted that the corporate actors representing top 
management were directly involved in one way or another in the corrupt transactions. Based 
on the case studies, the findings point to the fact that the corporate corruption schemes are 
well orchestrated with the ultimate aim of benefiting these corporates. A general view on 
supply-driven schemes paid by these firms to different receivers does not confirm the 
assumption of the exceptionality of the corrupt schemes. There are clear violations of 
national and international corruption laws, including the sanctionable practices of MDBs 
(see, for example, the Marrupa–Kazo case reviewed in Chapter 5). Moreover, senior 
management often attempted to scapegoat the individual members found to be directly 
involved in the corrupt practice (Ermann and Lundman, 2002; Ashforth and Anand, 2003). 
This is consistent with the responses obtained from the interviews and the case study. The 
statement made by one interviewee testifies this: 
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‘You know this elaborated scheme is undertaken under the eyes of the management. 
They will justify it as having been done by the individuals who took advantage of 
loopholes in the procedures and systems’ – Interviewee 10. 
One interviewee even went further by stating the following: 
‘Top management are, for sure, the culprits. However, when the issues become in the 
public domain they have to find an excuse to get out of it. Do you think they will say 
management took the wrong decision? Never…’ – Interviewee 23. 
Organisational structures and processes were often contrived to insulate senior managers 
from blame for the corrupt schemes to go undetected. The case studies confirm this. This 
also echoed by Wheeler and Rothman (1982) who claim that corporates are the primary 
beneficiary, even though the individuals could benefit financially.  
 
6.2.1.3 Attributes of corporate corruption 
While economists have tended to view reputational intermediaries as barriers to corporate 
corruption, sociologists and criminologists come to see them as key facilitators of fraud 
(Tillman, 2009). In this research, the passivity of the reputational intermediaries in detecting 
fraud was identified in the case studies. Undeniably, the role of ‘gate-keepers’ as 
reputational intermediaries is also important in facilitating this type of corruption. Based on 
the analysis of the cases, seven attributes associated with corporate corruption were 
identified. Table 8 below shows the seven attributes for corporate corruption to be effective. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6                                                                                                 Findings and analysis 
137 
 
Table 9: Attributes of corporate corruption 
 
Attributes 
 
Descriptions based on findings from the research 
 
Collective action 
 
Involvement of top managers/ executives. 
 
Key actors involved 
 
Top executives, Directors, Managers, high-level public official. 
 
Victims 
 
States, bidders and users. 
 
Beneficiaries 
 
Firms winning the contracts. 
High-level political parties. 
 
Types of violations 
 
Bribery, corruption, fraud, misrepresentations. 
 
Intentionality of 
behaviour 
 
To gain a competitive advantage for the benefit of the 
organisations. 
Reputational 
intermediaries 
 
Internal controllers, Internal Auditors, External Auditors. 
6.3 Part II : qualitative content analysis 
Using qualitative content analysis to review the PM literature, this research offers a better 
understanding of the limitations of PM in defining project success in international 
development projects. Relevant scholarly journals on PM that focus on project 
governance/project success issues were consulted for this research. Information gleaned 
from the literature was synthesised and used as input for this study (Harden and Thomas, 
2010).  
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To this end, the International Journal of PM and the PM Journal were reviewed, together 
with prominent journals in the areas of fraud and corruption, spanning the years from 
January 1990 to June 2017. The research articles consulted have used qualitative, 
quantitative or mixed methods. The work of Jing et al. (2009), who adopted this approach 
in their studies of the construction sector, and of Onwuegbuzie et al. (2010), who defined 
this process of literature review as ‘an interpretation of a selection of published documents 
available from different sources that optimally involves summarisation, analysis, 
evaluation, and synthesis of the documents’ were important insights.  
In this perspective, as proposed by Fink (2009), studies and analysis produced by 
researchers, scholars and practitioners were identified, evaluated and synthesised. The data 
gathering focused on academic journal articles. Shibboleth11 was used to gain access to these 
articles through University of Portsmouth credentials. In this regard, prominent journals 
dealing with issues of project governance and corruption issues were searched for. Based 
on the approach adopted by Jing et al. (2009), the scope of the search was extended to 
include common search tools such as Google Scholar.  
From the search and a selection of relevant publications, the following keywords and 
combinations were used: ‘governance’, ‘project governance’, ‘project success’, ‘project 
failure’ and ‘corruption risk’. Sixty-three (63) journal articles relevant to the areas were 
screened. Thirty-five (35) journal articles relating to the searched keywords were consulted 
and the various definitions of project success were classified and categorised (see Appendix 
VII).  Each journal article (n=35) was coded to refine the raw data and classify the 
information obtained. The refinement process excluded articles that did not relate to project 
activity in the academic field (n=28). This leaves 35 journal articles related to the subject 
                                                 
11 Shibboleth is an authentication system, which enables access to remote users by using of the University 
username and password to access most of the University of Portsmouth Library’s electronic resources. 
 
Chapter 6                                                                                                 Findings and analysis 
139 
under study. PM is an evolving management concept and the journal is the most appropriate 
method with which to be updated on the latest literature on project success. 
6.3.1 Findings 
Out of the thirty-five (35) journal articles, only eleven (11) journal article refers to risk 
management. However, only one (1) journal article addresses corruption risk in projects. 
The remaining articles focus on cost, quality, and time factors, as the three important 
elements. The study also noted that the definition of project success used by different 
researchers in the journal articles varied.  
Table 9 below summarizes the different definitions of project success as advocated in the 
journal articles. 83.8% of the research articles propose a strategy for project success that 
focuses on management issues to better manage projects. The remaining 17% advocate a 
strategy that takes in account the different stakeholders associated with the projects. This 
illustrates the underestimated benefit of a broader definition of project success based on 
external stakeholders. 
Table 10 : Definitions of project success 
Elements on which definitions of project 
success is referred to 
No. of articles 
Time, Cost and Quality Only 9 
Stakeholders 6 
Environmental concerns 4 
Risk management 11 
Monitoring/ institutional environment 4 
Impact on beneficiaries 5 
Team work 3 
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For this research, the external stakeholders are the development partners, the inhabitants 
who benefit from the project and the MDBs. It is clear, therefore, that the definition of 
project success has not matured enough in light of sanctions imposed by MDBs. 
 
Figure 13 : Strategy for project success 
6.3.2 Redefinition of project success 
The concept of project success has been the subject of much debate in management literature 
and is pivotal to the literature of PM (Freeman and Beale, 1992). The dimensions (criteria) 
upon which one appreciates success and the factors of success themselves have been the 
focus of many studies. In order to measure the failure or success of a project, the evaluation 
dimensions must be well defined. In the PM literature, the evaluation dimensions of a 
successful project are generally limited to the traditional constraints of cost, time and 
quality. The findings of this study confirm this assertion. 
Surprisingly, only one article refers to risk management for the identification of corruption 
risk with focus on mechanism to mitigating employees indulging in corrupt practices for 
their individual gains. The finding clearly shows that the issue of corporate corruption is not 
taken into consideration. However, it refers to corruption within corporates whereby 
employees commit corrupt acts for their private benefits. However, there is clearly no 
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attempt from PM perspectives to develop any strategy at corporate level to address the issue 
of corporate corruption. This finding from the qualitative content analysis method is 
indicative that PM theories on project success have not matured enough to address risks 
associated with corporate corruption.  
Based on this, it will be helpful to incorporate corruption risk management with particular 
emphasis on corporate corruption in the definition of project success. Researchers refer to 
critical success factors in projects such as general conditions, events surrounding the 
implementation of the projects, and circumstances contributing to project success (Pinto and 
Slevin, 1988; Jugdev and Müller, 2005; Ika, 2009). In fact, some researchers have provided 
a list of success factors (for example. Cooke-Davies, 2002; Jugdev and Müller, 2005; Ika, 
2009). The most well known list of success factors includes project mission, support from 
top-management, stakeholders-consultation, employees, project timeline, technical tasks, 
client-acceptance, monitoring and feedback, communication and finally, troubleshooting 
(Pinto and Slevin, 1988). 
One interviewee commented on the notion of project success. He explicitly stated: 
‘For the corporates involved in developmental projects, the focus is predominantly 
to maximise profit. Satisfying the need of external stakeholders are their least 
concerns. I feel there is a limitation in the definition of project success. This is a big 
weakness’ - Interviewee 14. 
6.3.3 Analysis 
PM was developed in the 1950s while international development became prominent in the 
1960s. These have grown in parallel but there have been very few attempts to bridge the 
two. From the literature the multiple benefits to be derived with a mature PM system in 
place is well noted (Bryde, 2003; Kwak and Ibbs, 2000). However, PM systems that 
exclusively pursue the success criteria based on cost, time and quality are ineffective in 
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addressing the challenges for internationally funded projects to thrive in a corruption-free 
environment. (Bourne et al., 2000; Walton and Dawson, 2001). Researchers have 
recommended the broadening of the definition of project success based on new identified 
success factors (Turner, 1993; Morris and Hough, 1987; Wateridge, 1998; Mc Pinto and 
Slevin, 1988; Saarinen, 1990; Ballantine, 1996). 
MNCs should work on a more adapted approach that meets the exigencies of the external 
environment. Some researchers propose focusing on the expectations of multiple 
stakeholders (Maylor, 2001; Bryde, 2003; Tukel and Rom, 2001). This approach will be 
beneficial as the projects financed by MDBs have a great impact on stakeholders. The 
empirical findings show a reluctance in the literature to broaden the scope of project success. 
According to Chan et al. (2003), this reluctance to go beyond cost, time and quality factors 
is due to commercial pressures. 
6.3.4 Narrainen’s Project Governance Framework 
Research, such as that conducted by Wu (2005), has shown the importance of corporate 
governance systems on the level and incidence of corruption, especially in the private sector. 
This study finds that, despite the fact that project governance is considered important in 
practice, actual corruption risk management with regard to corporates working in 
development projects has not been developed much. The empirical findings of this research 
confirm that the existing PM approach – though it has as one of its functions the 
management of risks - is not mature enough to effectively counteract corruption risks in its 
internal and external environment in mitigating corporate corruption. This is because the 
definition of project success is too restricted. 
PM principles in the framework represent the planning, organising, and controlling of 
organisational resources in order to achieve the specific goals or objectives. This study, 
using qualitative content analysis, confirms the constraints of cost, time and quality in 
achieving corporate objectives. PM operates in an organisational arrangement, hence the 
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attempts of managers to implement the project objectives within the framework of the 
organisation structure. Consequently, corporates can define projects as successful even 
though they might not be well received by the intended clients. In the context of this 
research, the intended clients are the users of the development infrastructures, the states and 
the population. 
A synthesis of the definition of process success based on the literature confirmed the 
restricted definition of project success as it is based on internal factors including time, cost 
and performance. External factors like corrupt practices, collusion involving corporate 
actors, and client’s satisfaction are simply ignored by management. Narrainen’s Project 
Governance framework proposes (see Figure 12) the integration of corruption risk 
management with PM principles in order to counteract corporate corruption. PM principles 
coupled with corruption risk management will avoid these corporates being trapped in the 
vicious cycle of corporate corruption and ultimately being sanctioned by the MDBs. 
Fighting corruption in funded projects will require corporates to embed corruption risk 
management in PM. This will enable corporates to ensure there are adequate control 
mechanisms in place to control and mitigate corruption risks while ensuring that the cost, 
quality, time and other factors continue to be met. Ultimately, this will lead to project 
success as depicted in Figure 12. Project success is a multidimensional construct that 
includes both the short-term PM success, efficiency, and the longer-term achievement of 
desired results from the project, that is, effectiveness and impact (Judgev et al., 2001; 
Shenhar et al., 1997).  
The value of this model is that it seeks a new definition of project success in development 
projects by considering both internal and external factors and is adapted to corporates 
involved in MDB-financed projects. By considering corruption risk management, the 
corporates will include mechanisms in place to address mitigation strategies for corruption, 
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including corporate corruption, to be detected. These lead to the ultimate goal of project 
success, which include not only maximising profit but also maximising delivery within the 
time constraints, while maximising their chances of winning future MDB-financed 
contracts. 
Relying on the findings, the proposed the project governance framework is recommended 
to corporates engaged in executing development projects while the framework incorporates 
corruption risk management to address both corporate corruption and corruption by 
employees and ultimately leading to project success. This study finds that despite the fact 
that there is a need for governance in project implementation; in practice project 
governance, integrating with corporate corruption has not developed. 
A systematic approach to mitigating capture risks is still lacking (OECD, 2017).The 
adoption of the model may also be beneficial to corporates in identifying and mitigating 
risks associated with capture. It will help to foster a culture of integrity at corporate level. 
Capture can facilitate corporate corruption, as corporate actors are involved in the process. 
The capture relationship involves at least different actors. As illustrated in the case study, 
the capture result in repeated interactions with actors from the receiving end, which over 
time create growing opportunities for the corporates. Corporates that rely heavily on third 
parties and agents are at risk, as any bribe paid by such actors may be difficult to monitor 
and control (David-Barrett et al., 2017). This research has drawn upon the current 
knowledge in PM and attempted to extend understanding by synthesising the existing 
literature by proposing a project governance framework that corporates may adopt to help 
make funded projects more corruption risk resistant. Sanctioned firms have to implement 
an integrity compliance programme in order to be reinstated after the debarment period. 
While this programme enhances systems and procedures within the corporate to bring an 
integrity culture, it does not specifically address corporate corruption. 
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Figure 14 : Narrainen's Project Governance Framework 
Corporates have to focus on enablers to get rid of unethical behaviour (Ho, 2011) so as to 
instil an anti-corruption culture. In light of the enforcement landscape of MDBs, there is an 
increasing need for ethics in the organisational fabric of the organisation to be improved.  
6.4 Part III: analysis of survey questionnaires 
This survey is used to capture the perceptions of corruption in corporates, which have been 
debarred by MDBs. The quantitative survey employs a Likert scale and it uses a five-point 
ordinal scale to rate the degree to which the respondents agree or disagree with a statement 
(1 = definitely disagree; 2 = mostly disagree; 3 = neutral; 4 = mostly agree; 5 = definitely 
agree). Forty-three (43) questionnaire responses were received out of 125 questionnaires 
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sent out, representing a response rate of 34.4%. The basic characteristics of the responses 
are outlined below. The tables and graphs illustrate the results and trends, together with 
discussions. Given the challenges faced in attaining research participants in corruption 
research and research generally, the final sample (representing 34.4%) is considered an 
adequate response for this research. In fact, a response rate above 20% is considered to be 
satisfactory and acceptable (Comford and Smithson, 1996; Fowler, 2002). Recent studies 
have demonstrated that a low response rate in survey research does not necessarily produce 
a non-response bias (Keeter et al, 2000; Karahanna el al, 1999). 
However, despite the response rate, a non-response bias could arise in the findings. A non-
response bias is the bias that results when respondents differ in meaningful ways from non-
respondents. Therefore, it is essential to conduct a non-response bias test in order to 
demonstrate whether the non-respondents are similar to the respondents (Fowler, 2002; 
Karahanna et al, 1999). Therefore, in this research a test was undertaken to determine 
whether the characteristics of the respondents from the original responses are similar to the 
non-respondents. The test was conducted for demographics region and sector of operations. 
The findings suggest that the demographics and sector of operations showed no significant 
differences between the respondents and non-respondents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 : Workforce of respondents 
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Respondents were also grouped as early or late respondents. The two groups were then 
compared on their responses to the Likert scale questions using t-tests.  In short, while these 
items are statistically different, the differences are quite small and generally would not affect 
the overall interpretation of the results. This suggests that those non-respondents who 
returned the completed questionnaire after reminders were similar to the respondents from 
the original responses. Hence, this provides evidence that within the sample used for this 
research there are minimal chances that it is likely that data has a no-response bias. 57% of 
respondents have a workforce less than 2,000. 18% have a workforce between 2,000 and 
5000. The remaining 25% of the respondents have a workforce of over 5,000, with 15% 
between 5,000 to 10,000, and 10% more than 10000. This illustrates that smaller enterprises 
are the ones, which are the most sanctioned. 
 
Figure 16 : Distribution of respondents by regions 
 
40
33
19
17
10 10
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Africa Asia Europe Latin America North America Oceania
N
o
. o
f 
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
.
Regions
Distribution of Respondents by Regions
Chapter 6                                                                                                 Findings and analysis 
148 
Respondents were required to indicate their regions of operation. 93% of respondents said 
they operate in Africa while 76.7% operate in Asia. While the results obtained show that 
contractors are represented in all six continents, North America and Oceania remain the 
regions least represented. Many respondents are MNCs operating in multiple regions. 
6.4.1 Sectors of activities of respondents 
 
 
Figure 17 : Sector of activities of respondents 
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representative of the major areas in infrastructural development financed by the different 
MDBs.  
6.4.2 Corrupt actors involved  
Respondents were asked to enumerate those actors, which, according to their experiences, 
are the most corrupt during project implementation. Politicians came top of the list, 
representing 38% of responses, followed by top managers (27%) and operations staff (20%). 
It is clear that politicians or politically exposed persons (PEPs) were important actors in the 
corruption exchanges that took place between the business side paying the bribes and the 
bribe receivers (represented by the public sector).  
 
Figure 18 : Percentage of Corrupt officials 
Based on these figures, the high percentage of 65% representing politicians and top 
managers combined has the propensity to make the corruption scheme supply-driven. While 
not ignoring the fact that these projects can also attract corruption based on the demand-
side, involving operational staff and field workers, the high percentage of 65% of 
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politicians/top managers is a strong indication that corporate corruption is particularly 
facilitated by contracting firms for their corporate benefit through the networking of 
influential actors from the receiving end. The results of the case studies also confirm this 
scheme. 
6.4.3 Causes of corruption 
Part of question 4 of the survey questionnaire includes a series of questions seeking to 
understand better the causes of corporate corruption. Unsurprisingly, most of the 
respondents confirm that the environment in which they work pushes them to indulge in 
corrupt practices. They identify poor economic situations (81.4%), political instability 
(79%) and the local corruption culture (84.4%) as preconditions for corrupt practices.  
One important response was that, 33 out of 43 (77%) claimed their companies had 
appropriate controls/safeguards in place to detect corruption before it occurred. This 
confirms that firms do have control mechanisms to identify malpractices committed at the 
organisational level. However, how far these controls are effective to address corporate 
corruption is not clear.  
Most respondents (35 out of 43, or 81%) agreed that the debarment periods imposed by 
MDBs were too long. 19% of respondents preferred not to reply to this question. 70% 
responded that sanctions had a negative impact on their companies. 81% considered that the 
sanctions process was more a ‘name and shame’ game. However, only seven out of forty-
three (17%) disagreed with this assertion. 81% of respondents claimed they needed to 
develop counter-strategies to deal with corruption in order to remain competitive after being 
sanctioned. 70 % of respondents considered that the sanctions would ultimately lead to a 
decrease in the number of contracts they would get in the future. According to 79% of 
respondents, sanctions were not the appropriate punitive action. 70% claimed that the 
sanctions imposed would cause a reduction in the workforce of the company. This is also 
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echoed in the statements made by SNC-Lanvalin President and Chief executive Office, Mr. 
Robert Card, in press releases: 
‘Even though SNC-Lavalin has already incurred significant financial damage 
and losses as a result of actions taken prior to March 2012, we have always been 
and remain willing to reach a reasonable and fair solution that promotes 
accountability, while permitting us to continue to business and protect the 
livelihood of our over 40,000 employees, our clients, our investors and our other 
stakeholders.’ -  Mr. R. Card (Source: The Canadian, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 19 : Responses to Question 4 
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Figure 20 : Responses to Question 6 
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In a similar vein, Mr. Robert Card reiterated the impact of sanction on the company.  
‘… any move to charge the company would immediately threaten its future and 
could force it to close down. Even if charged but not convicted, the damage to its 
reputation would be such that all of its government business would be at risk’ – 
Mr. R. Card (source: The Global and Mail, 2015)  
This shows the effect of sanctions on firms. This finding confirms that sanction has a 
profound impact on firms. Of the remaining respondents, 26% claimed sanctions would not 
reduce corruption while 5% did not respond to this question. The finding shows that 
corporates would in fact prefer to escape debarment and engage in NSAs with MDBs. With 
this option, they can pay a financial penalty and get away with debarment, which may have 
a negative impact on their reputation. 65% of respondents preferred an arbitration process 
in lieu of the sanctions process. There is also strong disagreement, with 79% of respondents 
willing to settle the issue through court procedures. Only a minority (14%) said that 
resolving the issue through court procedures might be inappropriate. Corruption being a 
complex phenomenon to prove and the trial being lengthy may be a reason for them to still 
carry on with their business. 
The findings regarding the fairness of the sanctions process are quite contentious with 23% 
respondents giving a neutral response. While 37% of respondents agree that, the sanctions 
process is fair and 40% claim the contrary. However, based on responses to what alternative 
mechanisms that they would prefer, it is clear that the sanctions process is preferred to 
arbitration or court action. To the question on whether the sanctioned firms negotiated to 
pay for a financial penalty in return for a reduced debarment period or no debarment, the 
responses were varied. 51% of respondents confirmed that the requests were made by the 
MDBs, while 42% claimed that they had not been approached for NSAs.  
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Figure 21 : Responses to Question 7 
The reason for this is simply that not all firms are offered the opportunity to engage in a 
NSA with MDBs. More specifically, the responses regarding whether small companies are 
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have been damaged.  
Only, 16% thought that this was not the case. Moreover, it is observed that a high percentage 
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malpractices, compared to 16% who thought it would not be the case. Based on this finding, 
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the root cause of corporate corruption at its root. While 49% of respondents agreed that, the 
negotiation process is transparent, 49% disagreed and 2% preferred not to respond. Clearly, 
this finding identifies the negotiation process as lacking transparency.  
While 96% agree that the sanctions process will bring down the level of corruption on 
projects, interestingly, 79% claim new forms of corruption may emerge. It corroborates with 
the above findings that perpetrators will find other means of deceit for corporate benefits. 
All agree that new forms of corruption will emerge. This finding is in line with the claim 
that corruption is dynamic in nature and perpetrators will find new ways of committing 
corruption for their benefits. 
 
 
Figure 22 : Responses to Question 8 
There seems to be a consensus that small firms are at a disadvantage in comparison to big 
firms. Logically, the core of the negotiated settlement is the financial penalty. MDBs will 
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that big firms would benefit the most from the negotiated process. Moreover, 72% of 
respondents claim that the cross-debarment of firms by other MDBs will make small firms 
go out of business.  
6.4.4 Political connections 
It is not surprising that 88% of respondents claimed that political instability had certainly 
been a cause for these corporates to indulging into malpractices. According to Kew (2006), 
political instability in a country is the failure of the political class to adhere sufficiently to 
the basic tenets of democracy and constitutionalism. Harriman (2006, p. 2) asserts that 
political stability ‘has given rise to abuse of power, brazen corruption, disregard for due 
process and the rule of law, intolerance of political opposition, abuse of the electoral process 
and the weakening of institutions.’  
These MDB-financed projects have a direct link to the government of the day in as much 
these investments are requested by the government. The decision of whether to extend the 
projects or not are taken by the ruling party. Corporates working on existing projects will 
certainly take advance of this political instability to set up networking with influential 
actors, as illustrated through the case studies for the ultimate corporate benefits. 
One interviewee also revealed how political connections encourage corporates to engage in 
corruption through the privileged contacts they engaged in. He commented as follows: 
‘MDBs encourage development irrespective of the countries. If the countries are 
receptive to development, these MDBs will be ready to invest in developmental 
projects. Politically instability in countries may be a reason why these countries 
want to engage in development projects with MDBs so as they have an upper hand 
in the procurement process.’ – Interviewee 11. 
Another interviewee highlighted how political connections can encourage corruption 
emanating from the business side. 
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‘These development projects are the governments’ initiatives for development. 
Political connections in fact encourages the political agents, and all those that 
revolve around the influenced politicians to establish good contacts with 
contractors. These contractors are on the lookout for such opportunities. They are 
well connected and they can influence the process by providing competitive 
advantages to the contracting firms. This is how the corrupt transactions take place. 
It is not necessary for there to be a demand side. The business side represents the 
active corruptor while the public sector represents the positive corruptor by 
accepting the bribes’ - Interview10. 
Based on the above findings, it is clear that political connections has an effect on the propensity of 
these corporates to become corrupt. Cingoano and Pinotti (2013) assert that corporate gain market 
power when they are politically connected. There is empirical evidence based on the findings that 
political connections increases the corporates market value of corporates engaged in development 
projects. These findings confirm that politically connected firms have a competitive advantage over 
non-politically connected firms. Researchers (Faccio, Mazulius, McConnell, 2006; Goldman et al., 
2013; Igan and Mishra, 2014) made similar observations. 
6.5 Part IV: Interview qualitative analysis 
As set out in the research methodology section, this component of the research qualitatively 
explored the following:-  
(i) causes and nature of corruption in development projects;  
(ii) consequences of corruption;  
(iii) sanctions process and  
(iv) deterrence of sanctions. 
The findings are discussed below. 
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The interviews were semi-structured: interviewees were free to follow up or raise any issues 
during the process. The same set of questions was asked to all interviewees (see Appendix 
VIII). The qualitative interviews were based on 23 in-depth questions with professional staff 
of the AfDB with wide experience in developmental projects. The empirical research 
reported here was carried out between May and August 2017. The participants have very 
close and direct insight into developmental projects and the phenomenon of corruption. Five 
core themes emerged from these interviews:  
 Sweetening process;  
 Corporate benefits;  
 Game of power; 
 Corrupt networks; 
 Corporate actors 
According to Jávor and Jancsics (2016), almost all corruption transactions have 
organisational aspects, as they necessarily involve organisational members or have 
organisational affiliations. However, there is a dearth of knowledge of the forces that give 
rise to and sustain corruption within these organisations. 
6.5.1 Analysis – themes and categories 
The first cycle was ‘process coding’ (Miles, Huberman and Saldana, 2013, p. 75), focusing 
on the causes of corruption and explaining ‘how’ and ‘why’ the corporate actors engaged in 
corrupt practices. The initial coding process emerged from the data while deliberately 
avoiding abstract notions. The second phase was ‘pattern coding’ (Miles et al., 2013, pp. 
86-87) whereby codes describing similar behaviours were grouped into more general and 
abstract units of analysis. This enabled large amounts of codes to be placed into a smaller 
number of categories.  
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6.5.1.1 The sweetening process 
Corruption does not always start with a direct bribe. Normally, it starts with a sweetening 
process, which serves as an enticement of the bribe-receiver/s. The grooming phase of the 
corruption process, if required at all, involves building rapport and pushing the boundaries 
of a relationship down, the ‘slippery slope’ towards the final act (Köbis et al., 2016). The 
corruptors manipulate the relationships to the point that affective bonds minimise the risks 
of rejection (Free and Murphy, 2015). At the same time, they are constantly watching out 
for the target’s weaknesses. To a question of how these corporates engage with the target in 
instigating the corrupt transactions, interviewees explained how these firms identified their 
preys. 
‘these firms, through their wide field-experience, know exactly where the weaknesses 
are and who have powers in their hands to influence the procurement process. They 
will identify the persons and entice them into the bribery scheme. They are experts in 
it’ - Interviewee 14. 
Another interviewee was more explicit by elaborating how firms approach their targets in 
elaborating the corrupt schemes. 
‘the bribery scheme they are using has evolved, it’s no longer the traditional, under-
the-table money now. It has become a well-orchestrated scheme, where these firms 
try to deceive the existing safeguards in their own companies so as to escape 
detection’ – Interviewee 11. 
6.5.1.2 Corporate benefits 
The issue of ‘top management’ involvement crops up in the interviews and case study 
review. In the four cases, top management involvement was identified as important in 
orchestrating the corrupt transaction. Selected verbatim quotations from the interviews are 
highlighted below to support this argument.  
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‘I would say that, though these multinational firms might have robust codes of 
conduct/codes of ethics in place, it does not prevent them from committing a corrupt 
act which would ultimately benefit the whole firm’- Interviewee 15. 
This is in line with what Anand, Ashford and Joshi (2004) assert: ‘while adopting such 
codes is a positive development, it is not sufficient as it can sometimes be used as a badge 
of morality’. To the question of why these types of funded-projects are vulnerable to 
corporate corruption, one interviewee explained: 
‘…these multinationals are operating in different jurisdictions. They have to 
struggle to remain in business as obtaining a contract is a very competitive market. 
The competition is fierce, and they have to protect the interest of their companies. 
They will look for ways to lubricate the wheels of the business in order to secure 
future contracts’ - Interviewee 13. 
Another interviewee was more explicit on describing how these multinationals are ready to 
do business: 
‘those firms which have already won contracts will do their best to secure future 
contracts and, of course, this is not about petty corruption. There are finding 
mechanisms to influence decision-makers – those who have close contacts with 
politicians - to secure future contracts. In all circumstances, these firms are taking 
risks in order to obtain corporate benefits’ – Interviewee17. 
The above responses are consistent with Passas (1998) who asserts that globalisation 
multiplies, intensifies and activates ‘criminogenic asymmetries’ that lie at the root of 
corporate crime. In fact, according to the rational choice approach, organisations are 
continuously assessing their costs and benefits. They tend to favour actions that increase 
their profit margin. Van de Bunt (1994) posits that this can occur even if firms have no 
problems in achieving their objectives. 
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Scholars have identified two perspectives of corruption in organisations by referring to the 
‘bad apples’ and ‘bad barrels’ dichotomy (Ashford, Gioia, Robinson, and Treviño, 2008; 
Coleman, 1987; Pinto, Leana, and Pil, 2008; Wheeler and Rothman, 1982). Organisational 
corruption can arise due to individual greed (Treviño, 1986; Treviño and Youngblood, 
1990) for private benefit (Aguilera and Vadera, 2008). This is a form of corruption against 
the corporate and is represented by the ‘bad apples’. Based on the ‘bad barrel’ perspective, 
corrupt behaviours, where organisations are the primary beneficiaries, takes place in 
accordance with organisational goals (Baker andFaulkner, 1993). This is reflected in the 
statements of the following interviewees who emphasised the notion of corporate benefit: 
‘I sincerely believe no individuals within the organisation will have the guts to 
engage in a corrupt act, committing the organisation. The risks are too high. Those 
in positions of power could act only with the blessing of the stakeholders of the 
company’ - Interviewee 7. 
‘They will never tell you the corrupt behaviour is part of the firm’s strategy even 
though the primary beneficiary of the corruption scheme is the company. I think it 
is more the issue of loyalty that explains this’ - Interviewee 5. 
According to researchers, there are multiple factors to explain the bad barrel perspective of 
corruption (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, and Treviño, 2010) and the secretive actions 
surrounding it (Vaughan, 1996; 1999). In line with what Baker and Faulkner (1993) posit, 
organisational goals may dictate the corrupt behaviour in which the organisation is the 
primary beneficiary. 
6.5.1.3 The game of power 
Corruption actors use corporate resources to engage in corruption (Jávor and Jancsics, 
2016). According to Bourgeois (1981), opportunities for corruption within a corporate arise 
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when there are surplus or unexploited opportunities in the system. One interviewee 
explicitly mentioned the modus operandi employed by top managers: 
‘these firms operating in different jurisdictions; they have to be competitive. And they have 
to thrive to survive and have future contracts. Representatives of these firms use 
organisational resources in the corrupt exchange’- Interviewee 5. 
 Another interviewee highlighted how the resources for corruption can be created: 
‘…it’s not difficult. They know how to find the resources. Low quality material, 
poor workmanship provides cost savings. This provides the necessary resources 
in the corruption exchange, and the corrupt exchanges allow them to turn a 
blind eye’- Interviewee 9. 
The allocation of resources in an organisation is typically very unequal and often determined 
by power relations (Hills and Mahoney, 1978; Pfeffer and Leong, 1977; Rajan and Zingales, 
2000). According to Dahl (1971), the basis of one’s power includes resources, opportunities, 
acts, and objects that can be exploited to affect others’ behaviour.  
One interviewee explained how the game of power is very important in the corrupt 
exchanges: 
‘…the higher up the hierarchy, the corporate representatives definitely have more 
power. They are like the commander of an aeroplane. They will act to the 
uttermost benefit and interest of the organisation. I can say in most cases they 
are obliged to do so’ - Interviewee 17. 
The above is in line with what Bacharach and Lawler (1981, p. 45) claim: ‘outcome is an 
important implicit element of power. Power must be impelling influence, therefore power 
that is not impelling is not power at all’. This power element is very important. According 
to Jávor and Jancsics (2016), the more powerful a corporate actor is the higher the 
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propensity to engage in corruption on behalf of the corporate. This research proves them 
right.  
6.5.1.4 Corrupt networks 
The first insight into corrupt networks appeared in the interviews. In trying to understand 
how linkages are built between the corporates and other stakeholders to complete the corrupt 
transactions, one interviewee revealed the following: 
‘these high-level executives know very well the weaknesses in the system. They try 
to establish secretive networks with main stakeholders and engage in a sweetening 
process’ - Interviewee 3. 
One interviewee explicitly identified the main stakeholders that the executives of the 
contracting firms will try to network with: 
‘they aim higher up the hierarchy, because the higher they go the lower the risks of 
being detected. They target state-owned firms, governmental institutions, political 
nominees, and even political parties – all high-level public officials’ - Interviewee1. 
The above findings illustrate how the networking is built and are in line with what Javor 
and Jancsics (2016) refer to as the ‘professionalised’ corrupt networks. Under such 
networks, the actors who act on behalf of the corporates are able to achieve their objectives. 
Buckley et al. (1976, p. 75) explain: ‘these actors in these networks have meta-power’. The 
willingness to engage in these corrupt networks are triggered by powerful actors from the 
supply-side of the corruption scheme. This is clearly illustrated in the political nexus 
identified in the case study. 
It is argued in this research that corporate resources are important elements in facilitating 
corporate corruption used by the corrupt actors used in the corruption schemes. These 
corrupt networks have strong link to political parties, public officials and oversights, as 
confirmed by the findings of the research. This finding corroborates with Nielsen (2003), 
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who posits that the characteristics of these corrupt networks are strong links with branches 
of government, watchdogs, auditing, and journalistic organisations. This research confirms 
this nexus. Furthermore, Jansics and Javor (2012) highlight the secretive nature and power 
of such networks as an essential element in the formation of such networks. The findings 
corroborate this assertion. 
6.5.1.5 Corporate actors 
The predominant sentiment expressed by respondents confirmed the cover-up of corrupt 
practices at management level. Respondents used words and phrases such as ‘intentionally 
turned off organisational control’; ‘turning blind eyes’; ‘control deactivation’; ‘authorised 
malpractices to go undetected’; and ‘ability to control and manipulate information’. 
A respondent noted the following:  
‘Top management within organisations are those who have power. They can make 
malpractices go undetected by turning off internal as well as external control 
mechanism …This is according to me what happens in corporate corruption’.- 
Interviewee 5. 
Another interviewee emphasized how top management strive to embed the malpractices: 
‘...when the corruption occurs at organisational level, top executives ensure that 
practices are concealed in the internal procedures and processes of the 
organisation. In this way, there is no risk that divergences are detected’ - 
Interviewee 9. 
This is captured by Javor and Jancsics (2016, p. 547), who confirm that this deactivation 
control from organisational elites may allow the ‘middle level to legalise corrupt 
transactions by falsifying records and manipulate documentation’. Jancsics (2008) refers to 
the process whereby the organisational elites enable middle management to embed 
corruption in the formal process and procedures of the organisation as ‘technicisation’. In 
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fact, Interviewee 9 was referring to something similar to this technicisation phenomenon. 
Indeed, in the case studies presented, this phenomenon of falsely recording of statements is 
well noted.  
The SEC has even taken these firms to task: 
‘Big firms enjoy an unfair advantage compared to smaller contractors. Big firms 
have the capacity to pay huge penalties to avoid prosecution or as a mitigating 
factor for shorter debarment period. Money talks’ - Interviewee 15. 
One interviewee further elaborated on what according to him is the approach of the 
MDB that is engaging with the firms found guilty of corrupt practices.  
‘I don’t think agencies will approach a small firm to engage in a negotiated 
settlement knowing pretty well that it will not be able to pay penalty fee’ - 
Interviewee 10. 
A corporate represents a power structure. As evidenced by the findings of the case studies 
and the interviews conducted, those in power, namely top management, have the control of 
the organisation’s resources. Moreover, they can influence organisational controls and 
manipulate the information and responsibility structure. This confirms Javor’s (1998) 
position on the power allows the dominant actors in these corporates to siphon off 
organisational resources for their corporate benefit. The influence over organisational 
controls is confirmed in the case study findings, as the internal controls in place could not 
detected the misrepresentations of books and records. 
SNC Chief Executive Mr. Robert Card said in a news release that ‘the alleged reprehensible 
deeds were by former employees who left the company long ago and that any applicable 
charges should be applied against them and not the firm.’ (The Canadian Press, 2015). This 
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statement shows an attempt to divert attention to the employees’ involvement in the corrupt 
transactions instead of the corporate’s involvements. 
This research confirms the cooperation of several corrupt actors in the arrangement of the 
corruption scheme. Insider actors represented by the supply-side transfer the organisational 
resources to the receiving actors. This finding emerged from the case studies. Researchers 
have named this as ‘corruption cliques’ (Brass, Butterfield, and Skaggs, 1998; Jansics and 
Javor, 2012). In fact, in this research this ‘corruption clique’ plays a crucial role in ensuring 
that the corrupt transactions are established. 
6.5.1.6 Capture 
The essential element of corporate corruption is capture. Capture is defined as the result or 
process by which public decisions over laws, regulations or policies are directed away from 
the public interest at the expense of a narrow interest group (Carpenter and Moss, 2014; 
OECD, 2017). It is, in fact the contrary of lobbying which is more transparent and open 
(Boehm, 2007). Public procurement is the area most captured (Boas, Hidalgo and 
Richardson, 2014; Bromberg, 2014; Hyytinen, Lundberg and Toivanen, 2008; Fulmer and 
Knill, 2013; Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2004). Actors from both the public sector 
and the private sector are involved in capture (Gournev and Bezlov, 2010; Szanto, Toth and 
Varga, 2012; Wedel, 2003). 
Policy capture has pervasively negative impacts on the economy and society. More 
specifically, it can lead to misallocation of public and private resources, resulting in rent-
seeking activities, inappropriate influence peddling, and corrupt practices. In fact, studies 
show that companies which are politically connected gain in market power and have a 
competitive edge over those which are not politically connected (Cingano and Pinotti, 2013; 
Faccio, 2006; Faccio, Mazulis and McConnell, 2006; Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2013). 
Companies that are not part of a capture network face economic disadvantages (OECD, 
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2016). Conversely, it facilitates access to more business opportunities than conventional 
business strategies. Surprisingly, capture affects democracies with strong public institutions. 
Johnston (2014) used the term ‘influence market corruption’ to describe the scenario where 
private wealth interests seek influence in strong public institutions. In many instances, the 
interviews explained this notion of capture. One interviewee explained as follows: 
‘..these corporates establish strategic contacts with high-level officials…’– 
Interviewee 17. 
Another interviewee elaborated further. 
‘ networking involving public officials/ private actors is an important vehicle for 
capture to occur, creating a sense of reciprocity where illegal payments and future 
contracts are linked.’ – Interviewee 5. 
6.6 Determinants of corporate corruption 
The main categories were defined according to the research questions. Transcripts for 
relevant quotes from the interviews were assigned to the main categories. In a second step, 
the codes were grouped into subcategories. Data obtained through the quantitative and 
qualitative data analysis were integrated and merged to capture insights regarding the 
dynamics of corporate corruption. There exists different approaches to integrate qualitative 
and quantitative data (O’Cathain, Murphy and Nicholl, 2010; Creswell and Plano Clark, 
2011). For the purpose of this research, a separative approach was undertaken. Data were 
collected and analysed separately and then integrated through themes in the elaboration of 
the results (Fetters et al., 2013). Integration through merging of data occurs when the two 
databases are brought together for analysis and for comparison. 
The qualitative themes were compared with the survey results to assess concordance 
(Moseholm and Fetters, 2017). The quantitative data was also used to explain findings from 
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the qualitative data. Quantitative and qualitative findings were synthesised through narrative 
both in the results and discussions through triangulation. The results were combined in a 
table format, where the frame of the analysis was the four overarching themes. The themes 
represent the four main determinants that encourages corporate corruption. The findings 
concurred with studies conducted by Gregory (1999) and de Graaf and Huberts (2008) 
whereby they posit that the private sector’s management style undermines the ‘ethics 
infrastructure’ in the public sector because their goals are focused on results. Furthermore, 
the empirical findings obtained confirms the assertion made by Pinto, Leana, and Pil (2008) 
that these corporates rather than the individuals are the principal beneficiaries of the 
corporate corruption. 
For corrupt transactions, the different actors must inevitably have a goal and, consequently, 
they act to achieve it. For the actors to achieve their goals they should inevitably have power, 
as confirmed by the analysis of the cases. The actors from the corporates are predominantly 
from top management level, as confirmed by the case studies and the interviews conducted. 
Importantly, there are certain forces that encourage the actors from the supply-side to 
engage in the corrupt transaction. For the corrupt mechanism to be established, inevitably 
there should be a channel of communication between the instigators and the targets of the 
transactions. This has been echoed in the interviews and the case study.  
An empirical approach starting with the set of determinants and then identifying the most 
relevant of them seems to be the most optimal solution. The key determinants for corporate 
corruption are identified as shown in table 10 below. The framework below is presented to 
conceptualise the understanding surrounding the determinants of corporate corruption. By 
synthesizing the findings through the different research methods, a matrix is provided which 
can be used to explain the phenomenon of ‘corporate corruption’ in development projects. 
From these findings, it is clear that the corrupt practices involving corporates are not mere 
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coincidence but are calculated risks taken by these corporates.  
As the main themes evolved, it was tested extensively with each interviewee during the 
semi-structured interview in order to gauge its accuracy based on their extensive experience. 
The four major determinants that represent the predisposition for corporate corruption were 
identified as:  
 Minimising competition 
 Institutional blindness 
 Addressing uncertainty 
 Maximising profit 
Table 11 : The main determinants of corporate corruption 
Minimising Competition Institutional Blindness 
 
 Capture 
 Greater market share 
 Bending rules 
 Continuous competition with other 
organisations 
 Competitive market 
 
 Tough economic times 
 Future contracts 
 New markets 
 Long-term contracts 
 Adverse market conditions 
 Economic instability 
Addressing Uncertainty Maximising Profit 
 
 
 Low corporate social responsiveness 
 Political instability 
 Underestimating social risks 
 Low level of responsiveness 
 Challenges in meeting organisational 
objectives 
 Rationality 
 
 Long-term goal 
 Organisational financial stability 
 Increasing shareholders wealth 
 Sustain financial health 
 Strong financial stability 
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It appears that corporates engaged in MDB-financed projects show a high propensity to 
engage in corporate corruption. The four major determinants represent the drivers that 
instigate these corporates to corporate corruption. The public officials represent the targets 
that facilitate the corrupt transactions. They may not necessarily represent the demand-side 
as they may be just the receivers of the bribes. The four main determinants that encourage 
corporate corruption to occur are explained below. 
6.6.1 Minimising Competition 
Regardless of what assets a company owns and how much cash it holds, loss over extended 
periods will eventually weaken a company's asset positions and decrease the amount of its 
cash holdings. When companies can operate at a consistent low-cost level, they will be in a 
better position to absorb any price decline or market downturn and stay profitable. The lower 
the cost, the larger the profit margin. If the cost rises to a level that results in a thin profit 
margin, companies become vulnerable to any price shock or sales deterioration and can 
sustain significant losses. To minimise loss, companies must aim to achieve the break-even 
sales volume by maintaining a satisfactory level of market share. With increasing 
competition, MNcs are thriving in international market. These corporates are looking for 
survival strategies. They are on the constant look out for market while minimising 
competition. Their objectives is to secure market without going for completion. Corporate 
corruption seems to be the quick and strategic instrument in achieving this. 
6.6.2 Institutional blindness 
These MNEs simply respond to the institutional weaknesses and fall into the vicious trap of 
corruption by supplying corruption. Studies have shown that strength of institution has a 
prevalence on corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Doh et al., 2003). Boddewyn and Doh 
(2011) explained that this institutional void lured corporates to engage in unethical 
behaviour. According to Khanna and Palepu (2010), MNCs adapt their business model to 
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address the cost of institutional voids. MNCs further entrench host-country corruption by 
institutionalising it as a norm and thus reinforcing the cycle (Luiz and Stewart, 2014). 
Ultimately, they become accomplices in the generation of conditions within the country of 
operation. The findings of this research converge to this assertion. 
Luiz and Stewart (2014) argue that MNCs either can reinforce the vicious cycle of 
underdevelopment, institutional weakness, and corruption, or can, through their influence 
on institutions, create a virtuous reinforcing cycle, which promotes good corporate policy 
and development. MNCs are competing for markets globally. This study provides empirical 
evidence to show that corporates lack a systematic framework for generating insights about 
the future in a consistent and reliable manner. The results point to the fact that these 
corporates are fully aware of their involvement in the corruption schemes, but due to their 
institutional blindness, are ignorant that they are taking inappropriate risks and developing 
competitive vulnerabilities. 
Institutional blindness is an organisational dysfunction that leads corporates to become 
disconnected with emerging realities. The effect on corporates is that they indulge in corrupt 
schemes without realising the consequences that they may be in if the corrupt schemes are 
unveiled. This research has identified common indications that corporates may be blinding 
themselves by limiting themselves to immediate success by instigating or facilitating 
corruption. Institutional blindness leaves a corporate vulnerable to corporate corruption. 
Institutional blindness can be fixed through the adoption of a project governance framework 
that effectively addresses corruption risks, including corporate corruption. It also empowers 
corporates to resist unforeseen corporate risks associated with corruption. 
6.6.3 Addressing uncertainty 
Randomness and uncertainty play increasingly greater roles in determining business 
success, largely because of rapidly evolving social networks. It is human nature to want 
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to know everything. Being in possession of knowledge is central to the way human beings 
work and interpret the world around them, hence the need to address uncertainty by ensuring 
that the corporates get a competitive advantage. Companies may take different approaches 
to maximise profit or minimise loss based on their own organisational strengths. While 
product differentiation and low price can be critical to maximising profit, controlling cost 
and maintaining market share may be more important in minimising loss. The corporate 
world is full of uncertainties. In their quest to ensure stability and obtaining future contracts 
these corporates tend to indulge in corporate corruption. 
6.6.4 Profit maximisation 
Profit maximisation is the capability of the firm in producing maximum output with limited 
input, or by using minimum input to produce its stated output. It is termed as the foremost 
objective of the company. It has been traditionally recommended that the apparent motive 
of any business organisation is to earn a profit as it is essential for the success, survival, 
and growth of the company. Profit is a long-term objective, but it has a short-term 
perspective – that is, one financial year. Profit can be calculated by deducting total cost from 
total revenue. Through profit maximisation, a firm is able to ascertain input-output levels, 
which gives the highest amount of profit. Profit maximisation is a short-term objective of a 
firm while the long-term objective is wealth maximisation. Profit maximisation ignores risk 
and uncertainty, unlike wealth maximisation, which considers both. 
The rationale behind profit maximisation is the need for the maximum level of accumulated 
profits for growth/expansion/diversification and protection against unforeseen situations 
like economic recession, natural disaster, unexpected losses in future, cut-throat competition 
and others. Conversely, the rationale behind wealth maximisation is to enhance shareholder 
wealth and confidence as a reward for their investment and to maintain their relationship 
and loyalty towards the company. 
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6.7 Concluding remarks 
Drawing out meaning from the research data collected, this chapter has presented the 
findings in a structured way to answer the research questions raised. The findings sought to 
ensure that no data was ignored in establishing the dynamics that are embedded in corporate 
corruption. This research provides empirical evidence to suggest that corporate corruption 
is not merely an occasional ‘grease’ but may have become normalised and embedded in IB 
dealings of MNCs. Moreover, the findings also indicate that the recipients or beneficiaries 
are powerful, well-connected elites in the corporates. This is in line with the observations 
made by Rocha, Brown and Cloke (2011). Based on the findings, it is argued that corporate 
corruption is essentially a top-down phenomenon where the corporate elite embrace the 
corrupt ways of doing business for the corporate benefits. 
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Chapter 7 Discussions 
7.0 Introduction 
As described in Chapter 1, the overarching objective of this study is to understand the 
dynamics of corporate corruption and to identify the determinants that encourage it to occur 
in development projects. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and reflect upon the 
findings. Chapter 7 aims to answer the pertinent questions this research has raised and 
synthesised the findings that emerged. The chapter considers the most informative and 
persuasive of the research findings in responding to the research questions. Gleaned from 
the empirical findings, responses to the questions are provided below. 
7.1 Integration of findings 
(i) What are the challenges facing corporates involved in international 
development projects?  
The data obtained relating to this question was identified by way of the detailed survey, 
interview and case study. Ethics experts and organisation theorists often associate diverted 
behaviours in corporates as the responsibility of individuals. This study shows that senior 
managers/top managers who are actually involved in corporate corruption, do it for 
corporate benefit; hence, these corporates become responsible for their actions. Based on 
the different methods used, rich empirical materials were obtained confirming this. 
This study considered the corporate perspective towards corruption and deconstructed the 
mechanism employed by corporates in the area of development projects in instigating 
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corrupt transactions. The findings show that corrupt transactions result from the prevalence 
of profitability objectives over the corporate and societal value of ethics. The findings 
further give credence that these MNCs have a high propensity to indulge in corrupt practices 
because of obstacles to their business development. Luo (2004) and Blundo et al. (2006) 
also highlight this point.  
(ii) How effective are the MDBs’ sanctions regimes in mitigating corporate 
corruption? 
The objective of the sanctions regime is to protect MDBs’ funds from being squandered. 
The survey findings depict the general feeling of discomfort among those corporates that 
have been sanctioned. While MDBs rely on debarment of corporates as a strategy against 
corruption, the problem that emerges is that there is a need to keep suppliers in the market 
for competition. As more corporates are sanctioned and excluded for participation in the 
market, the competition process is distorted and does not promote fair markets. While 
temporary debarment is justified, it may have a longer term impact on integrity and fairness 
with the automatic cross-debarment by other MDBs. 
The cross-debarment appears to be effective but the contentions among the sanctioned 
corporates is that it would inevitably change the way these corporates do business in the 
future. It is explicit from the responses obtained from the survey that these sanctioned 
corporates are still thriving for markets, though they are not engaging in the MDB’s 
contracts. The most pessimistic are the small enterprises, which lack resources to have a 
wider grip on the market. Moreover, these small enterprises view themselves as being the 
most disadvantage compared to large multinationals, as according to them, the negotiation 
settlement process is opaque. They claim that these large multinationals are more likely to 
solicit MDBs for engaging in negotiated settlements as they can afford to pay huge financial 
penalties. 
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This research reveals that the present sanctions regime is not based upon an understanding 
of the root causes of corruption emanating from the business side. The integrity compliance 
programme, which sanctions firms have to comply with, before being reinstated as eligible 
contractors, does not necessary treat the aspect of corporate corruption, albeit it focuses on 
corruption within the organisation. It predominantly treats corruption at corporate level by 
restraining individual actors from engaging in corrupt transactions. Consequently, it is 
argued that while the sanctions regime might be effective in restoring integrity to firms with 
corrupt individuals, it does not explicitly address corporate corruption, though the 
corporates do become conscious of its consequences once they are sanctioned. 
(iii)  How is the definition of project success helpful in restricting firms to engage in 
corporate corruption? 
The concept of success in projects has been discussed in management literature and has 
been central to the literature of PM. Indeed, the qualitative content analysis has help to 
connect the literature on PM and corporate corruption. This study demonstrates that success 
can indeed, be evaluated only when the evaluation dimensions are adequately defined. This 
research confirms that the evaluation dimensions generally correspond to the traditional 
constraints. In other words, a project is usually considered successful if its implementation 
complies with the usual constraints of time, cost, and the client's terms of reference or 
quality. Here, we identify the strong influence of the corporate’s philosophy upon which 
PM principles have structured itself.  
For corporates engaged in development works, success is the assessment of the technical 
quality of outputs and through the evaluation of management performance. However, as 
demonstrated through this research, the client's agenda may be significantly different. In the 
case of development projects financed by MDBs, the definition of success corresponding to 
the traditional constraints does not fully reflect the external environment. This perspective 
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is therefore more of a global one. The raison d'être of a development project hinges on the 
satisfaction of one or more objectives. It is important to judge the project's success by the 
way the corporate manages the inputs and delivers the outputs, but also by evaluating the 
project's contribution to the development agenda.  
This research establishes that, beyond the time, cost, and quality constraints, it is pertinent 
to consider another evaluation dimension to measure the development impact of the project. 
It is worthy to note that the research shows interesting empirical results for corporates 
engaged in MDB-financed projects to consider. The key to minimising corporate corruption 
risk is to develop and implement a risk-based approach at corporate level. Simply hoping 
that existing internal controls will detect and deter corruption risks will inevitably lead to 
increased losses for these corporates. With the risk based approach also factor in the 
corporate’s strategic objectives as well as its legal obligations. The ultimate challenge for 
management is how to manage corruption risks, involving both individual and corporate 
actors for corporate benefits.  
Based on empirical evidence, this research shows that corporate corruption takes place at a 
high level of the hierarchy. The common feature of this type of corruption is that corruption 
is permeated within the organisations without being detected by their internal control 
mechanism. The findings of this research confirm other researchers’ assertions that a firm’s 
behaviour, strategy and response are shaped by its organisational environment (Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967; Meyer and Scott, 1983). Narrainen’s framework elaborated in Chapter 6 
depicts this.  
(iv)   How is corporate corruption triggered by corporates representing the business 
side? 
Corruption is a two-sided transaction, with a ‘payer’ (the supply-side of corruption) and a 
receiving side. On the supply-side, we are examining the extent corporates consider are 
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influenced by the public sector in instigating or facilitating the corrupt transactions. The 
present research confirms that corporate corruption is predominately instigated by MNCs 
irrespective whether the receiving-end demands for it or not.  
In order to depict the supply-driven scenario in corporate corruption, MNCs instigate or 
facilitate the corrupt transactions. This research acknowledges the willingness of these 
corporates to instigate corrupt transactions with the target, which represents the government 
side. To illustrate the scenario of corporate corruption, in which the corporates are triggered 
to engage in corrupt scheme, the analogy below is used to explain how it can facilitate the 
corrupt transaction even in the absence of requests for bribery from the demand-side/ or 
receiving end. The objective is to illustrate how corporate corruption operates at the supply-
side. It also helps to undersand the scenario involved with the different actors.  
The analogy is based on the gravitation force that allows the water from the higher beaker 
to flow to the lower one. In the schema below, beaker A represents the corporates engaged 
in development projects while beaker B1 and beaker B2 represent public institutions in the 
country where the project is undertaken. In Figure 22 below, the beaker of water which is 
higher (in this case beaker B1), will flow down to the lower beaker A due to gravity. 
However, the valves, which are fixed along the water pipe, can constrict the water flow 
when they are closed. In scenario 1, beaker B1 is higher up than beaker A. It represents a 
high level of corruption characterised by poor governance and lack of anticorruption laws 
at the national level.  
In this scenario, the risk for public officials to demand a bribe is high. Logically, in this set 
up, water will flow from beaker B1 down to beaker A. The valve in the pipe will allow the 
water to flow when it is open and will cease to flow when it is closed. Scenario 1 (see figure 
23) represents the case where corruption is demand-driven as the corporate is responsive to 
the demand and will execute it. 
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Conversely, in Scenario 2 (see figure 24), beaker B2 is in lower position than beaker A, 
thus representing that there are checks and balances in the systems which constraints the 
public sector fromengaging in any corrupt transactions. In such scenario, bribery of/ by 
public officials maybe an offence under the law. Public officials will be less likely to 
demand a bribe. In this situation, there will be a reluctance of public officials to ask for a 
bribe as the action carries higher risks. Under such a scenario, the contracting firm is more 
willing to instigate the corrupt transaction by entering into a secretive corrupt pact with 
public institutions or representatives of such institutions.  
It is termed supply-driven as the initiative comes from the corporates, which represent the 
private sector. This is exactly what happens in the case of corporate corruption, whereby the 
corporates instigate or facilitate the corrupt transactions. Because corporates based in weak 
institutions face less monitoring by consumers and governments, they tend to behave more 
opportunistically, reducing the prudence of organisational processes (Lin and Chuang, 
2016). Institutionalists have argued that when formal institutions are weak and malfunction, 
informal institutions emerge to fill the ‘institutional void’ and play a greater role in 
Beaker B1 
Beaker A 
Valve 
Direction of flow 
Business side Public sector 
Figure 23 : Demand-driven scenario 
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governing human behaviour within the corporate (Peng et al., 2008, 2009; Mair and Marti, 
2009; Dixit, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The situation is similar here. The corporate plays an active role in executing the corrupt 
transactions eventhough there is no demand. The valve is the analogy for internal controls 
that restricts the flow when closed. Similarly, when a risk-based approach is adopted at 
corporate level (represented by the valve closed) corporate corruption risks can be mitigated. 
Finney and Lesieur (1982) suggest that corporate wrongdoing results from efforts to solve 
performance problems in the firms. This study proves this assertion. In fact, a highly 
competitive environment creates pressure or a need for illegality by restricting legitimate 
means for acquiring resources or attaining desired levels of performance (Vaughan, 1983). 
While it is argued that pressure and need can explain corporate illegality, there are other 
conditions that may lead to corporate illegality (Szwajkowski, 1985). Corporate corruption 
may occurs in the following scenarios, when (i) public sector represents the demand-side 
and (ii) the public sector is passive and represents the receiving end. 
Beaker A 
Beaker B2 
Valve 
Supply-side Receiving Side 
Direction of flow 
Figure 24 : Supply-driven scenario 
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7.2 What are the determinants of corporate corruption in 
development projects? 
This study illustrates that corporates engaged in development projects financed by MDBs 
try to establish or improve their positions by acquiring or controlling larger shares or take 
other actions to gain an advantage over competitors. Corporate corruption represents a 
deliberate means to gaining a competitive advantage. However, it does not occur 
inadvertently as corporate actors work towards achieving these corporate benefits. This 
research further demonstrates that corporates attempt to control or adapt to uncertainty in 
their environments and, consequently, corporate corruption may emerge in the quest of these 
corporates to seek a corporate benefit. This finding is in line with similar observations made 
by researchers of the causes of wrongdoing by firms (Aldrich, 1979; Pfeffer and Salanickm, 
1978). Characteristics of the firm and the environment can predispose organisation members 
to behave illegally (Baucus, 1994).  
Corporate corruption results from predisposition or a combination of situational factors, 
rather than from individual characteristics. This is also captured by an interviewee who 
highlighted that the corporate forces encourage the actors to engage in corrupt transactions 
for corporate benefit.  
‘I view it as insane for an individual to take his own initiative to commit corruption 
on behalf of the company’ - Interviewee 11. 
The first stage for the corruptor is to identify the potential target to corrupt. In a scenario 
involving different actors, this may not be a straightforward process. It is here that the major 
breakthrough is achieved by identifying whether the bribe-receiver is likely to be 
submissive. Based on the findings, we argue that the corporates, represented by top 
executives or management, play a dominant role in identifying the risks involved in 
engaging with submissive actors open to corruption. To explain the scenario, the analogy of 
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the mouse and cheese is referred to.  This research identifies four main determinants that 
can explain the motives of the corporates to instigate or facilitate corporate corruption. 
7.2.1 Mouse and cheese analogy to conceptualise corporate corruption 
Firms are under incessant pressure from markets and from shareholders for higher profits 
and they have to distinguish themselves from their competitors (Sikka and Lehman, 2015). 
This study examines the environment, settings and the responsibilities of different actors 
involved in the perpetration of corporate corruption and shows that these MNCs has  high 
propensities to indulge in corporate corruption. The analogy visually represents the ‘mouse’ 
as the corporates (the business side) and the ‘cheese’ as opportunities for corporate 
corruption. This analogy provide a simplistic framework for explaining corporate corruption 
etiology. 
       
 
 
 
 
      
 
The mouse is the analogy of the corporate actor who represents the assertive corruptor, 
looking for opportunities to engage in corruption (represented by the cheese) for the benefit 
of the corporate (to relieve its hunger). The mouse sniffs the piece of cheese to ensure it is 
edible prior to consuming it. Through this sniffing process, a signal is sent to its brain. This 
information is processed and if it considers that the piece of cheese is not poisonous, that it 
Figure 25 : The mouse and cheese analogy 
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is consumable, only then the mouse will proceed to nibble the cheese. This is precisely what 
happens when a corporate is on the lookout for opportunities to corrupt.  
This sniffing process whereby the mouse identifies the piece of cheese, is useful to explain 
the process the corporate undergoes to identify its potential target. Once the corporate has 
assessed its external environment, this information is sent for processing and consultation 
by top management (analogy of the mouse’s brain). If top management identifies that the 
environment is conducive to proceed with the corrupt transaction, then the appropriate 
mechanism is worked out by the corporate actors in order to instigate or facilitate the corrupt 
scheme while avoiding detection. Existing literature does not explain this process where the 
corporate is engaged in a thinking process before engaging in a calculated risk. This analogy 
throws more light on the processing of information by the corporate prior to engaging in 
corporate corruption.  
7.2.2 Determinants of corporate corruption based on Narrainen’s framework 
Based on the findings, this thesis proceeds to identify the processes and context, which 
shape the opportunities and drivers of the corporates to become criminogenic. In fact, the 
research findings the four major determinants that influence corporates to engage in 
corporate corruption. Aiming to present a corporate logic of corruption, this research 
suggests that the four determinants based on Narrainen’s framework shown below should 
be present, irrespective of the order. It is not based on individual actor but is described as a 
phenomenon where the collective action representing the corporate brain, which triggers the 
corporate corruption. 
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There is sound evidence of the framework being a reliable construct in identifying the 
determinants of corporate corruption in development projects more specifically in the 
infrastructural sector. The results show that these corporates develop certain inherent 
characteristics based on the four determinants, conducive to deviant corporate behaviours. 
7.3 Concluding remarks 
The empirical analysis offers two main results. It confirms that there is considerable 
propensity for MNCs to instigate corrupt transactions with actors from the public sector 
irrespective wherter the targeting end represents the active or the passive corruptors.  It 
appears that while these corporates tend to focus on time, cost, and quality in maximising 
profits, they also have a high propensity to indulge in corporate corruption in order to sustain 
their targeted objectives. This tendency can be explained in part by the inability of PM 
principles to effectively mitigate corrupt risk through a lack of proper definition of project 
Figure 26 : Determinants of corporate corruption 
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success. This chapter concludes by proposing four main determinants of corporate 
corruption that may be used to explain the propensity of the business side to engage in 
corrupt transactions with the public sector. The final chapter summarises the main 
conclusions raised by the research questions in the thesis and provides reflections on the 
limitations of the research.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
Chapter 8 pulls together the knowledge gained by the entire research study and concludes 
how it has advanced current knowledge and understanding surrounding corporate 
corruption. In this chapter, the key conclusions distilled from the study are presented and 
policy implications for International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and donors are 
highlighted. Finally, the chapter provides some directions for future research.  
The overarching aim of this research was to identify the determinants that encourage 
corporate corruption to flourish in international development projects. The aim of this 
research has been successfully achieved through a better understanding of the dynamics of 
corporate corruption. The following four subsidiary research questions were developed to 
guide this research:- 
(i) What are the challenges facing MNCs involved in international development 
projects? 
(ii) How effective are the MDBs sanctions regimes in mitigating corruption risks? 
(iii) How is the definition of project success conducive for corporates engaged in 
development project to controlling corporate corruption?  
(iv) How is corporate corruption triggered by corporates representing the business 
side? 
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8.1 Main findings 
Overall, the study addresses the research gap by providing empirical insights into the 
preconditions for corporate corruption to manifest in the realm of IB, with particular focus 
on development projects. This research contributes to the current debate and literature on 
corporate corruption. It is the first research study on the determinants of corporate 
corruption. No other study to date has analysed corporate corruption from a macro-
perspective. 
8.1.1 Determinants of corporate corruption 
Risks associated with corporate corruption have gained prominence in recent years owing 
to the proactive enforcement of anti-corruption policies by MDBs and national legislations 
having extra-territorial reach. Empirical evidence from this study identify the tensions 
within organisations owing to the international context and particularly the legal, political 
and social dimensions of the corporate’s environment. Undeniably, corporates sanctioned 
by MDBs show weaknesses in their governance structure as they face reputational risks. 
Arguably, corporates are responding to their corporate environment by developing strategic 
instruments counteracting the challenges they are facing. Consequently, these corporates 
are becoming instigators of corporate corruption for their ultimate corporate benefits. This 
research identified four main determinants encouraging corporate corruption, namely (i) 
minimising competition; (ii) institutional blindness; (iii) addressing uncertainty; and (iv) 
profit maximisation.  
8.1.2 Corporate corruption – a threat to MNCs 
Corporates need to be concerned of the scope of MDBs’ sanctions and the significant 
adverse business impact it may have on future contracts. Consequently, these corporates 
have a responsibility to ensure that their systems and control are in line with the MDB 
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integrity principles. There is no way out: if these corporates want to secure MDB-financed 
contracts, they have to comply with the MDBs’ requirements for integrity in order to avoid 
sanctions. This study shows that MNCs can play a significant role in instigating corporate 
corruption in collusion with different actors from the business side and public sector side.   
Moreover, the findings also show that while corporate corruption may be compatible with 
the corporates’ objectives it may result from a tension between the corporate pecuniary 
objectives and the enforcement environment of MDBs, thus jeopardising the development 
agenda. Rose-Ackerman (2007) and Martin et al. (2007) made similar observations. 
Empirical evidence from the present research seems inconclusive: corporate corruption 
from a perspective of MDB-financed projects is a top-down phenomenon and provides a 
strategic instrument for corporates to gain corporate benefits. There are cost implications to 
firms when they are sanctioned by MDBs. There is also nonfinancial costs in the form of 
loss of reputation of the firms, loss of business partners and restriction to bid for future 
MDB-financed projects. 
8.1.3 MNCs’ responsibility in mitigating corporate corruption 
With increasing investments in development projects worldwide by international financial 
institutions, multinational firms are competing in the international arena for foreign markets. 
There are challenges for corporates doing business in developing economies where there is 
regulatory uncertainty, reduced transparency and accountability, coupled with economic, 
political and social turmoil. Successful companies must be agile and adapt to the changing 
risk profile of their expanding operations.  
The findings show how these MNCs may face challenges working in multi-jurisdictions 
with multiple, diverse and possibly conflicting institutional forces (Marano and Kostova, 
2016). These MNCs have to ensue that fair corporate practices are embedded in, and 
therefore reflect, the institutional environments in which they operate.  
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The external environment in which these MNCs are operating is shaping a corporate culture 
with corruption becoming normalised in corporates with the ultimate objective of obtaining 
corporate benefits. The results of this study show that there is an emergence of 
‘criminogenic institutional framework’ in which corporates and/ or their agents are 
encouraged to engage in corrupt transactions with the target actors. This study confirms that 
the corporations engaged in MDBs have a key role to play in anticorruption efforts, which 
increasingly include supply-side elements. The implementation of the Narrainen’s Project 
Governance framework can help achieve this. 
8.1.4 Corporate corruption: a symptom of corporate brain disorder 
Interestingly, this study shows that corporates engaging in corrupt behaviour do so without 
due regards to their corporate reputation at the time of committing the corrupt transactions. 
Based on the results of the study, this attributed to the effect of institutional blindness. 
Institution blindness is a metaphor used in the study to describe the inability of the corporate 
to understand the consequences of its action in the long-term following their debarments. 
The case studies reviewed in this research show that the corporates have benefited in the 
short-term but, in the long-term, they have been sanctioned, paid financial penalties, and 
have faced reputational risks. Undeniably, the corporate actors may not have envisaged this 
scenario at the time the corrupt transaction took place. 
Corporates are viewed as social actors with motives, drives and intentions (Whetten, Felin 
and King, 2009). Consequently, the strategy put forward by these corporates ignore the 
consequences of their actions. Based on the findings of this research, these corporates were 
seen to underestimate corruption’s negative effects and overestimate its positive effects. 
This study develops new arguments on how these corporates respond to corporate 
corruption from the supply-side. It is based on the concept of corporate represented by the 
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‘corporate brain’. The corporate brain metaphor is of interest as a lens for considering long-
term directions for the corporates (Cleverly, 2015). 
Top management/ representatives are important actors who collectively represent the brain 
of the corporates, in the sense that their actions decide on the corporate long-term strategy. 
These corporate actors play an important role in positioning the corporates in the long-term 
through their collective decisions and actions. Any good decisions or actions will benefit 
the corporates. Therefore, these corporate actors act for the corporate benefits. This research 
confirms that collective action at top management level is at the core of corporate 
corruption. 
Furthermore, the empirical results of this study provide evidence that the supply-side driven 
by the corporates tend to anaesthetise institutions, representing the targeted actors through 
distribution of corporate resources. This is done by switching off internal controls within 
the corporates. It is further argued that this institution blindness is a symptom of corporate 
brain disorder, which is a determining factor that pushes corporates towards corporate 
corruption. 
8.1.5 Towards a redefinition of project success for MDB-financed projects 
This research contributes to a better understanding of how and why corporate corruption 
becomes prevalent among MNCs engaged in development projects. As opportunities 
abound in emerging markets, corporates need to look beyond the traditional risk paradigms 
to counteract the growing constellation of enforcement authorities. The elevated risk of  
sanctions within the context of a cross-debarment regime set up by MDBs makes it essential 
that these MNCs understand the unique legal and procedural environment of the MDB 
sanctions regime. As Hills et al. (2009, p. 73) put it: ‘corporates should be involved in 
increased anticorruption practices through a strategic lens’. Based on this research, the 
strategic lens for corporates, is to sustain future contracts of MDB-financed projects. This 
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can be achieved by integrating corruption risk management with PM principles during the 
implementation stage as depicted in the Narrainen’s Project governance model. Corporate 
corruption can cause significant damages to organisational integrity. Hence, these 
corporations are encouraged to mitigate corruption practices, to maximise operational 
efficiency and maintain a good reputation.  
8.2 Contributions of this research 
This thesis provides original knowledge to inform the debate on corporate corruption. 
Moreover, it can also act as a catalyst for further research in the field of corporate corruption. 
The contribution of this research to the extant literature is threefold:  
 The study demonstrates that PM has not matured enough to integrate corruption risks 
(including corporate corruption) in its framework in the case of international 
development projects. There is also a gap in the literature when considering the 
contribution of PM as a field of knowledge to international development projects 
(Ika; 2012, p. 28). Its insight could be beneficial to PM literature insofar as it can be 
used in ID projects (Ika et al., 2010; 2012) in redefining project success. This 
research will be significant to both academic research and in practice because it has 
the potential to clarify the definition of project success. 
The research will also be significant for contractors engaged in IDPs, insofar as its 
findings can help to build more resilience to corrupt practices from the supply-side. 
This will in turn help to mitigate corporate corruption and to ensure that funds that 
are allocated to projects are used for their intended purposes. Moreover, it will 
contribute to the generic literature on determinants of corporate corruption by 
addressing the root cause of the problem and to develop corresponding policies. 
Furthermore, it is envisaged that this research will open new arguments from a 
perspective, which has not been investigated before. 
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 This study rigorously demonstrates, in the case of supply-driven corruption at 
corporate level, that the traditional Cressey’s fraud triangle - which has been used to 
explain the propensity of the individual actor/s to engage in corrupt practices - is 
insufficient in explaining corporate corruption. This study moves beyond 
organisations of corrupt individuals, to examine the determinants of corruption at 
corporate level. It proposes a risk-based approach to project success based on the 
Narrainen’s Project Governance Framework. It identifies the four determining 
factors that can be used to explain why corporate actors engaged in corporate 
corruption.  
 Finally, this thesis brings new knowledge to a strand of the literature by identifying 
the determinants of corporate corruption at corporate level. The study provides a 
more comprehensive picture of how the organisational structure, component 
characteristics and relationship dynamics shape the occurrence of corporate 
corruption. 
The findings of this thesis have important implications for anticorruption policy. The 
results provide suggestive evidence that resolving the challenges in international 
development projects is an important channel towards instilling integrity in MNCs 
engaged in developmental projects because it will enhance aid effectiveness. The 
findings will contribute to guiding donor agencies in their anticorruption strategies 
with more focus on the supply-side of corruption. Based on the results of this study, 
the four determinants of corporate corruption can be referred to in explaining the 
propensity of corporates to engage in corporate corruption. In presenting these 
insights, a contribution is made to the on-going academic discussion of corporate 
corruption at the firm level. In sum, the determinants proposed in this research could 
be a promising framework for improving the theoretical understanding of corporate 
corruption, as well as policy-making to address corporate corruption.  
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8.3  Opportunities for further research 
The findings provide important implications for further research in the area of corporate 
corruption and the effectiveness of interventions designed to address corporate corruption. 
The results reinforce the idea that certain situational factors may be used to explain the 
propensity of corporates to be corrupt. Building on the findings from this study, the 
following further research are recommended:- 
 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has established that 
SMEs are more likely to be subject to corruption and perceive this as a major business 
obstacle (UNODC, 2012). SMEs are local or regional firms participating in markets where 
corruption may common practice and the inability of these firms to address the corruption 
risks. These SMEs will undeniably face difficulties in conducting business in the face of 
increasing competition. The sanctions systems imposed by MDBs are sanctioning an 
increasing number of SMEs. Further research could investigate whether there is a 
correlation between size of firms and the propensity to engage into corporate corruption. 
 According to Jávor and Jancsics (2016), the social environment created by 
corporates (the ‘bad barrels’) has a strong influence at the individual-level. Ashford and 
Anand (2003) postulate that, ‘corruption may become taken for granted and perpetuated in 
some organisations’. Based on these assumptions, it would be interesting to understand how 
corporate corruption can influence the behaviours of employees to be corrupt for their own 
personal interest. Moreover, collective individual acts may create an institutionalised system 
of corruption within an organisational context. Further research can help to understand how 
corruption becomes institutionalised and gradually embedded in organisational structures 
and processes. It can also explain the circumstances for the transition from corrupt 
organisations to corrupt individuals. 
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 Pinto et al. (2008) argue that corruption by individuals for their personal benefits 
perpetrated against firms varies according to their hierarchical levels. They refer to it as a 
‘bottom-up’ phenomenon. It is further argued that power dynamics within the organisational 
hierarchy shapes actors’ behaviour at different levels in the organisation (Hills and 
Mahoney, 1978; Pfeffer and Leong, 1977; Rajan and Zingales, 2000). Further research can 
help to understand the mechanisms employed at different hierarchical levels within firms 
and whether power dynamics has an effect on their motivations to engage in corruption.  
 There is a dearth of research focusing on corruption control in organisations. 
Controlling corruption at the organisational level is recognised to be complex (Ashford et 
al., 2008). In fact, this research confirms the secretive relationship involving top managers 
and other parties. Further work is required in understanding how corporates involve their 
top managers in corruption for the corporates’ benefit. This will be helpful in addressing 
corrupt behaviours among top managers and provide strategies to control it at corporate 
level. 
Another promising area for future research is to explore the joint effects of the industry, 
firm, and individual variables on the extent and severity of top management fraud. Little is 
known about the effect of these variables on top management fraud, and the few studies to 
date have produced inconclusive results (Zahra et al., 2005). 
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Appendix III – Consent form for survey participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study Title: Understanding the drivers of corruption in contracting firms delivering international 
development projects in aid-recipient countries. Towards building a corruption risk mitigating 
strategy. 
 
Please initial box 
1. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
 withdraw at any time without giving any reason, (you might wish to add a 
 constraint here- e.g. up to the point when the data are  analysed) 
 
2. I understand that data collected during the study, may be looked at by  
individuals from [company name / University etc. ], or from regulatory authorities.  
I give permission for these individuals to have access to my data. 
 
3. I agree to my interview being audio 
 
4. I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
Name of Participant:   
 Date:    Signature: 
Name of Person taking consent :    
Date:    Signature: 
When completed: 1 for participant; 1 for researcher‘s file. 
Name of Researcher : Narrainen Sanjeev 
Name of Supervisor : Chris Lewis Chris.lewis@port.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
 
 
Name of Researcher 
: Narrainen Sanjeev 
Name of Supervisor 
: Prof Chris Lewis 
Chris.lewis@port.ac.
uk 
 
Name of Researcher 
: Narrainen Sanjeev 
Name of Supervisor 
: Prof Chris Lewis 
Chris.lewis@port.ac.
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Name of Supervisor 
: Prof Chris Lewis 
Chris.lewis@port.ac.
uk 
 
Appendices  
251 
Appendix IV – Survey questionnaire 
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Appendix V – SurveyMonkey analysis 
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Appendix VII –  List of journal articles consulted 
 
Publication Definition of project success Strategy for project success 
Anti-
corruption 
measures 
1 Achterkamp and Vos (2008 Interest of stakeholders Stakeholder classification 
model 
no 
2 Ahsan and Gunawan (2010) Time and cost Donor and host country work 
together to plan and implement 
the project 
no 
3 Atkinson (1999) Time, cost and quality and stakeholders Proposal for a new framework  no 
4 Aubry et al. (2007) To include project management office to 
better manage projects 
New conceptual framework  no 
5 Bakker, Boonstra and 
Wortmann(2010) 
Time, budget and project requirement 
Stakeholders’ perspectives 
Management approach no 
6 Bryde (2003) Multi-stakeholder expectation Management and 
communication skills 
no 
7 Chan et al (2003) Commercial pressure Marketing management  no 
8 Cooke-Davies (2002) Cost, time and quality criteria  Project management no 
9 Diallo and Thruillier (2005) Communications and cooperation between 
stakeholders 
Team building in trust climate no 
10 de Carvalho , Patah, de 
Souza Bido(2016) 
national environment plays a key role in 
project performance 
Environmental concerns no 
11 Fortune and White, (2006) Factors can be categorized into 
environmentally related (meaning where 
the project resides)  
Environmental concerns no 
12 Guo et al. (2014) Time cost and quality 
Risk management element 
From corporate governance to 
project governance 
yes 
 
13 Hyväri, (2006) Factors can be categorized into 
environmentally related (meaning where 
the project resides) 
Environmental concerns no 
14 Ika et al. (2011) Critical success factors: Monitoring, 
coordination, design, training and 
institutional environment 
Strengthening of project design 
and monitoring  
no 
15 Jha and Iyer, (2006) Factors can be categorized into 
environmentally related (meaning where 
the project resides) 
Environmental concerns No 
 
16 Khang and Moe (2008  Visible impact on beneficiaries 
 Build institutional capacity 
 Good reputation 
 Project is meaningful 
Project management no 
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 Project extension 
 Project purpose 
 Long term goal 
17 Kloppenborg, Tesh and 
Manolis (2014) 
 Firm’s future 
 Meeting agreement 
 Customer’s success 
Empirical life cycle stage 
investigation 
no 
18 Lim and Mohammed(1999) Use of micro and macro criteria Management concept no 
19 Lipovetsky et al (1997) Meeting design and planning goals 
Customer benefits 
enefit to defense and national 
infrastructure 
 
Project management techniques 
 
no 
20 Mir and Pinnnington (2014) Variables which employees can relate 
directly to project environments 
Project management framework no 
21 Müller and Jugdev(2012) Success beyond the fraud triangle  Management notion no 
22 Müller and Turner (2007) To achieve a common understanding of 
what project success is, it should be 
measurable and therefore defined in terms 
of success criteria  
Project management no 
23 Munns and Bjeimii (1996) Oriented towards achievement of project Client should take interest in the 
development and use of project 
no 
24 Muriithi and Crawford 
(2003) 
Skills, knowledge, tools and techniques  Should be align with cultural 
and work values 
no 
25 Palomo et al. (2007) Risk Analysis Cost, duration and 
performance 
Framework to model 
uncertainty 
no 
26 Pinto and Mantel (1990) Implementation process 
Perceived value of the project 
Client satisfaction with result 
Project management tools no 
27 Raz and Michael(2001) Use of successful project management tool Risk assessment method no 
28 Sage et al. ( 2014) the social and political contextualization of 
performance in project management  
Management model no 
29 
 
Sauser et al., (2009) New criteria depend on the context  Management no 
30 Shenhar et al. (2010) Short term and long term project objectives 
 
 
Framework built on efficiency, 
impact business success, 
preparing for future 
no 
31 Shenhar and Dvir, (2007) To include more success criteria other than 
cost, quality and time.  
Management no 
32 Stefanovic (2007) Building team work effectiveness Management of people no 
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33 Too and Weaver (2013) Satisfy corporate governance requirements/ 
project sponsor 
Project governance framework Fraud/ 
Bribery 
within the 
organisation 
34 Judgev and Müller( 2005) However, its meaning is still not generally 
agreed upon  
Management issues to be 
incorporated 
no 
35 Zwikael and Ahn(2011) Perceived levels of project risk 
Intensity of risk management processes 
Risk management no 
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 Project extension 
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 Long term goal 
Project management no 
17 Kloppenborg, Tesh and 
Manolis (2014) 
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 Meeting agreement 
 Customer’s success 
Empirical life cycle stage 
investigation 
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18 Lim and Mohammed(1999) Use of micro and macro criteria Management concept no 
19 Lipovetsky et al (1997) Meeting design and planning goals 
Customer benefits 
Benefit to defense and national 
infrastructure 
 
Project management techniques 
 
no 
20 Mir and Pinnnington (2014) Variables which employees can relate 
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Project management framework no 
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Appendix VIII  –  Interview Schedules 
Causes of corruption 
Causes de la corruption 
1 What are the common causes of corruption in bank-financed projects? 
Quelles sont les causes courantes de corruption dans les projets financés par la Banque? 
2 Why do you think the contractors are willing to corrupt? 
Pourquoi pensez-vous que les entrepreneurs sont disposés à corrompre? 
2a Probe - Who are the professional working on the projects more likely to engage in corrupt 
activities? 
Explorer - Qui sont les professionnels les plus susceptibles de s’engager dans des activités 
corrompues dans le cadre des projets? 
3 Do you feel that governments are doing much to discourage corruption in bank-financed 
projects? 
Pensez-vous que les gouvernements prennent des mesures importantes pour décourager la 
corruption dans les projets financés par la Banque? 
3a Probe - What are the key reasons that encouraged such inaction? 
Explorer - Quelles sont les principales raisons qui ont encouragé une telle inaction? 
Nature of corruption 
4 Do you think the culture of the country and/or the culture of the organization encourages a 
culture corruption? 
Pensez-vous que la culture du pays et / ou la culture de l'organisation encourage la culture de la 
corruption? 
4a Probe - Which one is predominant in a bank-financed project? 
Explorer – Quel est l’élément prédominant dans un projet financé par une banque? 
 
4b 
Probe – To what extent, do you think the culture of the country or the culture of the 
organization is predominant? Why?  
Is it more the local culture or the imported culture? 
Explorer - Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que la culture du pays ou celle de l'organisation est 
prédominante? Pourquoi? 
Est-ce surtout la culture locale ou la culture importée? 
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5 Do you agree with the definition of corruption as the use of public office for private gain? 
Why? 
Êtes-vous pour ou contre la définition de la corruption comme étant l’utilisation de la fonction 
publique à des fins personnelles? Pourquoi? 
6 What according to you should the most appropriate definition of corruption? 
Selon vous, quelle devrait être la définition la plus appropriée de la corruption? 
7 Do you think the mastermind behind the corrupt act is the employee or the corporate?  
Le cerveau de l'acte de corruption est-il l'employé ou l'entreprise? Qu’en pensez-vous? 
What are the consequences of corruption? 
Quelles sont les conséquences de la corruption? 
8 Why are corruption so prevalent in bank-financed projects? 
Pourquoi la corruption est-elle si répandue dans les projets financés par la Banque? 
9 How corruption can affects a project?  
Comment la corruption peut-elle affecter un projet? 
9a Probe - What are consequences of corruption in a bank-financed project? 
Explorer - Quelles sont les conséquences de la corruption dans un projet financé par une banque? 
10 Can we say that the allegations received by MDBs represent the tips of the iceberg? 
Peut-on dire que les allégations reçues par les BMD représentent la pointe de l'iceberg? 
11 Are the sanctionable practices in MDBs wide enough to cover all types of corruption? 
Les pratiques sanctionnables dans les BMD sont-elles suffisamment extensives pour couvrir 
tous les types de corruption? 
11a Probe - What are prevalent corruption offences that are not covered? 
Explorer - Quelles sont les infractions de corruption courantes qui ne sont pas couvertes? 
Sanctions process 
Processus de sanctions 
12 To what extent do you agree that Negotiated Agreement with corrupt firms are appropriate? 
Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord pour dire qu'un accord négocié avec des entreprises 
corrompues est approprié? 
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12a Probe - How far it acts as a deterrent? 
Probe - Dans quelle mesure agit-il comme moyen de dissuasion? 
12b Do you consider it to be a fair process? And Why? 
Estimez-vous que c'est un processus juste? Et pourquoi? 
Deterrent measures 
Measures dissuasif 
13 How far do you think the investigation strategy of MDBs are efficient to discourage 
corruption? What can MDBs do differently? 
Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que la stratégie d'enquête des banques multilatérales de 
développement est efficace pour décourager la corruption? Que peuvent faire les BMD 
différemment? 
14 Are Sanctions appropriate to bring an anti-corruption culture? How far are they effective? 
Les sanctions sont-elles appropriées pour instaurer une culture anti-corruption? Dans quelle 
mesure sont-elles efficaces? 
14a Does it have a deterrent effect? 
Cela a-t-il un effet dissuasif? 
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Appendix IX – Form UPR16 
 
 
